The electoral success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in West Bengal represents a significant structural change along India’s eastern border, with important implications for India-Bangladesh relations.

West Bengal serves as India’s primary gateway to Bangladesh, characterised by an extensive, porous border, a substantial share of bilateral trade, and a central role as both a cultural and economic link between the two countries.

Historically, India-Bangladesh relations were perceived as contingent upon the political leadership in Bangladesh. Relations were considered stable when the Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina was in power in Dhaka.

However, ambiguity has consistently prevailed during the multiple tenures of the Khaleda Zia-led Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). This perception was reinforced when the Dhaka-Delhi bilateral relations deteriorated following Sheikh Hasina’s exit on August 5, 2024, following the July Uprising.

Lok Sabha Speaker, who represented India at Tarique Rahman's swearing-in, meeting the new Prime Minister (left), and India's Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri meets Shafiqur Rahman, the Amir of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (right)

Despite expectations of stability after the parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, limited progress has occurred since BNP leader Tarique Rahman took charge as prime minister following the historic election in February this year.

Simultaneously, the BJP’s win in West Bengal in the April assembly election has introduced additional complexities to India-Bangladesh relations. While bilateral dynamics were previously determined primarily by political developments in Bangladesh, the political context in West Bengal has now become a comparably significant factor.

This analysis evaluates the changing dynamics of India-Bangladesh relations following the BJP’s rise to power in West Bengal. This part examines key developments including the appointment of the new Indian High Commissioner, controversies surrounding Zahed Ur Rahman, one of Tarique Rahman's advisors, the ‘push-in’ issue and border killings.

A ‘walking distance’

An important paradigm shift is visible in the appointment of India’s high commissioner in Dhaka.  For the first time in the 55-year history of relations between the two neighbouring countries, India has appointed a political leader as High Commissioner to Bangladesh.

Veteran political leader Dinesh Trivedi, who served as Union Minister in the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and had switched to the BJP in 2021, was appointed as the High Commissioner to Dhaka, replacing incumbent Pranay Verma.

In addition, the Modi government also appointed, on June 24th, Dinesh Trivedi as a Cabinet Minister (Purna Mantri) in the Union Cabinet. Previously, Siddharth Shankar Roy, former Chief Minister of West Bengal, was accorded the rank of full minister during his tenure as India’s ambassador to the United States from 1992 to 1996.

The appointment of Trivedi as High Commissioner indicated a strategic adjustment in India’s approach to bilateral relations. The Modi government’s decision to select a political personality in a key diplomatic role could be seen as an effort to transcend traditional official-level engagement.

Historically, India’s political ambassadorial appointments have been largely confined to the United States. Current assessments in Delhi indicate that a political ambassador may facilitate more effective communication of political messages between Delhi and Dhaka compared to a career diplomat.

However, beyond the diplomatic dimension, the decision to appoint a political figure, having close ties with West Bengal, could also indicate a political plan to strengthen party-to-party engagement between the BJP and BNP. This is an area in which New Delhi and Dhaka have historically been less active compared to China, alongside established diplomatic mechanisms.

Trivedi maintains ties with the three principal parties relevant to Bangladeshi interests in India, though this may change as the Trinamool Congress faces internal challenges following recent electoral outcomes.

His cultural and political ties to West Bengal are regarded as the key consideration in his diplomatic appointment. Effective management of bilateral relations requires the development of both political and governmental communication channels.

Dinesh Trivedi entered Bangladesh at 11:00 AM on June 12, travelling from Kolkata to the Petrapole border in North 24 Parganas rather than by air. After presenting the necessary documentation at the Benapole border, he entered Bangladeshi territory.

India's High Commissioner to Bangladesh Dinesh Trivedi crossing the Petropole border (left), and being received by High Commission officials on the Benapole side (right)

During this entry, the High Commissioner articulated a commitment to advancing cooperation for the benefit of populations on both sides of the border, with particular emphasis on shared environmental and developmental challenges.

Nahid Islam, convener of the National Citizens' Party (NCP), the party formed by student members of the July Uprising, criticised these remarks, stating that the skies of India and Bangladesh are not the same, nor is the soil of the two countries identical. That matter was settled back in 1947, he remarked.

Dinesh Trivedi formally assumed office on 25 June after presenting his credentials to Bangladeshi President Mohammed Shahabuddin at Bangabhaban in Dhaka. In his first visit to the Indian Visa Application Centre (IVAC) in Dhaka, Trivedi “expressed satisfaction over the large number of applicants at the centre,” and announced resumption of normal visa operations for Bangladeshi citizens.

Trivedi also announced the opening of tourist visas through five visa application centres from June 28th. This measure is expected to support approximately 350 hotels in the Marquis Street, Sadar Street, Free School Street, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, and Colin Lane areas of Kolkata, including New Market, which is often referred to as 'Mini Bangladesh,' by facilitating the revival of business activity.

There is renewed anticipation among stakeholders along both borders, from the Changrabandha immigration checkpoint in North Bengal to the Petrapole land port in North 24 Parganas. Travellers, small traders, currency exchange businesses, transport operators, and hotel owners expect a recovery in the border economy following an extended period of reduced activity.

On the map: the border checkpoints and land ports along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border; source - Wikimedia Commons

After the interim government took charge on August 4, 2024, India had suspended the issuance of tourist visas to Bangladeshi nationals. While medical visas for emergency treatment and limited commercial visas were available, tourist travel has nearly ceased.]

This development had directly impacted the economies of border regions, with significant disruptions observed at major land ports such as Changrabandha and Petrapole.

The Hili border in South Dinajpur district of West Bengal facilitates the legal movement of citizens between India and Bangladesh, as well as the import and export of goods. The volume of exports through this land port currently exceeds that of imports.

Trade sources indicate that several years ago, an average of 250 to 300 cargo trucks crossed into Bangladesh daily through this border. In the past two years, this figure has declined to 15-20 trucks per day.

This reduction has adversely affected not only traders’ incomes but also the livelihoods of transport workers, drivers, porters, and other associated professionals.

The border checkpoint at Petrapole on the Indian side

Diplomatic stopover

It is alleged that Zahed Ur Rahman, the Policy and Strategy Affairs Adviser to Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, was prevented from entering Delhi. He was detained at Delhi Airport for two and a half hours. Although he subsequently received the necessary permission to enter the city, Zahed chose not to proceed; instead, he returned to Dhaka via Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Indian Deputy High Commissioner Pawan Badhe following this incident. In addition, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman has described the incident as “unexpected and regrettable”.

India's Ministry of External Affairs stated that although he was questioned at the airport, he was subsequently granted permission to enter India; however, he voluntarily returned to Dhaka.

‘Push-backs’ v. ‘push-ins’

The troubling scenario is unfolding along India’s border with Bangladesh. For the second time in just seven months, West Bengal is witnessing a mass exodus of Bangladeshi who have been living in India after having crossed the border illegally.

The Indian government, meanwhile, is set to launch a ‘Smart Border’ project to secure a stretch of approximately 6,000 kilometres along the borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The first flight of illegal immigrants took place in November 2025, when the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls was announced in West Bengal, months ahead of the assembly election in the state.

Between May 2025 and January 2026, the Border Security Force allegedly ‘pushed’ 2,479 people across into Bangladesh, of whom at least 120 were later confirmed to be Indian nationals.

West Bengal Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari told the state assembly on June 23rd that around 10,000 ‘illegal’ immigrants have been sent back to Bangladesh by the BSF to date. Emphasising his government’s tough stance against ‘illegal infiltrators,’ Adhikari stated that his government would adopt a new “identify, eliminate, and expel” policy.

A day after the West Bengal election results were declared, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman stated that his government would take appropriate measures if incidents of “push-ins” increase under the new government in Kolkata.  

In his briefing of May 7th, the Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson disclosed that the Indian government had sought Dhaka’s cooperation regarding the repatriation of individuals “illegal Bangladeshis” present in the country.  

The recent increase in border crossings has been precipitated by the setting up of holding centres across the state for undocumented migrants awaiting deportation.

In alignment with its stated election commitment to “detect, delete, and deport” undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants, the West Bengal government issued an order on May 23 establishing holding centres in all 23 districts for apprehended foreigners and released foreign prisoners awaiting deportation or repatriation, in accordance with Ministry of Home Affairs guidelines.

Holding centres have been established at 11 locations  across the state to accommodate undocumented migrants. Individuals identified as Bangladeshi and Rohingya nationals are being housed in these centres while repatriation procedures are conducted.

To date, 386 individuals have been placed in these facilities, with the largest concentration in Basirhat, North 24 Parganas, where the number exceeds 300.

The first two holding centres were set up on May 24 in the Muslim-majority districts of Malda and Murshidabad that share a border with Bangladesh, and nine more have been established in less than a week.

According to reports, as of May 29, more than 380 Bangladeshi nationals were housed in these centres. They are being allowed to enter Bangladesh after their national identity has been verified.

As of early June, over 152 Bangladeshi nationals were awaiting repatriation at the Hakimpur Check Post in Basirhat, while around 273 Bangladeshi nationals are housed across three holding centres, including in Baduria and Swarupnagar.

A notable aspect is the different terminologies used by both countries on this issue. India refers to these actions as “pushbacks,” a term originating in European and American border enforcement that typically implies interception during border crossings.

However, many individuals included in these statistics were apprehended in states such as Maharashtra, Assam, and Delhi and subsequently transported to the border. The occurrence of Indian nationals among those sent to Bangladesh further complicates the term’s applicability.

Conversely, Bangladesh uses the term “push-ins.”

A  large number of Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) personnel have been deployed along the borders of 26 districts in Bangladesh to prevent the BSF from pushing individuals, including women and children, into the country. Besides round-the-clock surveillance, local residents are also reportedly assisting the BGB at various points along the border.

There have been reports of tussles between the border personnel on both sides, followed by flag meetings, though the BSF had reportedly refused to take back those stranded at the zero line. The Bangladesh media had reported the BGB having foiled multiple ‘push-in’ attempts in June, across border points in Kormudanga, Darshana International Check Post, Borokhata and Poishottibari border points.

According to these reports, around 88 people were stranded in no-man’s land, following these tussles. According to the Human Rights Support Society, at least 166 people were pushed into Bangladesh in May alone.

Personnel of the Border Guards Bangladesh (left), and India's Border Security Force (right) patrol their sides of the border

The border still bleeds

On the other hand, border killings remain a major irritant between the two nations. According to the human rights organisation Ain O Salish Kendra’s yearly human rights report, 34 Bangladeshis were killed by the BSF in 2025.

Of them, 24 were killed in BSF firing, and 10 others died after facing physical torture by the BSF. The ASK data also showed that the number of border killings was 30 in 2024, 31 in 2023, 23 in 2022 and 18 in 2021.

Besides killings by the BSF, the Khasis on the Indian side have been allegedly involved in the targeting and killing of Bangladeshis along the border, especially in the Sylhet Division.

Apart from the killings in 2025, at least 38 Bangladeshis sustained bullet injuries or were allegedly tortured, besides allegations of the BSF ‘abducting’14 Bangladeshis. Of the ‘abducted’ victims, only four were returned to Bangladesh, according to ASK.

At the 57th Border Coordination Conference between the BSF and BGB held in New Delhi from 8-11 June, both sides reviewed issues like illegal crossings, border security, and trans-border crime during a four-day coordination conference in Delhi. Both sides had agreed to step up joint initiatives to bring incidents such as border killings, attacks, and illegal infiltration down to zero.

The political quotient

The BJP’s rise to power in West Bengal has introduced a significant new dimension to India-Bangladesh relations. Historically, the trajectory of bilateral relations was assessed primarily through the political contexts of Dhaka and New Delhi.

Recent developments indicate that Kolkata has become an equally influential determinant of the relationship’s future. West Bengal’s geographic location, border economy, cultural ties, and political significance make its domestic politics integral to India’s policy toward Bangladesh.

The appointment of Dinesh Trivedi as the High Commissioner could be reflective of New Delhi’s attempt to move beyond conventional diplomacy and engage Dhaka through political channels.

Trivedi’s symbolic entry through the land border, the resumption of tourist visa services, and the renewed attention to cross-border trade indicate that India recognises the importance of people-to-people and economy-to-economy links.

West Bengal Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari in discussion with police and administrative officials

Yet these positive signals are being overshadowed by rising tensions over alleged push-ins, detention centres, border killings, and the treatment of undocumented migrants.

As a result, India-Bangladesh relations now stand at a delicate crossroads. On one side, there is the possibility of renewed engagement through trade, travel, diplomacy, and political dialogue. On the other, hardline border policies and nationalist rhetoric risk deepening mistrust between the two neighbours.

If both countries fail to manage these tensions carefully, the border may become not a bridge of shared history and commerce, but a line of confrontation.

Therefore, the future of India-Bangladesh relations will depend not only on who governs in Dhaka or New Delhi, but also on how West Bengal’s new political leadership chooses to handle its border, its economy, and its historic connection with Bangladesh.

A stable relationship will require restraint, humane border management, diplomatic sensitivity, and recognition that the people living on both sides of the frontier are deeply connected by history, livelihood, and geography.

Without that understanding, the promise of cooperation may be overtaken by suspicion, confrontation, and recurring crises along one of South Asia’s most important borders.

(Views expressed in this report are the author's own.)

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