The GCC nations of the Persian Gulf had traditionally relied on Washington and its allies for security and stability in the region. The ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict, however, has belied that faith as the US, under the Trump administration, has pushed them towards a strategic realignment. With growing economic interdependence with Asian powers like China, India, Japan and South Korea, besides promising ties with Islamic neighbours like Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey, leaderships in the Gulf are increasingly asking which relationship better serves their future – military or economic? Emerging from this rethinking about security benefits and strategic liabilities of the traditional dependence on Western powers is a regional ‘self-help’ sentiment with West Asian power elites seeking diversified partnerships and reduced dependence on any single external power, points out Professor Swaran Singh in the 25th edition of Asia Watch.
Home page image: US President Donald Trump at the Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, in May 2025, a month before the Twelve-Day War
Text page image: President Trump delivers remarks at the US-Saudi Investment Forum in November 2025
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The most telling symbol of America’s changing fortunes in West Asia is not the current status and number of its troops, aircraft carriers, or military bases in the region.
It is a simple fact that, despite possessing the region’s most formidable military power, Washington appears increasingly unable to guarantee the security of maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz or to deliver any durable settlement of this region’s long-standing conflicts and contestations.
For decades, the United States justified its extensive military presence in the Persian Gulf on the promise of three public goods: freedom of navigation, regional stability, and deterrence against Iran. Today, all three appear increasingly uncertain, creating a crisis of confidence amongst its regional partner nations.
Saudi King Fahd with US President Ronald Reagan in 1985, with Ivana and Donald Trump by their side (left), and King Ibn Saud converses with President Franklin D. Roosevelt on board the USS Quincy, after the Yalta Conference in 1945 (right); images courtesy - Wikimedia Commons
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most strategically vital chokepoints. According to UNCTAD estimates, 29 per cent of the world’s liquified natural gas and 38 per cent of the world’s crude oil transits through these waters.
Most of these are destined for Asian nations like China, India, Japan, and South Korea.
The same estimates also show that the average number of ships crossing the Strait of Hormuz before the US-Israeli strikes of 28th February, which stood at 129 ships a day, has dropped to single digits since the 1st of March.
While Japan and South Korea, which import respectively 90 and 70 per cent of their crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz, are military allies of the United States, the last three decades have witnessed India, importing nearly 50 per cent of its crude oil through the same waters, building a closer friendship with Washington.
Yet, the recurrent crises since the early 1990s have repeatedly exposed the vulnerability of regional trade despite the presence of over 50,000 American troops, permanently stationed in this region.
Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz bids farewell to President Barack Obama at Erga Palace in Riyadh (left), and President Joe Biden and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in July 2022; images courtesy - White House
Equally significant is Washington’s inability to produce a durable solution to the Iranian nuclear question that lies at the centre of regional crisis almost since Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Successive American administrations have oscillated between diplomacy, sanctions, maximum pressure and military deterrence. Yet, Iran’s nuclear capabilities have continued to advance its uranium enrichment, besides expanding its long-range missile capabilities – in full exhibit during the beginning of the ongoing conflict – even as regional anxieties deepened.
Even more troubling for America’s regional partners is the persistence of Iran’s network of proxies, stretching from Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq to Yemen. Despite decades of American military engagement, these challenges remain unresolved.
The result is a growing perception among its Gulf allies that the ability of the United States, despite remaining militarily powerful, to shape political outcomes has, to put it mildly, diminished.
The growing confidence deficit
The Gulf monarchies once viewed the United States as the indispensable guarantor of regional order, or better, their regime security. That confidence of theirs has steadily eroded.
The attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in 2019 were widely interpreted as a turning point.
Despite the strategic significance of these targets and the implications for global energy markets, many Gulf leaders concluded that the response from Washington — which had fought destructive wars against Iraq (1991, 1998, 2001), Yemen (2001), Libya (2011), and Syria (2014) — had repeatedly fallen short of their expectations.
Each of these episodes has reinforced doubts about the efficacy of American power.
The gradual American retrenchment from the region over the last decade, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, fluctuating or inconsistent approach towards Iran across successive administrations, and their inability to prevent recurring regional escalations, have all contributed to a growing sense that Gulf security can no longer depend exclusively on Washington.
President Trump with Saudi prince Mohammed bin Salman (left), and with UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (right)
As a consequence, regional states have increasingly begun hedging their bets. Rather than abandoning the United States, they have sought to diversify their partnerships with other emerging Asian powers.
Accordingly, the Gulf’s strategic vocabulary has shifted from dependence on former colonial powers to autonomy-driven partnerships across Asia.
While American influence has increasingly rested on military assets, Asia’s influence has been built on trade, investment, energy, technology, strategic mineral resources, connectivity and infrastructure.
The Asian economic century
The numbers tell a compelling story. China’s annual trade with the broader Middle East is now nearly half a trillion dollars. India’s trade approaches a quarter trillion dollars. For the year 2024, Japan’s trade with just the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations was USD 115 billion, while South Korea's total trade with the Middle East stood at USD 144 billion.
By comparison, the total US trade with the GCC for 2024 was USD 120 billion. This is despite the US being a USD 32 trillion economy, compared to Japan, India and South Korea standing at USD 4.3, USD 4.1 and USD 1.9 billion, respectively.
Chinese President Xi Jinping with Mohammed bin Salman (left), and Xi Jinping escorts the UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan during the guard of honour at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing
But what makes this intriguing is that this transformation represents more than changing trade statistics. It reflects a deeper shift in this region’s economic geography.
China has become the largest trading partner of most Gulf states. Chinese companies have built ports, industrial zones, digital infrastructure, logistics hubs, and renewable-energy projects across the region.
Beijing’s diplomatic role has since graduated to facilitating the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement, highlighting Beijing’s growing political relevance.
India’s engagement has expanded even more rapidly. Nearly ten million Indian expatriates work across the Gulf region. The Gulf supplies a substantial share of India’s energy requirements and fertilisers while India provides them with food security, pharmaceuticals, services, skilled labour, technology and investment opportunities.
Japan and South Korea have similarly deepened their stakes. Both depend heavily on Gulf hydrocarbons. In return, they provide advanced manufacturing, technology, engineering services, automobiles, electronics, infrastructure, and industrial expertise.
Economic interdependence has become structural rather than transactional. The result is a new regional reality: the prosperity of West Asia increasingly depends upon Asia.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi in conversation with King Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia (left), and with UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on the sidelines of the16th BRICS Summit in Kazan (right)
From dependence to interdependence
The relationship that nations of West Asia seek is not of a one-sided dependence but of interdependence.
India, Japan, South Korea, and China depend upon West Asia for oil, gas, petrochemicals, and fertilisers. West Asian economies depend on these Asian partners for food imports, consumer goods, technology, construction services, industrial equipment, and investment.
This mutual dependence has created a dense network of economic linkages that contrasts sharply with America’s increasingly security-centric regional presence.
No doubt, Washington remains this region’s principal military actor with diplomatic and intelligence leverage. Yet, Asian powers have come to be their principal economic stakeholders.
The distinction is increasingly consequential. Economic partners possess long-term incentives for stability, connectivity, and growth prospects. Military partners, on the other hand, are often associated with crises, conflicts, and deterrence.
Increasingly, Gulf policymakers are asking which relationship better serves their future.
The United States still maintains one of the world’s most extensive overseas military networks in West Asia.
Major US military facilities include the Udeid Air Base in Qatar that houses the headquarters of the US Central Command’s forward operations and the Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which is home of the US Fifth Fleet. There are several major US facilities in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) besides additional deployments across Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere.
Britain also maintains its naval support facility in Bahrain while France operates the Camp de la Paix in Abu Dhabi, which was in the news when hit by Iran’s Shahed drones early this March.
Together these bases represent a security architecture largely constructed during an era of overwhelming Western dominance. Yet, recent regional crises, including the ongoing Iran conflict, have exposed their vulnerabilities.
An aerial view of 'Log Town' at the Al Udeid Air Base in this 2004 picture (left), and US bases in the Middle East (right); images courtesy - Wikimedia Commons
Iranian missile and drone strikes, direct and indirect threats to US facilities, attacks by Tehran-aligned proxies, and disruptions to commercial shipping have demonstrated that the existence of military bases does not necessarily translate into control over regional geopolitical dynamics.
On the other hand, the concentration of Western military facilities increasingly creates risks for some of these regional governments. As Iran’s threats at the outset of the ongoing conflict showed, hosting American bases had made the GCC states direct targets during military hostilities and resultant escalation.
The closer the strategic relationship with Washington, the greater the possibility of becoming entangled in conflicts not of their own making. This has encouraged regional leaders to rethink the balance between security benefits and strategic liabilities.
Satellite image of the fire at Salalah Port on 13 March 2026 (left), the Haifa refinery after an Iranian missile attack on 19 March 2026 (right); images courtesy - Wikimedia Commons
Towards a post-American region?
Perhaps the most significant development in West Asia is not the decline of American power but the rise of the regional ‘self-help’ sentiment.
The GCC states have been steadily expanding their indigenous military capabilities. Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in defence procurement and indigenous industrialisation. The United Arab Emirates has emerged as one of the region’s most sophisticated military actors.
Joint military exercises, intelligence-sharing arrangements, integrated air-defence discussions, and indigenous defence production have all accelerated.
Regional diplomacy has undergone a similar transformation. The restoration of Saudi-Iran relations, normalisation initiatives among regional rivals, growing GCC coordination, and efforts to reduce tensions reflect an emerging preference for regional management of regional problems.
A Saudi Arabian Air Force helicopter hovers over a religious site (left), and UAE special forces during a training (right)
The logic is straightforward. If external powers cannot reliably guarantee security, regional actors must increasingly provide it themselves.
Without doubt, the United States remains the most powerful military actor in West Asia. No other country, including the US allies like the United Kingdom or France, possesses comparable force-projection capabilities, alliance networks, intelligence infrastructure, or naval assets.
Yet power and influence are no longer synonymous.
Over the decades, the prosperity of West Asia has come to be increasingly intertwined with the Asia-Pacific rather than the Atlantic world. China has become indispensable economically, while the US views it as its geopolitical rival in the region.
India has become essential demographically and commercially. Japan and South Korea remain critical energy and technology partners. The future of West Asia’s growth and strategic gains clearly lies eastward.
This eastward shift is also visible institutionally. The expanded BRICS Plus grouping now includes new Gulf members like Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, as well as Egypt and Indonesia alongside BRICS founding members like China and India, besides the BRICS new Asian partner nations including Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
Whatever its limitations, this BRICS enlargement reflects a broader geopolitical trend that matches these West Asian states seeking diversified partnerships and reduced dependence on any single external power.
Saudi Arabian defence officers with their visiting French counterparts (left) and UAE defence officers with the Australian Navy chief (right)
The ‘Asian future’ of West Asia
The emerging story of West Asia is not one of sudden American military withdrawal or dramatic collapse. It is the quieter but more profound story of gradual transformation in America’s global relevance.
Even today, in the midst of its self-inflicted war against Iran, the United States continues to deploy troops, aircraft, fleets, and military bases. Yet in spite of this immense presence, it struggles to resolve its Iranian challenge to ensure lasting regional stability, let alone shape political outcomes as decisively as it once did.
Asian interlocutors like Egypt, Oman, Qatar, Turkey, and Pakistan have become primary actors for ensuring sustainability of President Donald Trump’s fragile ceasefire.
For decades, West Asia’s strategic map was drawn in Washington, London and Paris. Today, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian partners are becoming ever more central to the region’s economic future.
Increasingly, West Asia’s economic map is being drawn by Beijing, New Delhi, Tokyo, Seoul, and other Asian capitals. As history tells us, when economic gravity shifts, political influence eventually follows.
A US Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft refuels an F-35A Lightning II midair (left), and a 2009 picture of a KC-135 Stratotanker at the Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar (right)
The objective of these West Asian leaders is not to replace Washington with Beijing or New Delhi. It is to create a more plural regional order in which multiple partners can contribute to shared prosperity while regional actors are allowed to assume greater responsibility for their own security and success.
Hence, it is not that American power has disappeared altogether. What it means is that the region’s centre of gravity has been moving unstoppably eastwards.
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