Voting is just hours away for the February 12^th national election and referendum in Bangladesh. The Election Commission (EC) has completed its administrative preparations, achieving full readiness through the nationwide distribution of ballot papers.

A defining feature of this cycle is the ‘Postal Vote BD’ app, which has enabled 1.53 million citizens—including expatriates, government officials, and over 6,200 incarcerated voters—to cast their ballots remotely. As of early February, hundreds of thousands of these postal ballots have already been sent to returning officers, marking a historic expansion of the democratic franchise.

In an unprecedented move, 142 Imams and Khatibs will serve as observers. These religious leaders will visit polling stations nationwide to monitor the electoral process, adding a new dimension to oversight mechanisms. This observation contingent will be complemented by 330 international observers from 16 countries and six major organisations, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the European Union (EU), and the Commonwealth.

Image: Jamaat-e-Islami (left) and BNP leaders (right) holding up their election symbols

To ensure transparency and public confidence, the government has integrated election support into the toll-free national 333 helpline, providing voters with verified information on polling locations, electoral rules, and digital tools, while also serving as an early-warning system to maintain order. With nearly 900,000 security personnel deployed and advanced monitoring technology in place, the interim government has finalised preparations for what electoral analysts expect to be a pivotal moment in Bangladesh’s political trajectory.

A total of 1,981 candidates are competing across 298 constituencies, with 1,732 representing 51 registered political parties and 249 running as independents. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leads with candidates in 288 seats, followed by Islami Andolan Bangladesh (253), Jamaat-e-Islami (224), and the Jatiya Party (192).

The youth-led National Citizens Party (NCP), emerging from the 2024 student uprising, is contesting 32 seats. Other notable parties include Gono Odhikar Parishad (90), the Communist Party of Bangladesh (65), and Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (39). The Awami League remains suspended and is not participating in this cycle, fundamentally altering the conventional political calculus.

Inclusivity remains a persistent challenge in Bangladesh’s electoral landscape. Thirty of the 51 registered parties have fielded no female nominees whatsoever. Only 76 women—roughly 4 per cent of total candidates—are in the race, with the BNP fielding 10, the NCP 3, and the JeI nominating none.

Representation of religious and ethnic minorities comprises 80 candidates, 68 of whom were nominated by parties such as the CPB, which fielded 17 candidates, and the BNP. While 10 of these candidates are women, the election’s only transgender candidate, Anwara Islami Rani, withdrew from the Rangpur-3 race at the last moment, leaving no representation from this community in the final count.

An analysis by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) of candidate affidavits reveals a stark financial stratification among participants. The electoral field features 891 millionaires and 27 billionaires, with the BNP accounting for 16 of the billionaires and another nine running as BNP-aligned independents.

Collectively, candidates hold loans totalling Tk 18,868 crore, with the BNP carrying the heaviest debt burden: nearly 60 per cent of its 288 nominees report outstanding debts. This concentration of wealth stands in sharp contrast to grassroots candidates who are leveraging alternative financing mechanisms.

Tariq Rahman of the Am Janata Party, contesting Dhaka-12 and dubbed “Aam Tariq,” is the poorest contender with declared assets of just over Tk 10 lakh and no major property holdings. To bypass conventional ‘black money’ dynamics in campaign finance. Candidates such as Monisha Chakraborty (BASAD, Barishal-5) and independent Mizanur Rahman (Dhaka-4) are utilising crowdfunding mechanisms—collecting small donations via piggy banks and social media campaigns—to power their electoral efforts and represent the working class.

Bangladesh’s election campaign landscape has fundamentally shifted from traditional posters to a high-stakes digital battleground. With revised electoral rules banning physical posters, major parties such as the BNP, JeI, and the NCP have invested approximately Tk 2.8 crore (USD 233,331) in Meta advertisements alone.

This technology-driven approach specifically targets the Gen-Z vote, as nearly 44 per cent of the electorate is under 35. The digital campaign space is now defined by viral content strategies, including meme-driven political messaging, professionally produced video documentaries, and highly polished campaign songs designed for social media distribution.

Each major party has introduced distinctive digital tools to engage this demographically crucial young electorate. The BNP has launched ‘Match My Policy,’ an interactive app designed to incorporate youth opinions into national governance frameworks, alongside regular podcasts hosted by Tarique Rahman.

The JeI has achieved significant viral success with its ‘Balance Scale’ theme song, which advocates a departure from traditional party symbols and has been widely shared across platforms. Meanwhile, the NCP, born directly from the 2024 student movement, has gained substantial traction with youth-centric video content and its own ‘Shapla-koli’ theme song.

This digital transformation marks the 2026 election as the most technologically sophisticated in Bangladesh’s electoral history, in which social media influencers and information technology firms have effectively supplanted traditional street-level organisers as the primary drivers of the political narrative.

Recent polling data indicates a statistically competitive race between the political forces. The People’s Election Pulse Survey (PEPS) shows the BNP at 34.7 per cent, the JeI at 33.6 per cent, and the NCP and smaller parties trailing. While BNP’s Tarique Rahman is the leading choice for the next head of government at 47.6 per cent, JeI holds a significant advantage among the youth, emerging as the top preference for 37.4 per cent of first-time voters.

Image: Political parties contesting the election - I

With the Awami League barred from participation, both major blocs are now competing for 22 traditional AL strongholds, including Gopalganj and Madaripur. At the same time, the BNP seeks to defend its 33 established bastions, including Bogura and Feni.

Patterns of voter migration further evidence the shifting political landscape. Nearly half of former Awami League supporters now lean toward the BNP, and nearly 30 per cent have shifted toward the JeI.

This mass realignment, combined with a 17per cent undecided general electorate and one-fifth of young voters yet to commit to any political party, suggests that swing constituencies and uncommitted voters will ultimately determine the outcome. The competition for these uncommitted voices remains the focal point for all major alliances as the election approaches.

In a significant development that has reshaped alliance calculations, Islami Andolan Bangladesh (IAB), led by the Pir of Charmonai, Syed Rezaul Karim, withdrew from its alliance with JeI to contest independently. Citing disagreements over seat-sharing arrangements and perceived ideological deviations, IAB spokesperson Gazi Ataur Rahman confirmed that the party has fielded candidates in 268 constituencies and will support ‘honest candidates’ in the remaining 32 seats.

This exit has fractured the previously anticipated unified Islamist front, moving the party away from the “one-box” electoral strategy that many analysts had expected would consolidate religious conservative votes. Following the IAB’s departure, the JeI has consolidated its remaining partnerships into a 10-party reconfigured alliance that includes the NCP.

This bloc has finalised a seat-sharing agreement covering 253 constituencies, with three seats remaining open for multiple partners to contest. Despite the split, both the IAB and the JeI-led alliance continue to campaign in support of the national constitutional referendum, even as they now compete against each other in the general parliamentary race.

In the Dhaka Division, the total number of parliamentary seats is distributed across the districts. In the constituencies surrounding the capital, Dhaka, the 13th national parliamentary election is characterised by a high-stakes rivalry between the BNP and the JeI, further complicated by internal party friction and the emergence of the NCP as an important force.

Image: Political parties contesting the elections - II

The nomination scrutiny process has produced crowded fields in several constituencies, including Dhaka-1 (five candidates), Dhaka-3 (eight candidates), and Dhaka-19 (nine validated candidates).

The NCP has fielded eight candidates across the Dhaka division. Among them, Engineer Nabila Tasnid (Dhaka-20) reports the highest assets at Tk 5 crore, followed by Tareq Ahmed Adel (Dhaka-7) with Tk 4 crore. In contrast, party convener Nahid Islam (Dhaka-11) reports no immovable property holdings.

Despite their high educational qualifications and recent revolutionary credentials, the NCP has faced internal organisational turmoil, including the resignation of 15 central leaders over the party’s electoral alliance with the JeI, raising questions on the coalition’s stability.

Dhaka Division

Constituency dynamics vary significantly across the metropolitan region. In Dhaka-1, BNP’s Khandaker Abu Ashfaq has successfully unified previously fractious internal party factions to face the JeI’s Mohammad Nazrul Islam in what is expected to be a closely contested race. Dhaka-3 features a high-profile clash between BNP’s Goyeshwar Chandra Roy, a veteran party figure, and the JeI’s Shahinur Islam, making it one of the division’s most-watched contests.

Meanwhile, Dhaka-9 has emerged as the “litmus test” for new political voices, where independent Dr Tasnim Jara—running under the “Football” symbol—challenges both BNP veteran Habibur Rashid and NCP’s Javed Rasin, testing whether youth appeal can overcome established party machinery.

In Dhaka-15, six valid candidates remain after EC scrutiny, including JeI leader Md. Shafiqur Rahman, while BNP party chairman Tarique Rahman is contesting from the prestigious Dhaka-17 seat, is adding national significance to the battle for Dhaka.

Image: Map of Dhaka Division and districts; photo credit - Wikimedia Commons

In the heart of the capital, the contest for Dhaka-8 has taken a sombre dimension following the killing of activist Sharif Osman Hadi during the campaign period. In this charged atmosphere, BNP’s Mirza Abbas faces NCP’s Nasiruddin Patwary, who is backed by the JeI-led11-party alliance and vowed to dismantle what he characterises as “old political culture.”

Dhaka-12 has become what local observers call the “Battle of the Saifuls,” where BNP-supported Saiful Huq competes against rebel candidate Saiful Alam Nirob and JeI-backed Saiful Alam Khan Milon, creating potential voter confusion and a divided opposition.

In industrial hubs such as Savar (Dhaka-19) and Dhamrai (Dhaka-20), the central electoral narrative remains a struggle between the BNP’s traditional organisational dominance and the emerging grassroots strength of the JeI-led NCP alliance, which has mobilised effectively in blue-collar neighbourhoods.

In the constituencies of Munshiganj, Gopalganj, and Narayanganj, the political landscape is being fundamentally reshaped by internal party strife and the conspicuous absence of the Awami League. In Munshiganj, the BNP faces severe internal rifts, particularly in Munshiganj-1 and Munshiganj-3, where official party nominees are being challenged by high-profile “rebel” independent candidates within the party's organisational structure.

This internal friction has created openings for candidates from the JeI and its alliance to position themselves as viable alternatives, capitalising on the potential for a split in the BNP votebank. In Munshiganj-2, however, the BNP has achieved greater internal stability and unity, while the alliance has strategically backed the NCP to offer voters what it characterises as a “third option” beyond traditional party politics.

Gopalganj, historically an impenetrable Awami League fortress and the ancestral home of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has undergone a dramatic political transformation. With the AL currently suspended from participation, the district has become a genuinely competitive battleground for the BNP and the JeI, both of which are aggressively courting former AL supporters and attempting to build new coalition bases on the AL’s fractured remnants.

High-profile contests, such as in Gopalganj-3—formerly Sheikh Hasina’s own seat—now feature direct clashes between the BNP’s volunteer wing president, S.M. Jilani, and the JeI’s district Amir, M.M. Rezaul Karim. This shift marks a historic departure from decades of essentially uncontested politics in the district.

In Narayanganj, a similar pattern of BNP’s internal turmoil is complicating electoral mathematics in three out of five constituencies. In Narayanganj-2, 3, and 4, the primary competition is not against external rivals but between the party’s official nominees and expelled “rebel” leaders who retain substantial local followings.

These former MPs and local power brokers have refused to withdraw from the race despite party expulsion orders, creating uncertainty and forcing rapid recalculations of voter allegiances. Across all three districts, the ability of party central leadership to manage these grassroots rebellions and enforce organisational discipline will likely prove the determining factor on the pathway to the Parliament.

Chattogram Division

In Chattogram, the total number of parliamentary seats is spread across districts. Here, the 13th national parliamentary election replicates the pattern of stark financial disparities among candidates and persistent friction within electoral alliances. The JeI has fielded 14 professionals across the division, including doctors and businesspeople, with Mohammad Faridul Alam (Chattogram-12) emerging as the wealthiest among the JeI candidates with assets totalling Tk 8.40 crores.

However, even wealthier businesspeople dominate the BNP’s lineup of 17 candidates. Mohammad Aslam Chowdhury (Chattogram-4) holds property valued at over Tk 430 crore, while Jasim Uddin Ahmed (Chattogram-14) leads in liquid wealth with Tk 15 crore in cash holdings.

Notably, spousal wealth often exceeds that of the candidates themselves; for example, Shamanjar Shyama Khan, the wife of Humam Quader Chowdhury, holds Tk 26.96 crore in cash, highlighting the concentration of family wealth in political candidacies.

Electoral complications are most visibly manifested in Chattogram-8 (Boalkhali–Chandgaon), where alliance coordination has broken down. Despite a formal seat-sharing agreement between the parties, the NCP candidate, Zubairul Hasan Arif, faces significant confusion because JeI workers continue to campaign for their own candidate, Dr Md. Abu Naser, whose “Balance Scale” symbol remains on the ballot due to a missed withdrawal deadline.

Image: Map of Chittagong or Chattogram Division and its districts; photo credit - Wikimedia Commons

This confusion leaves the constituency’s 549,136 voters uncertain about which candidate genuinely represents the alliance, potentially benefiting Ershaed Ullah, the BNP’s primary contender, and who stands to benefit from opposition disarray.

Similar to the contestation in the national capital, the BNP confronts internal “rebel” challenges in Chattogram-16 (Banshkhali) and Chattogram-14 (Chandanaish), undermining party unity in critical constituencies. In Banshkhali, the expulsion of local leader Liaquat Ali has not deterred him from running as an independent against the party’s official nominee, Mishkatul Islam Chowdhury Pappu.

Similarly, in Chattogram-14, the candidacies of Shafiqul Islam Rahi and Advocate Mizanul Haque Chowdhury as independents threaten to fragment the BNP’s established vote base, creating a volatile environment where internal dissent and organisational indiscipline may prove as decisive as competition between rival parties.

The Feni district is poised for a historic electoral contest with 1,330,924 registered voters. Despite being the ancestral home of Begum Khaleda Zia and a stronghold of the previous BNP-JeI alliance, a dominant youth demographic—nearly 45 per cent of whom are aged 18 to 37—is expected to be the determining factor here.

Historically, the BNP and JeI contested Feni as a unified four-party alliance, presenting voters with a consolidated opposition front. However, with both parties now running separately and the JeI’s reconfigured alliance including the NCP, electoral analysts anticipate a significant shift in traditional vote-bank calculations, particularly as first-time voters demonstrate interest in modern leadership styles and digital campaign strategies that diverge from established patterns.

The Noakhali district, encompassing six parliamentary constituencies, remains a high-stakes battleground with implications for regional political alignments. While these seats functioned as BNP bastions from 1991 to 2008 before shifting decisively to the now-suspended Awami League, the BNP is launching a heavyweight campaign to reclaim its historical influence in the district.

Electoral competition is intensified by the visible presence of JeI, the NCP, Islami Andolan, and Khelafat Majlish, all of which are conducting aggressive grassroots campaigns and door-to-door mobilisation efforts. This multi-party contest marks a departure from the region’s historical two-party dominance, making Noakhali a key litmus test of the country’s evolving political allegiances and new coalition formations.

Barishal Division

In Barishal, the total number of parliamentary constituencies is spread across the divisions. The 13th national parliamentary election here features 123 candidates vying for these seats. In Barishal district alone, 41 contenders remain for six constituencies following seven withdrawals during the EC scrutiny period.

Despite a substantial female electorate of over 1.12 million out of 2.28 million total voters, female representation remains starkly limited, with only three candidates across the entire division. Dr Manisha Chakraborty (BASD) in Barishal-5, Israt Sultana Elen Bhutto (BNP) in Jhalokati-2, and one independent. The electoral rolls include 20 registered third-gender voters, although no candidate is standing to represent them.

A pronounced financial and legal divide between the BNP and the JeI defines the electoral landscape in the Barishal district. Five of the six BNP candidates qualify as millionaires, led by Mujibur Rahman Sarwar (Barishal-5), with a net worth exceeding Tk 11.37 crore, and Zainul Abedin (Barishal-3), who reports an annual income of Tk 70.56 lakh. In contrast, only one JeI candidate, Maulana Kamrul Islam (Barishal-1), has achieved millionaire status.

While most candidates identify as business professionals, individual profiles vary dramatically. Sardar Sarfuddin Ahmed (Barishal-2) lists “social service” as his profession and reports no declared income, while Rajib Ahsan (Barishal-4) faces 82 legal cases despite being the least wealthy BNP nominee, raising questions about the intersection of legal vulnerability and political candidacy.

Strategic shifts have further complicated the electoral arithmetic in Barishal. The JeI, which has historically won only Pirojpur-1—when Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayedee secured victory in 1996—has fielded candidates in 20 of the 21 constituencies but has strategically ceded Barishal-3 to AB Party’s Asaduzzaman Fuad, as part of broader alliance negotiations.

Tensions within the JeI-led alliance reached a critical point recently, as the IAB withdrew from the coalition due to disputes over seat sharing and ideological differences. Consequently, IAB’s Senior Nayeb-e-Ameer, Syed Faizul Karim, is now contesting independently in both Barishal-5 and Barishal-6, directly challenging the remaining alliance partners and BNP heavyweights in what has become a multi-cornered contest.

Image: Map of Barishal Division and its districts; photo credit - Wikimedia Commons

In the southern districts of Bhola, Patuakhali, and Jhalakathi, the electoral landscape is being shaped by internal party dissent and the persistence of legacy politics. In Patuakhali-3, alliance candidate VP Nur faces a formidable challenge from expelled BNP leader Hasan Mamun, who is running as an independent with widespread support from local party activists rejecting the central leader’s nominee.

This internal rebellion has left Nur in a vulnerable position, forcing him to seek spiritual support at the Charmonai shrine and political reinforcement from alliance partners. Meanwhile, in Bhola-2, independent candidate Taslima Begum has resigned from her local government post to challenge established powers, leveraging her background in social service work and a dedicated team of grassroots supporters to build an alternative political base.

In Barguna-1, the electoral race highlights an instructive contrast between financial wealth and academic credentials among candidates. BNP’s Nazrul Islam Molla emerges as the wealthiest candidate, with assets exceeding Tk 1 crore, although he holds the most modest educational qualification (HSC) among the major contenders. He faces challenges from the JeI’s  Md. Muhibullah and IAB’s Md. Oli Ullah, both of whom hold postgraduate degrees despite possessing significantly fewer financial assets.

This dynamic creates a “wealth vs. education” narrative that resonates differently across voter demographics in the coastal belt, where educational attainment and business success represent competing forms of social capital.

Across Jhalakathi, Pirojpur, and other coastal constituencies, the BNP holds a distinct organisational advantage, bolstered by the established strength of Rafiqul Islam Jamal in Jhalakathi-1 and the historical legacy of Israt Sultana Ellen Bhutto in Jhalakathi-2.

A critical split in the Islamist vote further strengthens the BNP’s electoral momentum, as Islami Andolan is running independently and likely siphoning votes from the JeI coalition. Consequently, traditional party loyalty and family influence remain the dominant drivers of voter behaviour as the February 12 polls approach.

Cumilla Division

Cumilla has 11 parliamentary seats spread across the districts. In Cumilla, the 2, 7, and 9 are replicated, indicating BNP internal friction. Despite central leadership expelling dissenters to consolidate the “sheaf of paddy” under Tarique Rahman’s leadership, independent candidacies by figures such as M. A. Matin Khan (Cumilla-2) and Atiqul Alam Shawon (Cumilla-7) threaten to split the opposition and create openings for the JeI-led alliance.

Financial disclosure statements reveal a pronounced disparity in candidates’ wealth across the district. BNP’s Zakaria Taher Sumon (Cumilla-8) emerges as the district’s wealthiest contender, reporting an annual income of Tk 59.26 crore and movable assets exceeding Tk 191 crore. In contrast, the JeI’s wealthiest candidate, Dr Syed AKM Sarwar Uddin Siddiqui (Cumilla-9), holds Tk 2.94 crore in assets but carries a heavy debt of Tk 2.60 crore.

Educationally, the field is prestigious, with PhD holders such as Khandaker Mosharraf Hossain. The EC has, however, issued warnings of strict penalties for inconsistencies detected in the income reports and affidavits of several veteran leaders, suggesting potential accountability.

The most dramatic shift occurred in Cumilla-4 (Debidwar), where a January 2026 court ruling disqualified BNP veteran Manzurul Ahsan Munshi for defaulting on a Tk 89 crore loan. This legal development paved the way for Hasnat Abdullah, a key leader of the 2024 student uprising and Chief Organiser of the NCP, to emerge as a frontrunner.

Image: The Cumilla Division is to be carved out from the Chittagong Division

Running under the United Bangladesh alliance banner, Abdullah has consolidated support after several rivals, including multiple JeI candidates, withdrew in his favour. Meanwhile, in Cumilla-7, the absence of an official BNP nominee suggests a strategic decision by the party leadership to support its alliance partner, Redwan Ahmed (LDP). However, local grassroots discontent remains palpable among party activists who sought a BNP candidate.

All set for a historic race

The 13th national parliamentary election represents a watershed moment in Bangladesh’s political evolution. With the Awami League suspended, the contest has crystallised into a high-stakes confrontation between former allies: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami, now leading an alliance that includes the student-led National Citizen Party.

This fracturing of the historical BNP-JeI partnership marks a fundamental realignment with unpredictable consequences for post-election governance and stability.

The BNP has fielded 288 candidates but confronts severe organisational challenges. Dozens of “rebel” independent candidates have defied party discipline, threatening to fragment the opposition vote in critical constituencies. This internal friction exposes deeper questions about the party’s capacity to enforce coherence under electoral pressure.

Image: European Union observers are part of the international observers monitoring this election

Conversely, the JeI-led alliance stands to gain from the BNP's disarray while campaigning on structural constitutional reform through the July National Charter referendum—a package that includes prime ministerial term limits and a bicameral parliament, both to be voted on concurrently via a separate pink ballot.

Structural disparities define this cycle with uncommon clarity. Transparency International Bangladesh’s analysis reveals 891 millionaires and 27 billionaires amongst 1,981 candidates. The BNP holds the dubious distinction of fielding both the wealthiest candidates and the most heavily indebted, with nearly 60 per cent reporting outstanding loans.

This raises pointed questions about political accessibility and casts doubt on the BNP’s financial outlook should it form government whilst managing this debt burden. Inclusivity metrics remain troubling: women constitute a mere 4.24 per cent of candidates, whilst the only transgender candidate withdrew, leaving this community unrepresented.

The electorate itself has undergone demographic transformation. Nearly 44 per cent of 127 million registered voters are aged 18 to 37, a cohort that came of age during 15 years of non-competitive polls under Awami League dominance.

Major parties have responded with unprecedented digital campaigns—viral content, Meta advertisements, and interactive applications such as “Match My Policy”—targeting digitally native voters whose priorities differ markedly from those of older generations. Whether they choose established parties or new movements remains the pivotal unknown.

Despite numerous safeguards and international observers, anxieties persist. Internal rebellions, particularly within the BNP, suggest organisational discipline may collapse under pressure. Voter migration patterns from the suspended Awami League create uncertainty, whilst Islami Andolan Bangladesh’s withdrawal from the JeI alliance has produced complex multi-cornered contests, rendering predictions hazardous.

The divisions examined—Dhaka, Chattogram, Barishal, and Cumilla—encompass both the political heartland and critical economic corridors. Outcomes here will prove decisive for establishing the next government’s mandate and legitimacy. Dhaka will determine whether urban youth mobilisation can overcome patronage networks.

Image: While JeI Amir, Shafiqur Rahman (left), will contest from Dhaka 14, BNP chief Tarique Rahman (right) will contest from Dhaka 17 and Bogra

Chattogram will indicate whether the BNP’s southeastern advantages can withstand internal rebellions in the financial capital and across the country. Barishal will test whether coastal communities prioritise economic credentials or educational qualifications. Cumilla will reveal whether student-led movements can translate revolutionary energy into electoral success.

Ultimately, the 2026 election represents less a contest of traditional ideology and more a fundamental test of whether a digitally mobilised generation can navigate entrenched patronage and dynastic politics to establish an accountable democratic order. Or, in turn, the vote bank of an older vintage retains a degree of stability in the outcome.

The Awami League’s absence creates both opportunities for renewal and risks of fragmentation. Whether the next parliament possesses the legitimacy and coherence to address economic challenges, implement constitutional reforms, and manage regional relationships depends substantially on the outcome of this election.

Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture, with democratic consolidation or further instability hanging in the balance.

(Views expressed in this report are the authors' own)

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