In the 1960s, when the Cold War was its peak, Herman Kahn, American physicist and futurist coined the concept of ‘escalation ladder’ to describe how two nuclear powers could intensify their military conflict through a linear escalatory path from the lowest level of military hostilities that could eventually end up in a nuclear confrontation.

While Kahn expanded his initial 16-step escalation ladder to 44 steps, deterrence theorists, over the years, improvised the ladder to explain possible escalatory behaviour of nuclear-armed states.

Since the 1990s, when India and Pakistan came to blows over crises caused by terrorist attacks on Indian soil, western theorists have refined the ‘escalation ladder’ to forecast how the conflict is likely to expand between the two South Asian nuclear-armed neighbours. Many of these forecasts predicted a capability-centric model wherein one of the two, most likely Pakistan, was expected to rapidly move up the ladder in order to gain superiority and have a handle over the escalation dynamics.

Between the 7th May, from the launch of India’s precision strikes on terror infrastructure in Pakistan to the evening of 10th May when the ceasefire came into force, we witnessed a complete distortion of the much-vaunted escalation models as the four-day military hostilities were simultaneously enacted in multiple domains of land and aerial warfare. These include 155 mm guns and mortars used for extensive shelling as well as a wide assortment of aerial platforms ranging from air-launched missiles, including cruise missiles, combat drones, loitering munitions, sub- and supersonic cruise missiles, multi-barrel rocket launchers, short-range theatre missiles, to interceptors lavishly fired from air and missile defence systems.  

Image: Video grabs of the Lashkar-e-Taiba compound in Muridke after the Indian strikes

From the escalation paradigm, the irony about Operation Sindoor versus Operation Bunyan-ul-Marsoos is that the ceasefire happened when both armies were mobilising their ground forces along the border, after extensive use of air power and preliminary progress towards missile platforms.

Conventional escalation models predict conflict to start at the sub-conventional level and moving up to higher levels of confrontations between the land forces – infantry and mechanized infantry – which could even graduate to a limited war (restricted to a theatre like in Kargil) before going up the ladder to other domains, which includes use of air power, variety of missiles, including short-range, tactical, cruise, long-range and so on, before reaching the nuclear level.

In this case, it started with extensive use of air power and was limping towards lower levels of missile force deployment. The ceasefire came not just with the ground troop mobilisation but also the impending possibility of extensive missile deployment.

In fact, there were reports of a Fatah-II missile, with estimated range of around 400 kms, being fired presumedly from a mobile launcher from right across the border and said to be fired towards Delhi (in some reports, stated as a ‘strategic location’), but intercepted by an air defence system at the Sirsa Air Force station.

The firing of Fateh-II was seen as a response to Indian attacks on multiple airbases, and most of them being the frontline air fields like Sargodha, Nur Khan in Rawalpindi, Chaklala, Sukkur, Bholari, Jacobabad, Murid base in Chakwal, and the Rafiqui base in Jhang district of Punjab province, among others - all attacked in one sweeping campaign in the early hours of 10th May. The IAF’s calibrated attack on frontline air bases was an outcome of relentless drone strikes on the Indian bases along the western front. Incidentally, many observers see this campaign as the game-changer of the conflict and one that could have forced Pakistan to consider pushing for a ceasefire, on the American prodding. 

As a symmetrical retaliation to the Fateh-II firing, India could have used the Prahaar (400 kms, if already deployed) or the BrahMos targeting Rawalpindi or Islamabad, which, however, could have resulted in a swift advancement to extensive missile use by both sides.

Pakistan had long held any attack on Rawalpindi, where the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army is situated and Islamabad, the country’s capital, as among the highest tripwires for nuclear use. Similarly, a missile hitting Delhi could have been a tripwire for the Indian side as well, if not for a nuclear first strike, certainly for a massive missile barrage using both land-attack and long-range missiles.

However, the fact that both sides showed the intent to target the most sensitive tripwires of each other showed that escalation to higher levels was just a matter of time, which could have prompted both parties to swiftly agree on the ceasefire.

Nonetheless, the escalation dynamics seen in the four days of military hostilities since 7th May open a new dimension in the character of the India-Pakistan conflict. Despite the Indian precision strikes being on declared terror assets, Pakistan ignored the claim and responded by attacking Indian civilian zones and military bases, which led to the subsequent retaliatory spiral.  

Operation Sindoor and its aftermath, therein, indicate the inability to frame India-Pakistan military hostilities in conventional escalatory models, along with the utter unpredictability of it.

With India now demonstrating its resolve to pursue terror modules located in Pakistani territory – and Indian government today announcing that future terror attacks will be treated as ‘act of war’ – the next such military face-off may take an unpredictable trajectory of escalation, with the onus of escalation control left to the side that seeks operational domination.  

Was Operation Sindoor successful?

The stated objective of Operation Sindoor, or its first leg, was the elimination of terror infrastructure in Pakistan and PoJ&K. The second leg was to respond to anticipated retaliation by Pakistan to Indian military strikes, which happened on expected lines and to which India has suitably responded.

That brings us to the widely debated question: whether Operation Sindoor was successful and whether India has shied away from taking the campaign to its ‘logical conclusion’.

In widening the scope of the military operation to include hitting around 9 identified ‘terror assets’ and launching around 21 (or more) hits, Operation Sindoor was an advancement from the earlier two operations – Surgical Strike of 2016 and Operation Bandar or the aerial strike on terror assets in Balakot in 2019.

Despite the expansion of identified targets and strike range, Operation Sindoor was clearly limited in its objective – hitting and destroying ‘terror infrastructure’ in Pakistan and PoJ&K and only retaliating if Pakistan seeks to respond to the initial strikes and escalates to further military hostilities. By that standard, the Operation was successful, though its expansion to higher levels on the escalation ladder could have put pressure on New Delhi to dynamically expand the objectives further to what is now described as ‘logical conclusion.’

Logical conclusions expected from this conflict

That necessitates the question: what could be the assumed or imaginable ‘logical conclusion’ to this Operation and resultant conflict?

For many Indians, including strategic experts and ordinary citizens, the ‘logical conclusion’ could have been an ‘all out’ war that could have destroyed the ‘military might’ of Pakistan or permanently eliminate the Pakistan Army’s ability to undertake not just cross-border terror campaign against India but also ‘finish off’ its capability to fight India in future wars.

Image: Indian Army personnel firing at terror camps across the LoC

For some, ‘logical conclusion’ could have been the complete destruction of the ‘nation-state of Pakistan’ and its existence or cause its disintegration.

Needless to emphasise, the latter was nor can ever be the objective of Indian military operations. Neither will any Indian political leadership aspire for such a ‘logical conclusion.’ As was explained in The Polity’s previous report, Avenging Pahalgam: India’s quest for an endgame against Pak-backed terror, of 3 May 20205, Pakistan has a history of ambiguous articulation of its nuclear use thresholds, or tripwires that India could hit, which could result in a nuclear response from Pakistan.

From the first nuclear threat during India’s Brasstacks military exercise of 1986-87, when Zia-ul-Haq threatened that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons if “India crosses the border even by an inch,” to numerous such threats including 17 nuclear threats at the height of the Kargil conflict, Pakistan had consistently muddied the waters since the 1980s on its nuclear thresholds in order to create an air of ambiguity and benefit from nuclear brinkmanship behaviour.

Among the multiple articulations made by various Pakistan officials and leaders include ‘crossing the LoC,' 'strangulation of the Pakistan economy,' 'naval embargo,' or 'attack on Karachi port,' and so on.

At one point, Pakistan wanted to convey that it will resort to a nuclear use even if India attempts a sub-conventional response to a terror attack from Pakistan by crossing the border – a done in the Surgical Strike of 2016 – which intended to project Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence at all levels, including sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear. As early as the late 1990s, India had rejected this theory by stating that there was space for a ‘limited war’ under nuclear conditions – a conception which prompted the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine in the first decade of this millennium.

However, in a 2002 report prepared by Landau Network – Centro Volta, an Italian think tank, many officers of Pakistan’s Strategic Planning Division (SPD), which oversees its nuclear arsenal, is seen to have attempted articulation of some credible nuclear use postures, which included a military defeat at the hands of India or ‘existential threats to the nation-state of Pakistan’ as among the ultimate redlines that will prompt Pakistan to unleash its nuclear arsenal against India.

By these standards, the ‘logical conclusions’ discussed above could have led to an inevitable ‘nuclear conflagration’ which could have been a point of no-return for not just Pakistan but the region as such.

For, a nuclear war could have not just led to Pakistan being “bombed back to the stone age” – as allegedly threatened by then US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Armitage at the height of the India-Pakistan crises in 2001-2002, following the attack on Indian Parliament and India mobilizing its troops along the border via Operation Parakram – but could have also led to considerable destruction of population centers and strategic locations across India with Pakistan’s capability to target even the remotest Indian counterforce and countervalue assets.

Will Pakistan’s terror campaign end?

Accordingly, the only ‘logical conclusion’ that could have been expected from Operation Sindoor was to deter or permanently eliminate Pakistan’s intent and ability to support and back the cross-border terror campaign against India. It could be assumed that the Indian leadership could have anticipated a Pakistan retaliation and escalation to full-fledged military hostilities, which, they hoped, could have ended in a ceasefire that could have also come with a Pakistan commitment to end cross-border terror.

However, the ceasefire ended without any conditionalities as both sides feared rapid escalation to higher levels, and ‘things going out of control.’ The Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of both sides are slated to meet in the next few days. However, it is unlikely that Pakistan is expected to provide any commitment about ‘cross-border terror’ as the Pakistan military and political leadership was in denial throughout about India’s allegations about the Pakistan-link to the Pahalgam massacre or on the terrorist links of assets that it struck.

In this situation, any written or verbal commitment on the question of ‘cross-border’ terror was neither expected as an outcome of Operation Sindoor nor in any future deliberations. Neither will such a statement from Pakistan hold much traction, considering that President Pervez Musharraf had made a similar commitment in 2002, which led to the end of the crisis following the mobilisation of Indian troops under Operation Parakram.

Accordingly, the Indian leadership was evidently clear that the military strikes should have been a ‘message in itself’ – that terror attacks will come with military action, irrespective of the potential for escalation. In fact, the Indian government explicitly declared this as a policy statement when, after a meeting of the security brass, hours before the ceasefire was announced, that any future terror attacks originating from Pakistan will be considered an ‘act of war.’

Considering these facts in mind, and giving merit to the fact that the military objectives were met, the ceasefire could be construed as a ‘logical conclusion’ if the immense scope of escalation and the unpredictable outcome of full-fledged military hostilities are envisaged.

A disinformation warfare in full display

If Kargil was said to be the first televised war in South Asia, Operation Sindoor versus Operation Bunyan-ul-Marsoos was all about disinformation and propaganda in full flow despite the pervasive reach of electronic and social media on both sides of the border.

The Pakistan media, for that matter, had unleashed a disinformation campaign right from the morning of 7th May with claims of repelling the Indian strikes, downing 5 Indian fighter jets, establishing conventional superiority over India and throughout claiming India’s attack as a ‘false flag operation.’

In the subsequent days, the Pakistani media coverage illustrated the stranglehold of the Pakistan Army, with only its narrative beaming out from Pakistan’s television channels and online platforms. In the intervening night of 7th and 8th May, Pakistan media was completely in denial about the Indian military operations while sticking to a single news – “29 Israeli-origin Indian drones attacked Pakistan and many of which were intercepted.” At the same time, the Pakistani media completely blacked out the consistent drone attacks since 7th May by the Pakistan military, besides also ensuring the Indian attack on Lahore air defence also does not figure anywhere.

Any semblance of ‘Pakistani retaliation’ began appearing on Pakistan TV channels only by early 10th May when the latter began beaming visuals of a Fateh battery and its 155 mm guns booming out cannons and rockets at Indian locations. Along came claims of Indian military bases along the western front being destroyed, cyber attacks on India’s critical Indian infrastructure, including HAL and the ‘Maharashtra Election Commission”, UIDAI, 70 percent of Indian grid being destroyed by Pakistan hackers, and so on.

Image: Visuals of misinformation and propaganda on Pakistan television 

The Pakistani media claimed that the retaliation was in response to Indian attacks on Pakistani air bases on its Eastern flank which they claimed “were repelled by air defences” – the only instance when the Pakistan media acknowledged major military strikes on Pakistan soil while dismissing earlier operations like the Indian attack on the Lahore air defence.

The manner in which Pakistan Army managed its media and engaged in extensive disinformation and propaganda during the four days of the conflict not just showed the extent of its grip of the ‘information warfare’ matrix but also how even the information dissemination and perception management of the Pakistan population was tightly controlled and customised through the straitjackets determined by GHQ, Rawalpindi.

The Indian side, on the other hand, stuck to ‘information dharma’ – by keeping its citizens, and the world, informed about the ‘truths’ of Operation Sindoor and sticking to an ethical, but restricted, format of information dissemination. The decision of the Indian government to deploy two serving woman military officers, one being decorated Muslim officer from the Indian Army, along with this composed and eloquently-articulate Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri had led to widespread appreciation, not just for its symbolism (women officers and Sindoor) but also for the transparent outreach to the population about the military operation.

However, with the disinformation warfare from Pakistan intensifying, the Indian government evidently changed tack by allowing a few prominent national and vernacular television channels to indulge in outright disinformation.

Accordingly, in the intervening night of 8-9th May, leading national television channels like India Today, along with some vernacular language channels, unleashed a misinformation barrage which included three Pakistan jets being downed by Indian forces – including one F-16 and two JF-17s – and a Pakistani pilot being captured. The tempo increased around midnight with reports of Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikrant being deployed, and, hours later, it was claimed that the aircraft carrier hit Karachi Port, the first time India did so after the 1971 war. (In the breifing of 11th May, the Director General of Naval Operations confirmed that the carrier was at striking distance.)

Later reports talked of Indian attacks in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore and other Pakistani cities, as well as attack by rebels against the Pakistan Army in Balochistan. Subsequently, some regional channels and online platforms also claimed that Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir was arrested.  

While the Pakistani media made light of these media reports at the break of daylight, it was evident that a section of the Indian media was also playing tit-for-tat or catch-up game with the Pakistani media on the disinformation warfare front.

Interestingly, at the briefing, neither the Foreign Secretary nor the military officers refused to get into any of the operational issues, stating that “the situation is still evolving,” thus discouraging the journalists from discussing any of the operational matters or attempting to thwart the disinformation campaign.

It was only on the 9th and 10th May that the Indian government realised the folly of this approach and decided to directly confront some of the claims made by the Pakistan government and the Pakistani media. While dispelling many of the claims of attacks on the Indian bases on the intervening night of 9-10th May, the two military officers showed pictures of the Indian Air Force stations at Sirsa and Pathankot to show that the bases are intact, along with time tags.

It was, though, evident that a handful of carefully chosen pictures cannot be an accurate image of any damage that could have happened in the claimed Pakistani attacks.

Image: An S-400 system in action

The Indian briefing focused more on the Pakistan attacks on religious places in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, while also rejecting Pakistan's claims about Indian attacks on mosques in Pakistan territory. Accordingly, the Indian side gave further details about the targeted sites and the terrorists reportedly killed in the first Indian strikes, which reportedly included top leaders of Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), including the alleged masterminds of the IC-814 hijack of 1999 and the Pulwama terror attack of 2019.

The briefing also showed images of the funeral at Muridke, which showed senior Army and local police officers attending the last rites of the LeT leaders/cadre killed in the 7th May strikes.   

However, it is evident that after the initial bouquets and praises the Indian side received on the briefing style and delegation, they were seen to be falling short in matching up to the disinformation campaign from the Pakistani side.

Were the fighter jets downed?

One of the key elements of the disinformation campaign has been the speculation surrounding the downing of fighter jets on both sides.

The downing of 5 Indian jets was repeatedly highlighted by the Pakistan media. That there was no Indian government response to this claim and that reports surfaced in Indian media of an aircraft crashing in a Punjab village also added fuel to these claims.

At the Indian government briefing of 8th May, the question of the Pakistan campaign about the downing of Indian jets was specifically raised with the Foreign Secretary. Mistri, however, refused to either confirm of deny these claims. Social media buzz in the night of 7th May talked about an Indian defence journalist confirming the downing of 3-4 Indian jets, including the celebrated Rafale jet, though immediately deleting the tweet on X.

It was evident that the theory propagated about 3 Pakistani fighter jets being down on 8th May, including the F-16 (which Pakistan was not supposed to use against India), was subsequently withdrawn due to lack of supporting evidence and the Indian government refusing to confirm media reports on this front.

In fact, at the briefing by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of the three services on 11th May, the DG of Air Operations confirmed that some PAF 'high-tech' fighters have been down, without going into the details. In the same vein, Air Marshal, A.K. Bharti also refused to confirm whether Indian jets have been downed, as claimed by Pakistan, stating that India's military objectives have been met and that there were losses on both sides. Stating that the Indian pilots are "safely back home," he refused to discuss further stating that "we are still in a combat situation and do not want to divulge details that will give advantage to the enemy." 

On the other hand, soon after the ceasefire, some Indian analysts have talked about Rafale jets being downed even as some foreign analysts insinuated that Pakistan had shown an edge when it came to air power.  For instance, Bharat Karnad quotes a former Indian Navy officer’s comments, stating thus:

“Saab Erieye AWACS patrolling silently

J-10C fighters flying in passive mode

PL-15E missiles—the export PL-15E, the domestic variant with over 300 km reach and Mach 5 speed—locked in and fired

The Rafale didn’t even know it was targeted until the missile was 50 km away. At that speed, the Indian pilot had 9 seconds. Not enough to react. Not enough to survive.”

Karnad clearly points to a Rafale jet being downed by the Chinese-origin air-to-air missile from a J-10C fighter of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). However, it is worthwhile to note that the Indian media also had reported that an AWACS of the PAF – possibly the Saab Erieye – was also downed by the IAF, though there is no confirmation on this claimed action.

While one could expect that the Indian government or IAF might be compelled to confirm in the coming days the loses suffered on the Indian side, particularly the Pakistan claim about downing five Indian jets, it was clear that at least one aircraft had come down crashing on a field in Punjab, reportedly also killing a farmer.   

The military lessons

Operation Sindoor demonstrated the capability of India’s armed forces to undertake deep and precision strikes inside Pakistan territory without having to cross the border.

As per the briefing provided by the government and various reports, the joint operations of the Indian armed forces in the early hours of 7th May included the use of an air-launched cruise missile (SCALP), an air-to-ground precision-guided weapon (HAMMER), as well as loitering munitions. There are also reports of the BrahMos cruise missile being used in the operation, though it is unclear whether it was a land or air-launched version that was used and for which targets.

From the images shared in the briefing of 7th May, it was evident that a combination of combat drones, loitering munitions and the HAMMER was fired from the Indian jets on the identified targets along the LoC. However, it seems the IAF could have used the SCALP as well as the BrahMos for the strikes at the LeT base in Muridke and the JeM headquarters in Bahawalpur.

From the briefing and reports, it is evident that the S-400 air and missile defence system acted as the frontline defence against incoming drones, loitering munitions and air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles that were fired indiscriminately from Pakistan. Considering that only a handful of batteries of S-400 was acquired from Russia (the remaining delayed by the Ukraine war), and at least one battery deployed on the Chinese frontier (unless re-deployed to the western border in last few weeks), it is worth speculating whether the depleting stock of S-400 rockets also prodded the Indian decision to agree on a ceasefire.

In coming days, the targeting and interception record of the Akash Surface-to-Air (SAM) missile, which, along with Pechora and IGLA, also served as frontline air defence systems, will be known, especially in intercepting the drones and loitering munitions, and also which of these air defence systems were successful in downing the Pakistani jets, if at all, they were downed.

It is unclear yet whether it was an S-400 that supposedly intercepted the Fateh-II missile fired at a ‘strategic location’ in or close to Delhi. There is speculation whether the intended target was either Delhi or Hisar, which supposedly hosts a BrahMos deployment. However, what is clear is that a 400-range Fateh, which is a tactical short-range missile, if fired from close to the International Border (IB) on the Punjab or Rajasthan frontier, can come close to Delhi, depending on the payload, if not actually hit the critical political decision-making assets in Delhi.

Image: Video grab of IAF officials examining the shot-down Fateh missile in Sirsa, and a Pakistan TV report on the Fateh firing

While India had not preferred to respond to the Fateh-II firing before the ceasefire came into force, questions will be raised about the platform-wise response that India could have used in the event of a decision to respond to a Fateh-II attack.

In recent months, the Pralay, which is also known to have a 400 km range, was displayed at the 2025 Republic Day parade, though it is unknown if this system is already deployed. While the BrahMos land-based version or air-launched variant can be an ideal riposte along with the Nirbhay long-range (1000 km range) sub-sonic land attack cruise missiles, this could also be the time to discuss the status of Prahaar, a short-range tactical and nuclear-capable missile, which was developed as a response to Pakistan's Nasr tactical nuclear missile system.

The status of production and deployment of Prahaar, whilst not clear yet, its role as a frontline land-attack system, along with the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system (MRLS), will need to be discussed in the context of this conflict.   

While the recent flurry of acquisitions by the Ministry of Defence might have kept the Indian armed forces in good stead during Operation Sindoor, there are many chinks in the armour which has been exposed and calls for immediate action.

The urgent need to upgrade the inventory of land-attack missile systems, including cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, air and missile defence, air-launched missile platforms and, most importantly, quickly develop or acquire the next-generation multi-role combat aircraft is the most significant defence technological take-off from this conflict.

Having used the S-400 in considerable terms and stocks having naturally depleted, the need to augment production of the S-400 missile inventory and add more batteries has been imminent on priority, along with the status of the other air defence systems. There will be analyses in the coming days on the role of the MR-SAM and SR-SAM, including their production status and whether they were deployed for action on the western front.

However, what would be more worrying is the vulnerability of the national capital to an enemy strike, be it from the West or the North.

With the Fateh-II smelling Delhi at close distance, the need is ripe to examine the quality of air defence over the national capital. There has been little discussion about the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD), which were supposed to provide area and point missile defence capability.

Said to be deployed around the national capital (possibly at Hindon Air Force Station, Rajokri, Dhaunsa or Delhi Cantonment), it is unknown whether these systems are also on forward deployment on the western front. For that matter, it is unknown whether the interception from Sirsa Air Force station of the Fateh-II was undertaken by a PAD or an S-400.

Needless to say, the conflict of last few days is clear eye-opener on the need to increase the defence budget, ramp up defence production and acquisition, proactively pace the deployment of developed and acquired systems including the missiles for land-attack, cruise and loitering munition platforms, swiftly upgrade the air defence and affirmatively deploy the missile defence capability.