In the first episode of The Long Conversation, Dr. G. Madhavan Nair, the former Chairman of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), referred to a story of 1972 when Prof. Satish Dhawan, the then Director of Indian Institute of Science (IISc), while on a sabbatical at the California Institute of Technology, was approached by the Government of India to head the Space Commission, which was conceived following the death of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, who was then the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) with the space programme functioning as an adjunct under the DAE. 

On a closer look at the records in Indian archives, The Polity found that this story goes deeper and signified some profound as well as esoteric moments in India’s nation-building journey. The story of the establishment of the Space Commission and why it marked a significant milestone is reconstructed through archival accounts in this three-part narrative. 

Part - II

Haksar said there is no second-best choice if Dhawan declined ISRO offer

In the first part of this narrative on the early years of the Indian space programme, we talked about the immediate responses to Dr Vikram Sarabhai’s death and the nature of discussions that took place in the Prime Minister’s Office regarding the future of the space programme.  

While the first part reflected upon the discussions collated in the PMS file no.17/39/72 PMS (Vol. I), the second part examines Vol-II of this file and is marked in its title as Department of Atomic Energy (Correspondence with and about PMO/PMS). 

Among the first correspondences is the one related to Dr Satish Dhawan’s appointment as head of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), giving Dr M.G.K Menon charge of ISRO as Chairman until Dhawan takes over, and the appointment of Dr Homi Sethna as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in January 1972. 

This phase of the correspondence pertains to Dhawan expressing his confirmation to accept the new responsibility, while also discussing with Prof. R. Choksi (Chairman of the IISC Governing Council) about his future role at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), the institution Dhawan was heading as director when offered the ISRO chairmanship. 

Dhawan writes to Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi, on 24 April 1972, on his return from the California Institute of Technology, mentioning that he was assessing how time can be divided between the essential work of the Institute and ISRO, in case he assumed the ISRO responsibility. Dhawan also sought an appointment with the Prime Minister after visiting M.G.K. Menon and some of the labs and projects.

Factors that led to Dhawan’s selection

On 25 May 1972, P.N. Haksar, the principal secretary prepares a profound note for the Prime Minister in which he highlights why Dhawan is the correct person for the job (of ISRO chairmanship) and why he needs the fullest support of the government and the Prime Minister. 

Haksar, in this note, describes that Dhawan has led a “cloistered life devoting himself to the pursuit of his scientific speciality in the field of aerodynamics.” Haksar points out that Dhawan had many doubts and hesitations in accepting the responsibility, and that if he were to opt out of it, there was no one at present even as a second-best choice. And therefore, it was important for the Prime Minister to express her appreciation for the high sense of duty which has led him to respond to her call. 

The Prime Minister should, hence, assure him of “her personal support in sorting out any problems he may run up against any administrative and other fields and Dhawan should not hesitate in coming to PM and that he will always have direct access.” 

Haksar’s words embodied many significant aspects of the nature of decision-making, and the quality of thinking and vision of the bureaucrats and the political leadership of the time, besides providing a broader glimpse of the period – the late 1960s and early 1970s – when India’s nuclear and space programmes were at a critical phase. 

Though Vikram Sarabhai’s appointment had greatly helped in salvaging the nuclear mission following the death of Dr Homi Bhabha and took forward the space programme, his untimely death caused, according to Dr G. Madhavan Nair, a huge vacuum and another major leadership crisis for both the missions.  

This is not to say that there was a dearth of technological leaders. Instead, the nation was blessed by a legion of visionary technocrats who fostered these national missions and their ability to handle multiple endeavours, be it Sarabhai easily fitting into the chair of Homi Bhabha or M.G.K Menon succeeding Bhabha at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) and chipping in as interim head of the space programme until Dhawan took charge. Besides, there were well-groomed leaders like Homi Sethna and Raja Ramanna who fostered the nuclear programme with the same spirit and vision that Bhabha had endeared himself to. 

However, unlike in the case of the nuclear establishment which was set up in the 1950s itself, the space programme was still at a nascent stage under the stewardship of the AEC, and yet to foster a generation of experienced leaders who could accelerate the vision that Sarabhai had laid for the space mission. The programme, hence, certainly needed a personality of stature and scientific mastery as well as the leadership qualities and vision of Bhabha and Sarabhai, in order to provide direction and establish a national institutional structure that matched the nuclear establishment. 

The quest for a personality who could meet these prerequisites echoed in Haksar’s profound statement that “there was no one at present even as a second-best choice.” There are many aspects to this statement. First is about how the science and technology programmes were then coming up in a new nation like India, which was struggling with development and nation-building goals. Second, about how the early generations of scientists were nurtured and trained, and how much equipped our institutions were to undertake this goal (which was a key area of nation-building). 

Cradles for the national missions

Homi Bhabha had started by setting up TIFR as a research institution that would train generations of scientists and engineers to run the nuclear programmes along with setting up the research traditions that could herald the programme. Bhabha also harnessed the Atoms for Peace programme by using international collaborations to send young scientists and engineers for training and exposure at western labs and research institutions. 

Though an endeavour of similar magnitude with a link to the space mission cannot be said of the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL) in Ahmedabad, the latter is often described (even in the Cabinet note on Space Commission) as the cradle of the space programme, with Sarabhai (as its director) seeking to implement the same kind of norms, work culture and autonomy for ISRO. Similarities could also be drawn between the PRL’s evolution and the TIFR story (header image shows S.K. Bhatnagar, Homi Bhabha and others at the PRL). 

Then, there was the IISc (again a Tata-supported initiative) that supported both the nuclear and space missions, with Bhabha himself being at the institute before he set up the TIFR. It may, hence, sound coincidental, if not a matter of legacy, that the choice of a successor to Sarabhai had to come from IISc. That also calls for understanding the scientific origins of personalities who followed Dhawan, including the likes of Dr Vasant Gowarikar, Dr. S.C. Gupta, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and so on.

National missions under the PM: genesis of ‘commission’ model 

That brings us to another aspect of Haksar’s note - the promise to be given by the Prime Minister of ‘personal support’ and ‘direct access’ to Dhawan. This is significant in many respects as it sought to replicate the tradition that Jawaharlal Nehru and Homi Bhabha had established for the nuclear programme. By enabling the Prime Minister’s direct oversight over the programme, Bhabha ensured that these national missions will advance without, or rather will not be hampered, by bureaucratic meddling. 

The authority that Nehru granted to Bhabha to take critical decisions pertaining to the nuclear programme provided the genesis of the Commission model of institutional structuring, which was replicated for the space programme as well. G. Madhavan Nair had, in the second episode of The Long Conversation, lamented that the space and nuclear programmes succeeded only because of the Commission model, which ensured the least bureaucratic interference and autonomy for the technocrats to take decisions that best suited the programmes.   

Indira Gandhi wanted to maintain that tradition in order to ensure that the leaders who followed both Bhabha and Sarabhai at the helm of the nuclear and space programmes are given the same level of autonomy and organisation wherewithal to fulfil the goals conceived for these missions. The impact of such cultures in ensuring the programmes proceed without any administrative or political hiccups is an aspect that cannot be understated. This amply reflects at various stages: how crucial decisions were made, how the national debate was streamlined through a coordinated effort between the PMO and AEC (as seen in the parliamentary debates of the 1970s regarding PNE), and so on. 

Sense of duty, to the nation

The final aspect emerging from Haskar’s note is the reference to a ‘sense of duty.’ That scientists and technocrats of the leaders were self-motivated (as Bhabha and Sarabhai were) to join the national leaders in the nation-building process and contribute to setting up national institutions and structures (akin to temples of development) could be a commentary on the ‘sense of duty’ that shaped the national calling of these scientists, which was then critical for a newly independent nation-state. 

Most of these first-generation scientists were trained in advanced institutions in western nations and could have rewarding careers in those nations, where science and technology was promising field. That many of them responded to the national calling is also reflective of how the spirit of nationalism weighed strongly (not just for political leaders) but also in the minds of various segments, including scientists and technocrats.

The contribution of a few other prominent scientists like Dr Meghnad Saha, who developed the Saha Ionization equation, and whose well-known differences with Nehru and perceived feud with Bhabha and Bhatnagar could have denied him many of the opportunities that others got in contributing to these missions, needs no overstatement. 

While his contribution to nation-building, scientific advancement and the research undertaken by institutions like the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics and the National Academy of Sciences is integral to India’s modern science and technology journey, there is certainly a need to explore the correspondences he had with the country’s political and scientific leaderships in order to explain the dynamics involved between these personalities who shape the country’s technological trajectory. 

Finally, the role of foreign institutions, with whom our early generation of scientists was associated, and how much latent and patent role they had played in augmenting the goals of these programmes also needs greater examination.