Why West-induced regime change in Iran will be recipe for chaos

Asia Watch – A bimonthly column by Professor Swaran Singh in which he analyses major developments across Asia

Asia Watch
By Swaran Singh
Jun 23, 2025

History is replete with instances of West-induced regime changes across West Asia, including in Iran. It was an American sleight of hand that derailed the democratic process in Iran, which eventually brought the current Islamic regime to power. By using the nuclear bogey to dismantle the regime in Tehran, the US-Israeli military action only reminds us of the campaign against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, citing his chemical and biological weaponry. If the outcome of the campaign in Iraq was political instability, chaos and a rise of extremism, the result might be no different in Iran as well. While the Khamenei-led order might still survive, it is doubtful whether the Iranian polity is prepared to absorb a radical political transformation, says Professor Swaran Singh in the second edition of Asia Watch.

In the face of the United States' direct attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities last weekend, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has reportedly designated at least three possible successors in case he or any of these get killed in this war.

This is not the first time that a living Supreme Leader has anointed his successor. In 1989, shortly before his death, Ayatollah Khomeini had designated the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as his successor.

Indeed, this selection of the current Supreme Leader as the successor had required an amendment in Iran’s constitution to allow a lower-ranking cleric to become the Supreme Leader.

Image: Portraits of the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

Initially, Khomeini had designated Hussein-Ali Montazeri as his successor, but, later, had a falling out. While it remains uncertain when and who will succeed the current Supreme Leader, the US-Israeli resolve in seeking ‘regime change’ has unleashed speculations of its likelihood and implications.

History of regime changes

The story of regime change in Iran goes back to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 at St Petersburg, which divided south and north of Persia as their respective spheres of influence. Persia was not a colony or protectorate at the time but was heavily controlled by these two powers.

The first externally staged ‘regime change,’ therefore, was affected in 1925 when, with British support, a coup d’état by a Persian Brigadier-General, Reza Khan, ended Persia’s Qajar dynasty (1789-1925) and established the Pahlavi dynasty to initiate a new British-supported era of nationalism and modernisation.

The second externally-sponsored ‘regime change’ in Iran happened during the Second World War, in 1941, when the Germans were invading France and the Soviet Union for whom the Persian government was suspected of leaning towards Germany.

In August 1941, therefore, Anglo-Soviet forces, through their Operation Countenance, invaded Iran to secure its oil fields and the Persian Corridor for their supply lines during the War.

This second ‘regime change’ was orchestrated during this period, when, in 1943, Reza Shah was deposed with his young son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Tehran Conference of the Allied ‘Big Three’ – Joseph Stalin, Franklin D Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill – issued the Tehran Declaration guaranteeing Iran’s post-war territorial integrity and sovereign independence.

The third instance of ‘regime change’ in Iran happened in 1953, again, through a British-assisted initiative. After a prolonged period of unrest, Iran’s Majlis (the Parliament) elected a popular politician of the National Front, Mohammad Mosaddegh as Prime Minister on 28 April 1951. With a sweeping majority vote of 79-12, Mosaddegh’s election started a new era of popular government.

As part of his promise, Prime Minister Mosaddegh sought to audit the documents of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petroleum). On their refusal, Majlis passed legislation to nationalise the oil industry seizing control of Iran’s oil industry that was largely controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

This was to trigger economic pressures from Britain which included actions like freezing assets and blocking drilling equipment sales to destabilise the government. When these efforts did not work, Britain’s intelligence agency M16 reportedly enlisted the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in their July 1953 Operation Ajax.

This involved unleashing propaganda, bribes, street unrest and support for military intervention under the stewardship of Kermit Roosevelt Jr., a CIA officer and grandson of former president Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Following a military coup, Mossadegh was charged with treason and a new government under General Fazlollah Zahedi was formed, which confirmed the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, taking back the reins.

Shah then established a secret police, trained and funded by the CIA, to suppress dissent. In 1954, a consortium agreement was signed with British Petroleum and other American and French companies, which diluted the full nationalization of the oil sector.

As oil revenues rose from USD 55 to USD 181 million during 1954-1957, popular political parties like the National Front and Tudeh were outlawed. The Shah’s puppet authoritarian regime, thus, sowed the seeds for another ‘regime change in reverse’ with the Shah being overthrown in the Iranian or Islamic Revolution of 1979 by rising radical Islamists led by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Image: A top secret note on CIA's Operation Ajax

Trump’s turn now

The current debate on ‘regime change’ in Iran has been unleashed by US President Donald Trump’s social media commentaries stating: “We know exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ is hiding. He is an easy target, but is safe there…we are not going to take him out (kill!), at least not for now.”

His use of ‘We’ to project joint US-Israeli operations has also sought to justify and endorse Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategies of assassinating key military and political leaders as well as eliminating scientific figures associated with Iran’s nuclear programme.

Netanyahu, for his part, has been advocating ‘regime change’ in Iran as his goal from the very outset of this conflict. He has affirmed that “we can’t have the world’s most dangerous regime have the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

The resultant face-off, which now puts the US directly against Iran, is expected to expand and prolong unless an early regime change puts another temporary halt to these hostilities.

It is interesting to note that, despite President Trump having said he would take ‘two weeks’ to decide whether to directly attack Iran, Seymour Hersh, the celebrated author of The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and Amerian Foreign Policy, had prophesied in his column last week: “I have vetted this report with a longtime US official in Washington, who told me that all will be ‘under control’ if Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ‘departs.’”

Furthermore, Fox News reporter Jacque Heinrich indicated that Washington did not rule out using tactical nuclear weapons to attack Iran’s underground uranium enrichment sites.

At the core of the US-Israeli concerns remains Iran’s nuclear programme which can potentially make any such invasion of Iran impossible.

In terms of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal that was signed between Iran and the P5 of the UN Security Council – China, France, Russia, the UK, US – plus Germany, they had agreed to dismantle much of Iran’s nuclear programme and open its facilities to more intrusive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief.

However, with President Trump, in his first tenure, withdrawing from the deal in 2018, had triggered speculations that Iran could have revived its uranium enrichment at its facilities in Isfahan, Nantaz and Fordow.

More recently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in its quarterly report dated 31 May 2025 that Iran can convert its current stockpiles of its 60 per cent enriched Uranium into 233 kg weapons-grade Uranium, enough for 9 nuclear weapons, in three weeks’ time.

It is probably this assessment that could have triggered the urgency and anxiety leading to Israeli attacks on June 13 while Iran was still in the midst of negotiations with both the United States and other European nations aiming to negotiate their successor deal to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal that expires this October.

Image: The Shah leaving Tehran following the Islamic Revolution and his statue being removed by protestors

Russia, China & others

The last few years have seen Russia, China and Iran coming closer, especially in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) that had recently condemned the Israeli attacks on Iran. India had chosen to abstain on this resolution.

Russia, China and Iran had recently held joint naval exercises.

In this backdrop, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who is currently the Deputy Chair of Russia’s Security Council, made a startling gesture following the American strikes on Iran. “A number of countries are ready to directly supply Iran with their own nuclear warheads,” Medvedev had proclaimed without naming them.

Responding to what the American strikes have accomplished, he stated that the “critical infrastructure of the nuclear fuel cycle appears to have been unaffected” adding that the “future production of nuclear weapons will continue.”

Russia’s Ukraine war has seen it deepening its ties with Tehran, leading to both countries signing their strategic partnership this January.

The Chinese media, for its part, have termed the military action against Iran as “a dangerous turning point” in the sequestration of “military interventions in the Middle East that often produce unintended consequences, including prolonged conflicts and regional destabilisation.”

Image: Demonstrations during the Islamic Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini being received in Tehran by protestors

Pakistan, meanwhile, had come into focus when an Iranian general claimed an assurance given by Pakistan that it would use its nuclear weapons against Israel if the latter launched a nuclear strike against Iran. This led to denials from Islamabad even as Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s coveted Army chief, was hosted by President Trump.

Pakistan had also upped the ante by proposing the Noble Prize for President Trump, for his perceived role in halting the military hostilities with India early this month.

On the other hand, Pakistan also has a critical role in Washington’s Iranian affairs. According to a 1981 agreement, Pakistan’s embassy in Washington DC hosts the Strategic Interests of Iran on the lines of the Swiss Embassy hosting the Strategic Interests of the US in Tehran – serving as negotiating conduits since the US and Iran have no direct diplomatic relations.

But, after the American strikes on Iran, Pakistan also called it a violation of “all norms of international law” and asserted that “Iran has a right to defend itself under the UN Charter.”

In terms of responses from the regional allies of the US, Saudi Arabia has expressed “great concern” on the US targeting of nuclear facilities in “the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran,” while Qatar has called this “dangerous escalation” leading to “catastrophic consequences.” Oman, which was mediating the nuclear talks between the US and Iran, expressed “denunciation and condemnation of the escalation resulting from the direct air strikes launched by the United States” while Iraq called it as posing “serious risks to regional stability.”

Hamas has, likewise, condemned the “US aggression” and declared their “solidarity with Iran.”

While a consolidation of the Islamic nations against the US-Israeli action is not expected to happen beyond these statements, it is evident that the US strikes have caused considerable consternation in the Arab world. Israel’s continued onslaught against its neighbours, especially the killing of over 50,000 Palestinians, has surely impacted the Arab people and this may be reflected in the responses of these regimes which may intensify in the coming days.

Lessons & implications

Scholars like Arash Azizi point out that Iran’s regime changes have been driven both by great power competition and their imperial urge to control its resources.

However, the moral and strategic fallout of these regime changes has always been stark: bringing short-term stability and modernisation followed by a lack of popular legitimacy breeding either the creation of foreign-controlled puppet governments or anti-western radicalisation and revolution.

Today, Iran’s proxies in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, etc., represent its historical trauma of suppression and isolation in its immediate periphery.

It is also true that widespread dissatisfaction persists today among Iranians over economic hardships, lack of freedom, and the rights of women and minorities, fuelling ongoing calls for political transformation. Protests, such as the “Woman, life, freedom” movement, have recently united diverse segments of Iranian society, but they have so far failed to coalesce into a force internally capable of toppling the regime.

Iran’s pluralist and fragmented society, combined with deep mistrust and the lack of a unified opposition, makes a smooth transition unlikely.

Conversely, in case of the current regime collapsing, the most powerful factions – particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the hardliners – that control the military and economy, could even further tighten their grip, potentially leading to a new form of authoritarianism rather than democracy.

Second, foreign interventions aimed at regime change, as seen in Iraq, Libya and Syria have historically resulted in instability and unintended consequences. A succession of regime changes could destabilise the region, disrupt global energy markets, and create opportunities for extremist groups or rival powers to intervene.

A western-sponsored, more moderate Iranian government could shift regional dynamics but will seek to potentially reduce ideological confrontation though not necessarily aligning with Western interests. In other words, there is no guarantee that a regime change would lead to improved governance and stability, or better relations with Israel or its western allies.

Image: Ayatollah Khamenei with China's Xi Jinping and Russia's Vladimir Putin

The outcome, inevitably, could be prolonged unrest, civil conflict, or the emergence of another authoritarian regime.

The Iranian people’s mistrust of both domestic and foreign actors, rooted in decades of authoritarianism and external interference, complicates any transition. While a regime change in Iran could briefly address popular demands for freedom and reform, the risks of instability, authoritarian retrenchment, and regional turmoil are high.

The outcome would depend on the ability of domestic actors to build consensus and institutions, as well as the restraint of external powers seeking to shape Iran’s future.