Delhi: A hotly contested election in the offing

The Delhi election scene, amid an intense winter season, has already heated up even before the Election Commission announced last week the polling date for the state assembly elections – polling on 5th February 2025 and counting three days later. The ruling Aam Admi Party (AAP) supremo Arvind Kejriwal took the first plunge by bringing out the first list of candidates for the Delhi assembly seats in late November last year.

The dynamics of Delhi state politics had already been vitriolic in the last few years with the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) central leadership desperately seeking to capture the state that had evaded its grip, notwithstanding its consistent performances in the Lok Sabha polls since 2014. Using the alleged corruption over Delhi’s excise policy, the BJP leadership has been effective in portraying the AAP – which emerged out of the Anna Hazare anti-corruption movement – as just another political party with corrupt means and ends. By keeping the AAP’s top leadership, including Kejriwal, behind bars for a considerable time, the BJP had been relatively effective in denting the AAP’s political legitimacy.

The other aspect of the political strategy was to place impediments in the AAP government’s ability to govern the government of the National Capital Territory (NCT). Having uprooted the Supreme Court’s verdict that gave greater administrative powers to the Delhi government through an ordinance, the arrival of a highly politicised Lieutenant Governor also ensured that the AAP government gasped for breath, particularly in pursuing its populist initiatives.

It is no surprise then that the race between the three players – AAP, BJP and Indian National Congress – is on declaring freebies and populist initiatives to outwit each other. AAP has topped up on its existing populism with more promises including increasing the monthly dole for women, free health care for senior citizens, funds to Residents Welfare Associations (RWAs) to hire security guards, salary to religious priests, and so on. 

The BJP, for its part, promises to increase the women’s dole to Rs 2500 and provide 300 units of power, it remains doubtful whether it can outmatch the populism legacy, matched with sound financial management, that the AAP had effectively followed in its two tenures in Delhi. The Congress, not wanting to fall behind, has its own set of freebies, largely matching the framework set by AAP.

It will, however, be a herculean task for the latter two to match AAP’s record investments in education, free water and free bus journeys for women – all of which have made considerable gains for the AAP.

Nonetheless, the election seems headed for a tight race. This is not just because the BJP is going all out to win the battle at all costs. The Congress’s effort to regain a foothold, it is felt, could be at the expense of the AAP vote base, a considerable part of which could have been wrested from the Congress in the latter’s growth years.

In fact, the proactive Congress’s campaign is already giving jitters to the AAP leadership with Kejriwal declaring that he will demand the removal of the Indian National Congress (INC) from the I.N.D.I.A (the umbrella alliance of the opposition parties at the national level). This was after Congress leaders like Ajay Maken and Sandeep Dikshit (who will take on Kejriwal in the New Delhi constituency) for mismanagement, unkept promises and also echoing corruption allegations that the BJP had made against the AAP.

While Rahul Gandhi’s entry into the campaign is intended to elevate the election into a three-cornered race, the actual factor that could tilt the race one way or another will be the impact of recent electoral roll revisions in the state. Citing the recent instances in Maharashtra and Haryana, AAP has been vocal about large-scale deletions and additions to the voter list in the last few months.

With the Congress poised to eat into the AAP vote base, these additions and deletions might prove to be decisive.

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Indians in MAGA crosshairs

Though Indians in the US were traditionally known to be supportive of the Democrats, with its support for minority groups and immigrants, that conditioning had significantly altered in the past decade. With the advent of the Modi regime and Hindutva in India, many Indian-Americans aligned towards the Right of Centre had found greater traction with the Republican party, notwithstanding its intuitive support for white supremacism and anti-immigration rhetoric, which was heightened after Donald Trump took office.

Matching these trends, the Indian support base for the Republican party and Trump has significantly increased in recent times, particularly after PM Narendra Modi’s 2019 clarion call during his US visit – ‘Ab Ki Baar Trump Sarkar’ – literally interfering in the politics of a foreign nation.

Having Republican faces like Vivek Ramaswamy and recent-convert Tulsi Gabbard (a Hindu though not of Indian origin) in the forefront of the Trump campaign, it is assumed that a considerable number of Indian-American votes had gone to Trump in the November 2024 presidential elections, notwithstanding the Indian roots of his rival and incumbent vice president, Kamala Harris.

With both Ramaswamy and Gabbard attaining enviable positions in the incoming Trump Administration, the Indian-American community was on cloud nine until MAGA (Make America Great Again), the umbrella coalition of Trump supporters, decided to spoil the party. By turning the gaze on H1B visas and Indian-Americans having benefitted the most from the scheme, MAGA hardliners unleashed their fury on the community, including its Republican leaders, for what they claimed was “stealing American jobs.”

The war of words even saw Trump’s poster boy, Elon Musk, also being targeted by MAGA hardliners for his support of the H1B programme, forcing his hasty withdrawal after his initial offensive, and also pushing Trump to take a stand. Having mobilized the MAGA base with his anti-immigrant rhetoric, Trump, however, backed the H1B as necessary and termed it as great besides using it for his own businesses.

Suffice it to be pointed out that the first Trump Administration had cut down on the H1B numbers substantially, which was struck down by a US court, besides also winding up the work permit in the H-4 visas for spouses of H1B visa holders. While the Joe Biden Administration had blocked attempts to end the restored work permit system, it is likely that Trump 2.0 will yet again rescind as part of his hardline anti-immigration proclivities. 

Amid continuing rage against Indian-Americans from the MAGA camps, all eyes will now be on 20th January 2025, the inauguration day when Trump has promised a set of radical first-day actions which include mass deportation of illegal immigrants, and over 100 potential Executive Orders including closure of the US-Mexican border.  

That Indians also form a big chunk of undocumented or illegal immigrants in the US will not be good news for the country. Furthermore, Trump's proclaimed intent to target countries that impose higher tariffs on American products is already cause for worry to the Indian government and the industry alike.

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India finds its ‘good’ Taliban

In what could be seen as a historic reproachment, the Indian government established high-level diplomatic contact with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan with the Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri meeting an Afghan delegation headed by its acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai on 8th January 2025.

The meeting assumes major significance as it signals New Delhi’s inclination to engage the Taliban regime, including the prospects of establishing political and diplomatic relationships that even also imply an envoy of the Taliban regime taking charge of the Afghanistan embassy in New Delhi.

India had already started the engagement with the current Taliban regime after its return to power in August 2021. Since then, there have been four meetings between the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Taliban leaders handling various portfolios. There was also a meeting between the Indian Ambassador in Qatar and the Taliban representative in Doha. India has also deployed a technical team in its Kabul embassy, according to a report in the Indian Express. 

This engagement is a far cry from the first reign of the Taliban between 1996 and 2001 when India had treated the hardline Islamist force as not just a terrorist entity, though not officially listing it so, but also a proxy of Pakistan. Besides the public execution of India’s close ally and former Afghanistan President Mohammad Najibullah in the streets of Kabul, its links with al Qaida, and the destruction of the 2000-year-old Buddha statues in the Bamiyan valley in 2001, the Taliban regime was also seen to have given safe haven to the hijackers of IC-814 during his stop-over in Kandahar from where the release of hostages was negotiated in late December 1999.

The current arrangement is said to be prompted by the need to protect India’s strategic interests in Afghanistan, where the US is no longer a player and China has made headway with the Taliban regime. However, more important is the opening gained through the current Taliban regime’s increasing animosity with Pakistan, its erstwhile mentor.

At the heart of the current Pakistan-Taliban turmoil is the increasing attacks against Pakistani security forces by the Tehrik-i-Taliban, a UN-designated terrorist organisation, which is evidently supported by the regime in Kabul. Pakistan alleges that the Afghan Taliban regime’s support of TTP has resulted in more than 3000 deaths in Pakistan since its return to power in 2021.

The Chinese inroads into Afghanistan, including the appointment of an Ambassador in Kabul – the first by any country after the Taliban return in 2021, and prospects of using the land-locked, mountainous country to augment its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), are also behind New Delhi’s decision to elevate its engagement with the Islamic regime. 

Besides building upon the decades of development assistance India had undertaken across Afghanistan comprising over 500 projects worth USD 3 billion, there are clear strategic reasons behind India’s keenness to get the Afghan Taliban on its side.

One key impetus is to enhance connectivity to Central Asia from its strategic Chabahar Port on the Iranian coast via land routes passing through Afghanistan. This trade movement is also destined to benefit the economic landscape in Afghanistan, notwithstanding its competing footprint with the BRI-oriented infrastructure that China will be developing via its Xinjiang province, where Beijing has long been trying to stem the Islamist elements. 

While official recognition of the Taliban government in Kabul by New Delhi is still not on the cards, the latest high-level meeting in Dubai has indeed opened up the doors for greater Indian humanitarian and economic assistance in the country, including helping in settling refugees fleeing from Pakistan. The Taliban leaders, for their part, have assured India that it does not pose any threat to Indian interests, which, in itself, comes as a major step towards greater ties between the two nations. 

Having debated for years whether there is a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, the Indian government seems to have finally identified the better one.

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A nuclear deal that went nowhere

The India-US nuclear deal – announced through the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement by India and the US and came to fruition in 2008 when an India-specific exemption at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, presented two years earlier, in the US Congress – was a momentous period in independent India and recent political history of the country.

As per the deal announced through the Joint Statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush, the US was to facilitate India’s integration into the non-proliferation regime, i.e., to facilitate India’s access to global nuclear commerce without joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the cornerstone treaty of the non-proliferation regime, while continuing to maintain its nuclear weapons. It could have thus become the only State with Nuclear Weapons (SNW) outside the NPT to gain access to and participate in global nuclear trade. For this purpose, the Warsaw Guidelines of the NSG were waived solely for India.

In return, India was to separate its civilian nuclear programme from the strategic or nuclear weapons programme and also commit to join international non-proliferation efforts like the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Further, India was to open up its nuclear energy arena with foreign suppliers destined to provide India with new generation reactors at a handful of nuclear power projects to be set up in different parts of the country.

The period between the announcement of the nuclear deal to its formalization (2005-08) saw intense political contestations in the country with both the Left parties and the right-wing BJP opposing the deal – the former alleging India’s alignment with the US, and the latter alleging a compromise of India’s strategic interests. While the Left parties exited the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) over the deal and walked into political obscurity, the BJP ended up implementing the deal when the Narendra Mod-led government came to power.

However, despite the normative aspects of the deal getting formalized in the initial years of the previous decade, the promising part of nuclear commerce got stuck at two hurdle points: (a) the refusal of NSG members to enable the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies to India, and (b) the states with advanced nuclear industry raising objections on India’s nuclear liability law (Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act)for liabilities tied to nuclear suppliers.

While ENR technologies continued to be denied to India, it was assumed that the hurdles of the nuclear liability law were addressed during US President Barack Obama’s visit to India in January 2015 through provisions like the indemnity clause and nuclear insurance. However, none of the designated nuclear power projects took off in the subsequent years, owing to various reasons, including commercial reasons and lack of a political push even as India’s indigenous programme kept advancing.

Besides new reactors being added to India’s existing nuclear power enclaves, the second phase of its three-stage nuclear programme was also kicked off in 2024 with the fuel-loading at India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) facility in Kalpakkam.

It was amid these developments that the US National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, during his visit to New Delhi in the first week of January 2025 made a startling announcement – that the US Department of Commerce has removed strategic Indian nuclear facilities like Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Centre (IGARC) and Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), from the US Entity List – a list of organisations, businesses or individuals that are subjected to export control restrictions or licensing requirements for specific items or technologies.

While the existence of BARC (Mumbai) and IGARC in Kalpakkam – both being strategic nuclear facilities – may not have had a bearing on the commercial segment of the nuclear deal, the latest measures were described as “necessary steps to remove long-standing regulations that have prevented civil nuclear cooperation between India’s nuclear entities and US companies. The Biden Administration, he further added, “has determined that it is past time to take the next major step in cementing this partnership.” 

This announcement, coming at the fag end of the Biden Administration’s tenure, came as a surprise as few in India actually noticed the fact that prestigious and critical Indian nuclear establishments continued to be in the US Entity list, more than 15 years after the formalization of the nuclear deal. Also, to infer that this was one of the reasons for the commercial agreements not taking off between the US nuclear supplier and Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) came as a bit of a surprise.

Reflecting upon this, an Indian Express report states that two key hurdles continue to remain on the nuclear deal – a US law that bars manufacturing of American-origin nuclear components in India and the continuing reluctance over the nuclear liability law, notwithstanding measures taken in 2015.

Whatever the facts of the matter, it speaks considerably on the failure of the political, scientific and industrial leaderships of both countries that a historic nuclear deal – which came after years of intense political contestations and a national debate of unprecedented scale – has failed to take off in concrete terms even two decades after its initial conception. 

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The familial overhang over the Indian judiciary

It has been reported in the national media in recent weeks that the Collegium of the Supreme Court which chooses and recommends judges to the High Courts in the country as well as to the apex court is planning to stop recommending, at least for the time being, relatives of judges who have served or are serving in the higher courts in the country.

To ordinary citizens, this should come as not just a startling fact but also an embodiment of the deeply nepotistic character of the Indian judiciary. Few would remember the debate in the parliament over the National Judicial Appointment Commission (NJAC) when members like John Brittas of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) profoundly talked about the unique Indian system of “judges appointing judges” as well as the family linage and legacy that defined and dominated the top echelons of Indian judiciary since independence.

While MPs like Brittas had lamented on the need for an independent NJAC, notwithstanding questions being raised on whether such independence can be assured in a highly-charged political environment when the government of the day is alleged to be populating constitutional and statutory bodies with its preferred candidates, the actual issue that was highlighted was the familial bonding and legacy that dominates judicial appointments in the higher courts.

It is such widespread criticism of nepotism defining the essential functional character of the Indian judiciary that the Collegium is reported to have decided to enforce an embargo – temporary or undeclared – on the selection of kith and kin of serving judges to higher judicial appointments.

While questions are raised on the fairness of such decisions, assuming that merit should be the sole benchmark of appointment in such a critical pillar of the polity, the decision gravely illustrates the inability or failure of the collegium system to have established a fair appointment system hitherto, while assuming the role of an unbiased adjudicator for the nation and its citizenry. 

In a country where father and son – Y.I. and D.Y. Chandrachud – have become Chief Justices of India (CJI), and where a serving judge of the Supreme Court (Justice Nagarathna) is forced to defend the judgement of her father in the same court several decades earlier, it is only a poor reflection on the juridical and political culture of the country – which boasts a robust legal education system and a legion of trained legal professionals – that such a deeply patronizing system prevailed for so long for an institution that was supposed to uphold the law of the country and instil a free and fair justice system.  

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Stop press: RAW disowns its operative?

As we were preparing to publish this edition, a national daily reported that a high-level panel set up by the Government of India has recommended ‘legal action against an individual’ on the alleged assassination plot against Khalistan extremist leader Gurupatwant Singh Pannun.

While the recommendation could be a follow-up to an Indian investigative team recently visiting the US to apprise the American authorities of the progress made in the investigations, it is evident from the recommendation that the Research and Analyses Wing (RAW), India’s premier external intelligence agency, could have decided not to protect or rather disown its allegedly ‘rogue’ operative.

It is rather implausible to assume that Vikash Yadav, the CRPF officer reportedly on deputation as Senior Field Officer to the Central Secretariat, had acted on his own on this alleged plot, if at all such a plot had indeed happened.