Henry Kissinger, as seen in Indian diplomatic papers – III

This third and final part of the Henry Kissinger series is a continuation of the records in the T.N. Kaul papers continuing with Subject File No.1 in the second part and adding Subject No. 3 in the second half of this final part.

This part of the conversations in the final months of 1973 included Kissinger’s Peking visit and discussions over Bangladesh, Kissinger’s revelations about Chinese perspectives of India, the American views about India-Soviet relations and so on. This part also has records of 1975 and 1976 which shows glimpses of US reactions to the Indian PNE and its impact on the Tarapur nuclear power plant, as well as the political developments in India. 

Kissinger’s Peking visit and the MEA conversations

The month of November 1973 saw a handful of conversations between Kissinger and the Indian foreign policy establishment, which are in the T.N. Kaul papers Subject File No.1.

A letter from the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister (marked as personal) dated 01 November 1973 talks of a meeting with Kissinger in which he informs Kaul of the plan to have a night halt in Islamabad en route to Peking, and that Pakistan had no role in this trip nor will there be any other official engagements during the night halt. Kissinger then proposed to send Joseph Sisco to India to brief on the Middle East.

However, Kaul tells Kissinger, in Sisco’s presence, that while an exchange of views on the Middle East was welcome, the Indian Press and public opinion will misunderstand when a junior office is sent to India when Kissinger makes it to Peking. While Sisco was willing to withdraw but insisted on knowing an Indian decision immediately, Kissinger suggested the briefing to be done in Washington itself with the Ambassador.

While Kaul’s letter to the FM was to solicit instructions on this briefing, he ends the letter by advising that in case Sisco visits India, he should not be allowed to meet the Prime Minister. Kaul does not elaborate on whether it was the protocol's inappropriateness or some other reason.

(a) Letter from Ambassador to Foreign Minister dated 02 November 1973

Unlike the previous one, this letter is a note that details a phone conversation between Kissinger and the Indian Foreign Secretary, Kissinger, with Kaul and Sisco present. The points discussed were:

Bhutto’s volte-face: The FS apprised Kissinger that difficulties may arise on the Delhi Agreement with regard to the 195 PoWs if Pakistan does not enter into dialogue with Bangladesh on the basis of sovereign equality. He explained that Bhutto had done a volte-face after telling the Indian delegation that he wanted to “sweeten” the atmosphere by persuading “China to give up their veto regarding Bangladesh’s admission to the UN.”

Kissinger replied that the had the impression that Bhutto was thinking along these lines and added “I will be glad to discuss this with him in Islamabad. Anytime we can be of help, please let us know.”

The FS curtly asked Kissinger to bear in mind India’s intention to strengthen relations with all her neighbours, especially Pakistan, in its own national interest and for peace and security in the area. Kissinger replied: “We have no doubts about your intention, and no question about it. I will keep in touch with your ambassador and he should keep in touch with me if we can help in any way.”

Kaul checkmates Sisco’s Delhi visit plan: Kissinger declared that relations with India are vital for the US and that he wanted to visit Delhi in response to the Foreign Minister’s invitation. He hoped to do so sometime after the Peking visit. As told to Kaul on the previous day, Kissinger reiterated that the Islamabad stop-over was for a night halt and that Pakistan had no role in the Middle East. Kissinger repeats the offer to send Sisco to Delhi.

Sisco, in turn, added, “India is an important non-aligned country.” Kaul immediately intervenes to remind what he told the previous day - that Sisco’s visit will invite press and public criticism and be compared to the Secretary visiting Islamabad and other countries and a junior officer sent to India. If the US government did not mind this possible criticism, Kaul reminded, “We would have no objection to his visit.

However, while Kissinger wanted to ask the government, Sisco repeated the intransigence of the previous day by stating that he wanted to know it immediately in order to draw up his plans. Kaul mentions in brackets that Sisco’s visit has been called off and this was mentioned to the FS over the phone.  

The FS conveyed the Foreign Minister’s happiness at the Washington meeting and that both ambassadors had told him that relations were improving. “That is our clear intention and there is no reason why we should not improve our relations, sincerely,” replied Kissinger.

The discussions then veered to Middle East settlement and the Indian Ocean.

The Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean: Kissinger mentioned that “some Indian newspapers have reacted adversely to our sending the US Fleet to the Indian Ocean, although your FM’s statement was restrained. There is no other way to send out the seventh Fleet except through the Indian Ocean,” and remarked with a laugh “unless you want to give the Indian Ocean a more neutral name. Our ships are nowhere near the Indian coast. They are more than 100 miles away. Their destination is the Arabian Sea. I hope your FM will agree that this action is not related to India, Pakistan or Bangladesh.”

The FS said he appreciated Kissinger’s explanation, not adding anything further.

Kissinger’s China visit: Kissinger states that he would have an opportunity in China “to probe them about their relations with India.” The FS replied that India wanted to normalise relations with China, but “sometimes we are not sure whether China wants to do the same.” The FS explained that Dalai Lama had been given asylum on the clear understanding that he would not engage in any political activity and he had not done so on his visit abroad. Still, the FS said, “The Chinese regarded our letting him go abroad as a hostile action. We had got used to such Chinese protests and did not take them too seriously.”

Kissinger replied: “My experience with China is that when they adopt such a line, it is the symptom and not the cause.”

Kissinger ended the conversation with pleasantries and pulled a quick one on Kaul by remarking humorously “We are very happy with your Ambassador but I am terrified of his contacts with the media,” to which Kaul replied, “That is why I keep out of Washington and visit the rest of the country.”

Kaul opines in the conclusion that despite his busy schedule, Kissinger wanted “to make a gesture of friendship. The general tone and tenor of his remarks was very friendly.” Kaul feels that with the US Administration being preoccupied with internal affairs and the Middle East crisis, no progress can be expected on PL-480 and such matters before the end of the year.  

Like in the conversation with the Foreign Minister, Kissinger, in subsequent meetings too, displays greater sensibility, adroitness and circumspection as Secretary of State even while using his diplomatic craftiness whenever needed. Evident in this letter was Kissinger’s seemingly genuine intent to help resolve matters in the sub-continent. While reiterating that Islamabad was a night halt, his mentioning of meeting Bhutto shows that there was certainly official business to do in the Pakistan capital.

The Sisco visit matter was an interesting episode where Kaul played spoilsport by blocking plans for the Assistant Secretary of State’s visit to Delhi. That this was still the year 1973 and that a senior State Department official was coming to brief India on the Middle East settlement was in itself proof of India gaining importance in Washington. However, Kaul seemingly wanted to push the limits, to probably force a Kissinger visit to Delhi, in order to project parity with China, and a pre-mature attempt at de-hyphenation. 

The Seventh Fleet mention was interesting not just for the fact that the naval force came back into discussion after the Liberation War infamy, but also because Kissinger used the opportunity to tease India about its perceptive sphere of influence or leverage over the Indian Ocean region. Decades down the line, Washington will not just endorse this Indian sphere of influence but also designate the oceanic expanse as integral to the Indo-Pacific architecture.

Kissinger’s China visits have been the subject of diplomatic folklore, on how he pulled off a détente through a secret visit. The visit in question in this letter is his official trip, and that he offers to probe their thinking on India indicates his masterly grasp over geo-political interactions but also his ability to humour his guests with an “I will do it for you” promise. The most significant part though was Kissinger’s comment about China that “when they adopt a line, it is the symptom and not the cause.”

Regarding Sisco’s visit, there was another letter from the Foreign Minister to the Ambassador stating that he was not averse to Sisco’s visit and would like to meet him. 

(b) Letter from Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary, dated 29 November 1973

The occasion was a dinner hosted by Kaul in honour of Senator and Mrs Fulbright, which was attended by Kissinger, (Antoly) Dobrynins, Tinoo Sen, D.P. Sign and Tom Braden. Though an intimate private dinner, there were informal discussions, particularly on the Middle East.

Fulbright as pro-India: Fulbright’s views, Kaul reports, were much closer to India’s than to the US administration’s, especially on Vietnam and Cambodia, including that the US should stop giving arms to South Vietnam and allow the Southeast nations to settle matters on their own.

On Indo-US relations, Fulbright felt ironic that two great democracies should be so far apart. He did not doubt in his mind that the vast majority of Congress and the American people had high regard and respect for India and its policies. He hoped that Kissinger as Secretary of State would take early steps to mend fences with India and strengthen cooperation in all fields. (Importantly), he did not see India’s friendship with the Soviet Union in any way as an obstacle to this; on the contrary, he felt it was a good thing and would help better understanding between India, America and the Soviet Union.

He also spoke on a resolution of the PL-480 rupees matter and called for a great exchange of scholars and students between both countries.

Kissinger's desire to visit India: Kissinger started by stating that he had not been able to visit India so far and intended to do so soon, but got delayed by the Middle Eastern crisis. He proclaimed that there is no hesitation in the US administration about improving and further strengthening relations with India in all fields, and hopes to pay personal attention to it.

Though not usually attending dinners by Ambassadors, he expressed gratitude to attend dinner in honour of Fulbright. He proposed to call Kaul the next week and discuss the whole range of Indo-American relations. Regarding PL-480, he would alert Kaul about meeting some Congressmen and Senators, which Kaul was already doing.

Kaul ends the letter stating that the dinner atmosphere was informal and marked by friendship and frankness. Dobrynin’s presence, he highlighted, added a useful dimension to the talks, particularly in view of Brezhnev’s visit to India.

In fact, the significance of the dinner itself was not Fulbright being the guest of honour, but having both Kissinger and Dobrynin, who was the Soviet envoy in Washington and one of the longest-serving, in the same private dinner hall of an ambassador of a third world country. That Kissinger attended the dinner, despite staying away from such ambassadorial events, could be on account of Dobrynin’s presence and that the discussion veered towards India-Soviet relations and Fulbright providing positive vibes of the relationship were indications of this aspect.

Fulbright’s comments, in fact, reflected the Nehruvian view that India and its non-alignment policy were intended to be a bridge between the developed and the third worlds, though it also implied a bridge between the rival superpowers. Many decades down the line, today Washington can be seen to be comfortable with India’s strategic partnership with both the US and Russia notwithstanding the acrimony between the great powers, particularly on Ukraine. In fact, these sentiments were reiterated in a subsequent meeting between Kissinger and Kaul as listed below.

(c) Letter from Ambassador to the Foreign Minister dated 7 December 1973

This is apparently the last letter available in Subject File No. 1 of T.N. Kaul papers and hence could be the last conversation of 1973. Kaul met Kissinger on 7 December, following the meeting with Sisco and Porter, and discussed the former’s visit to China and Islamabad. There were reiterations about the need to strengthen the India-US relationship.

Kaul tells Kissinger that after the rupee agreement had crossed the US Congress, the path would be paved for improving relations in the commercial, economic, scientific, technological and cultural fields. The idea of a Bi-National Commission to go into these questions could be then taken up. Kissinger welcomed these suggestions

US not panicked by India-Soviet relations: He then remarked: “The US is not panicked by closer Indo-Soviet friendly relations.” Kaul reminds Kissinger of what Dobrynin said at the dinner party, that the Soviets are also not panicked by closer Indo-American relations. Kaul suggests that Kissinger make a statement about improving Indo-American relations in his next press conference and that it would have a good effect on America and India.

The reason why Kaul proposed this was also on account of a New York Times report on the same day which had an editorial titled “India Tilts.” Kissinger, however, stated that neither he nor the State Department attaches any importance to the New York Times. Kaul, however, reminded that many Senators and Congressmen are influenced by American media and it is necessary to correct misperceptions.

Kissinger then agrees to make a statement on Indo-US relations at the next presser. He also proposes to visit India in the Spring of 1974.

Visit to China: Kissinger explained that India had not figured very much in his talks with the Chinese. They had, however, expressed “extreme distrust of India’s relations with the Soviet Union, Collective Asian Security Treaty, etc.” They also distrusted India’s sincerity but did not expand on this theme. Kissinger mentioned that he told the Chinese that it was his impression that India was ready to normalize relations with China and there was no difficulty on account of India’s relations with the Soviet Union as India was not a stooge of the Soviet Union.

Kaul asked Kissinger whether China had said anything about their relations with Bangladesh and in particular about its admission to the UN. Kissinger replied “On Bangladesh, I think they will follow Pakistan. It depends on when Pakistan will recognize Bangladesh.” Kissinger added that the Chinese think they “have the best chance in Bangladesh and maybe they are right.”

Kaul expressed hope that the US would not make another wrong assessment about Bangladesh, and the Indian view was that pro-Chinese elements in Bangladesh were very small and were getting weaker partly because of China’s attitude to Bangladesh’s admission to the UN. In any case, there was no conflict of interests or policies between the USA and India vis-à-vis, Bangladesh. 

Kissinger replied “on Bangladesh, now that it exists, we are on your side. We want stability there and recognize your major role there.”

Bhutto’s double games: Kissinger mentioned that he met Bhutto for one hour during the stop-over in Islamabad and that Bhutto did not complain against India though he had expressed concern about Pakistan’s relative military weakness vis-à-vis India.

Kaul, in turn, told Kissinger that Bhutto had been making several statements in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir inciting young guerillas to join Pakistan commandos and calling for general strike in whole of J&K. This, Kaul pointed out, was violation of Shimla agreement under which both sides agreed to finally settle the question of J&K bilaterally, and not to do anything to unilaterally alter the situation or hinder normalization of relations.

Delinking Pakistan from South Asia: Kaul suggested to Kissinger the desirability of having a separate Assistant Secretary for South Asia, or combining it with the South East Asian or East Asian Division rather than the present Middle East Division, as sufficient attention was not paid to the problems of South Asia because of the current arrangement.

Kissinger admitted the logic and validity of this argument and asked whether organizationally it could be better to attach Pakistan to the Middle East and the rest to East Asia. Kaul felt this would “be politically, geographically, geo-politically, economically and otherwise undesirable and a wrong step.” He pointed out that Pakistan was part of the sub-continent and if it was separated and joined to the Middle East, this would encourage suspicion that the US was trying to take Pakistan out of its natural geo-political area.

Kissinger agreed with Kaul’s view and stated that he would consider joining the whole of the sub-continent to the East Asia Division as creating a separate division for South Asia would not be possible.

The Seventh Fleet issue, again: Kaul told Kissinger that the Indian Parliament and public opinion were concerned about the statement of US Defence Secretary Schlessinger that the Seventh Fleet would make frequent and result visits to the Indian Ocean. Kaul also drew his attention to the paragraph in the Indo-Soviet Joint communique which had accepted the idea of a Conference of littoral and other states about the Indian Ocean.

Kaul also reminded Kissinger about the UN Resolution on the subject and asked whether America would make a positive response to this suggestion. Kissinger, however, did not commit himself but promised to consider it while assuring that the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean was not aimed against India and in any case, the present aircraft carried would not be replaced.

This being the last conversation between the two provided significant indications on not just the state of India-US relations but also on the geo-political situation, especially about this part of the world, at that point in time.

While the acceptance of both superpowers for India to have equally cordial and friendly partnerships with both countries has been a highlight of the last few conversations, including this one, a major insight from this letter was the Chinese thinking about India, as conveyed by Kissinger. Though it is hard to judge whether Kissinger had made his own improvisations to these messages, the fact that China had expressed distrust over India and questioned its sincerity is an important message that Kissinger would not have hesitated to convey.

The interesting part is that China has questioned India’s proximity to the Soviet Union though it does not consider that Beijing was also an erstwhile communist ally of Moscow until the Sino-Soviet rivalries broke out. That China had a myopic view of world affairs and the actions of its neighbours and rivals was evident at that point itself.

The Chinese approach on Bangladesh of tagging along with Pakistan and their thinking that they “have the best chance in the new nation” comes as a critical insight as it denotes China’s confidence in regaining influence in a nation, whose birth it opposed and reportedly sent mercenaries to fight against the Mukti Bahini. Kaul tried to caution Kissinger, on his assertion that the Chinese thinking might be right, by reminding him not to repeat the mistakes of 1971 on Bangladesh. This prompted Kissinger’s change of stand, prompting him to proclaim that the US was on India’s side and recognize India’s role in Bangladesh. 

The discussion on the South Asia division is quite significant as it underlines the fact that India fully endorsed the US role as a global policeman with the inherent right to manage global affairs through its own administrative division. While India was uncomfortable linking its region of influence with West Asia, the proposition that Pakistan could be de-linked from South Asia was also not acceptable, thus highlighting the regional geo-political paradoxes.

Similarly, by asserting that the aircraft carrier cannot be changed, Kissinger latently asserts the US right to send its naval fleet to any part of the world to synergize its global role. The Indian reactions, though prompted by the 1971 hangover, did not muster much traction.

On the whole, while Kissinger looked favourable to India in many respects, and openly gestured support for its stand, Kissinger was circumspect about elucidating US priorities and interests even while expressing the desire to augment India-US relations.

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Conversations of 1975-76

While earlier sections covered the records in Subject File No. 1 of the T.N. Kaul papers, there were a few more references to and conversations with Kissinger in Subject File No. 3 (Part-I), which largely pertained to matters like the revival of US arms sales to Pakistan in the early 1975 and many discussions on the political situation in India. 

The CIA’s role: In one such conversation, Kaul is seen as remarking to Kissinger: “I reminded him for a few minutes after the officials had left about his promise to remove Peter Burleigh. He said he would instruct Saxbe to do so. I asked him to ensure that the CIA was not getting involved in our internal affairs. He assured me that so far as India is concerned the CIA or the US Embassy in Delhi have absolutely no contact with the opposition agitation or its leaders.

This was a conversation in January 1975 when political agitations were peaking in India under the JP movement. This links the US to the general political environment and how it was influencing or affecting foreign policy and other grand strategic issues, like the nuclear one.

Anti-Indian feelings in Bangladesh: In another letter, Kaul states thus: “As he had told Foreign Minister and me before, America did not wish to see any anti-Indian feelings develop in Bangladesh. There was no conflict of interests between India and USA in Bangladesh.” Kissinger then added humorously: “Last time when they won the election in America, India marched into Bangladesh. I hope you won’t do it during our next elections.

Kaul replied “It was Pakistan and your policy that forced us to go into Bangladesh last time. I hope neither of you will force us again.” Kaul states that Kissinger took his caustic reply in good spirits and added that “we have been telling Pakistan not to encourage anti-Indian feelings in Bangladesh. I am not sure that they will always listen to us but judging from events so far, I get the impression that they are being restrained, cautious and careful.”

(d) Letter from T.N. Kaul to Y.B Chavan, Foreign Minister dated 26/8/1976 with a copy to the Prime Minister

Kissinger’s Pakistan visit: Kissinger said to Kaul that while his visit to Pakistan was mainly to discuss the reprocessing plan issue, the American media had given it the appearance of a dramatic confrontation. Kaul refers to reports linking Pakistani request for sophisticated arms, like ground-to-air missiles and A-7 Corsair aircraft with the US despite eliciting Pakistani cooperation on the reprocessing plant. To Kaul’s point that these arms will have a destabilising effect, Kissinger termed them as of “modest proportions.”

Kaul pointed out the efforts made in the US media and sections of the Congress to make India a scapegoat for all issues, depict GoI as hostile to the US, distort internal developments and activate the nuclear proliferation issue to paint India in a bad light.

Kissinger’s reply is interesting; he remarks that much of the criticism of India was from people who in his view had been overly friendly towards India in the past and had made India out to be a “paragon of virtue which India had never claimed or aspired to be”.  He preferred to view nations in the light of their permanent interests and actions in international affairs in recent years.

Kissinger spoke in a somewhat philosophical vein about India being an “incipient great power” and many times referred to the fact that there were no basic major differences between the two countries. There was a need to have an adult view of each other instead of the desire to score small points against one another.

On the nuclear issue, Kissinger pointed to his own defence of US fuel shipments for Tarapur. He had also refrained from commenting on the emergency in India.

With regard to the agitation in US media and Congress against India regarding the supply of enriched uranium, he said “the main reason for it is that India was the last country to detonate a nuclear explosion. It is not that they disbelieve or suspect the motives and intentions of India. Their apprehension is that if other countries follow India, they would not be as dependable and reliable and may misuse nuclear technology. That is why America is against proliferation. So far as I am concerned, I have supported the fulfilment of our agreement with India.”

Despite these words, Kaul is doubtful if America will honour its agreement regarding the supply of enriched uranium for Tarapur. The feeling in the US Congress is very strong on the subject and the International Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives has unanimously passed a resolution which would bar the supply of “nuclear material, equipment or devices to any country that does not agree not to use such material, equipment or devices for any nuclear explosion device, regardless of how the device itself is intended to be used.”

This conversation points to the friction that persisted after the 1974 Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion and how it affected fuel supplies to the US-built Tarapur nuclear power plant. What is manifestly clear throughout is how Kissinger took a studied approach to India’s PNE. As was shown in Part I of this series, he was not overtly critical of Indian tests, and even in the press conferences, he is seen to list facts rather than being aggressively critical of the Indian tests like his Canadian counterpart.  

Of course, one can correlate these with the Kissinger papers to understand how he reacted within the US government and the State Department and whether it was more of his immaculate realist statecraft at play in the public domain and conversations with Indian officials.

Nonetheless, what is clear from these documents in the Indian archives is that Kissinger comes across as a completely different personality than the monstrous image that has been bestowed on him for decades in sections of both the Indian and international media. While he was always tactful, shrewd and to some extent even manipulative, Kissinger is study on how statecraft works in the hands of a superlative practitioner.