Henry Kissinger, as seen in Indian diplomatic papers – II

In part one of this exploration on how Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State who passed away on 29th November, figured in the Indian archival records, we largely listed the references in the correspondences that T.N. Kaul, then Indian Ambassador to the US, had with his colleagues in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). 

In this second part, we continue to explore more of Kaul’s correspondences, particularly in the years 1973 and 1975, but also look at correspondences by other personalities and records like the P.N. Haksar Papers. 

L.K Jha’s meeting with Henry Kissinger 

L.K. Jha, who was earlier the Secretary to Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi, had also served as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), served as India’s Ambassador in Washington during the crucial years of 1970-73. 

In his book White House Years, Henry Kissinger, who was still the National Security Advisor (NSA) when Jha served in Washington, is seen to be praiseworthy of Jha’s diplomatic skills. That India-US relations were then at a nadir, thanks to the grave differences over India’s role in the liberation war and creation of Bangladesh, and that an administrator like Jha, who had no prior experience in diplomacy, had accomplished his role successfully is testified by none other than Kissinger himself.

Relevant to this context is his letter to Sardar Swaran Singh, the External Affairs Minister, dated 29 June 1970, listed in P.N. Haksar Papers (Installment III, Nehru Memorial Library and Museum, now the Prime Minister’s Museum and Library), in which Jha talks about the “first diplomatic assignment in my life,” and seeks the minister’s guidance and help to make it a success.  

An interesting part of this letter is how Jha described India-US relations in 1970 as “not of differences but of indifference.” To generations of scholars who studied this relationship and was fed on Dennix Kux’s description of “estranged democracies” whose engagement became the story of later years, Jha’s description may come as a new insight. Jha also makes it a point to praise his colleagues in the Washington mission, particularly M.K. Rasgotra, who, in subsequent years, went on to become India’s Foreign Secretary. 

Another notable point is that T.N. Kaul was at this time the Foreign Secretary and subsequently succeeded Jha as the Ambassador in Washington – an interesting instance on how Ambassadors in major stations were then senior to Foreign Secretary, a trend which was seen on many subsequent occasions. 

(a) Letter from L.K Jha to T.N. Kaul, dated 18 April 1971 (on the meeting with Kissinger)

Addressing Kaul as Tikki, Jha refers to a dinner meeting with Kissinger and Senator Stevenson, son of Adlai Stevenson in which the Democrat senator confronts Kissinger on Indo-China. Terming Kissinger’s reply as illuminating, Jha goes on the describe the sum-total of what Kissinger said as reply to various questions.

Kissinger had remarked: “People who keep on asking for a target date for final US withdrawal from South Vietnam, whether they are Senators or people in the press, are asking the wrong question. The President won’t answer it because he cannot. There is no target date. The earlier the better is the only way the question can be answered. The real thing to explore is what are the factors which will determine the time-table of withdrawal. Obviously, the logistics of the problem are relevant. You can step up the rate of the withdrawal up to a point, but not go beyond that.”

However, Kissinger continued, “we are far from reaching that stage. The two things which have significance are prisoners of war and the capacity of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves, not for ever but at least for a period after the withdrawal. Of these, the prisoners of war issue is the less critical. We have other bargaining counters up our sleeves to deal with the problem even after our withdrawal from South Vietnam. The capacity of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves is coming up much faster than people realise. Of course, if the North Vietnamese chose to negotiate, everything could be speeded up. I am not without hope that they will.”

Kissinger then stated that he agreed with the Indian Ambassador, in a sense, that “the President made a mistake by announcing his peace terms publicly. They should have been conveyed to Hanoi either at Paris or through friendly powers so that they would not have dismissed them as an ultimate position or an ultimatum.” 

“One of the things we have learnt is that, Kissinger added, “if we do make any political moves or concessions, we should do it quietly and convey them to Hanoi before they are published in this country. When we announce anything publicly, Hanoi feels that this is a compromise with and concessions to our own critics for which they have to take no counter-proposals or counter-offers.” 

About East Pakistan before the war: Jha points out that he had the opportunity to broach the situation in East Bengal with Kissinger. Referring to an earlier conversation between the two on the same matter, Kissinger replied: “I am afraid, we are very badly advised. All our experts in the Pentagon and elsewhere were dead sure that West Pakistani military forces could not overpower the people of East Bengal, but it seems they have done so. What options do we now have? We must be Machiavellian and accept what looks like a fait accompli (emphasis original) – don’t your think?”

Jha, in turn, reminds Kissinger that he “had not quite subscribed to the view that the Pakistani military forces could not overpower the freedom fighters because I had no illusions about their ruthlessness and the extent to which they would go, but it is equally clear that the military victory is not going to provide a permanent link between what is now officially East Pakistan and West Pakistan.”

Jha also tells Kissinger that “India and the USA had a common interest in ensuring that the people of East Bengal felt that we are their friends. So far as India is concerned, they can have no doubt about it because we have the friendliest feelings for them, not out of any motivation or self-interest, but as a natural instinctive response. Surely, in the United States too, there is a great deal of positive response and sympathy towards the people of East Bengal on a humanitarian plane.”

Even on a Machiavellian plan, Jha points out, US self-interest in the long-term lies in not alienating the people of East Bengal. Should we not, therefore, have a closer coordination of our policies in helping the people of East Bengal? 

Kissinger deftly replies that “this is desirable and possible provided you don’t threaten us with the terrible unpopularity the US will have if it does not fall in line with your policies and view-point.”

Jha makes clear in the letter that he was taken by surprise, “I was not quite sure what provided this comment and whether he was just speaking off the cuff.” He though countered Kissinger by saying that “I was surprise this more, as it was my impression that our Foreign Office had kept Ambassador Keating very well informed and there had developed no differences.” 

On his riposte, Jha felt that Kissinger appeared to change his ground a little bit when he stated that the “White House certainly agrees with the thesis you have been propounding that a strong India is a necessary counter-poise from the US point of view to a strong China.” 

Kissinger goes on to add: “The State Department has been banking on Japan, and we have gone along with it because Indo-American relations have been clouded by a large number of short-sighted professionals. Basically, you are right, or may be right, when you say that it is not Japan but India which can save South and South-East Asia. The President sees it more clearly than people in the State Department.”

Kissinger concludes the conversation by assuring Jha that they will meet again and opines that it is the Indian envoy’s turn to give the former a lunch. However, Kissinger places a strange request: “please ensure that whatever we discuss and talk should not go to the State Department either her or through Ambassador Keating in New Delhi.” Kissinger then instructs Jha to “keep exchanging ideas and if we can get to a constructive base by the time your Prime Minister comes and meets the President, we might really achieve something of great significance.” 

Jha analyses this intense conversation by highlighting that Kissinger is “not on the best possible terms with the State Department, specially as it has been said for a long time and ultimately on the floor of the Senate that it is he and not Willian Rogers who shapes the country’s foreign policy.”

The President, Jha points out, “tried to pour oil over troubled waters and referred to Rogers in glowing terms. Rogers, nevertheless, is chafing with a sense of grievance. Kissinger, on his part, never misses an opportunity to emphasize and underscore his own importance. Pointing out that after the dinner, Kissinger received many calls which seemed to be from the President, Jha concludes the letter by stating that he was not taking all of Kissinger’s remarks “at their face value” and that he would like to take Kissinger’s exuberance with “a pinch of salt.”

This is one rare and significant piece of conversation that precedes both the events of 1971 and subsequent conversations between Kissinger and Kaul in subsequent years. Like in the conversations with Kaul in which Kissinger disowned the actions of the State Department, it is evident that this is a legacy that Kissinger has carried from his NSA days.

However, the most significant part of this conversation with Jha, in the presence of a US Senator, was how Kissinger ingeniously conveyed to Jha that the US administration’s views were not in consonance with India on East Pakistan. While again putting the blame at the doors of the State Department, Kissinger seemed to convey the department’s conclusion that the Pakistani army will prevail in East Pakistan. 

Even when Jha tried to convey that the Indian government and the US mission in New Delhi were having no differences over the East Pakistan situation, Kissinger again veers the topic to how India is seen in administration’s priorities and yet again blames the State Department for under-valuing India’s role. Kissinger tops it up by requesting that no part of the conversation should reach the State Department. 

Thus, Jha letter reveals the essential approach and demeanor of Kissinger even before he became the Secretary of State. As was revealed in Kaul’s correspondences of 1973-74, listed in Part I of this series, the same approach was in abundant display in subsequent years in office. 

Conversations with T.N. Kaul

(b) Luncheon meetings between Dr Henry Kissinger and Ambassador at Ambassador’s residence, dated 15 June 1973 

This document is filed in T.N. Kaul Papers, (Subject File No. 1 [Instalment I, II and III], Nehru Memorial Library and Museum, now the Prime Minister’s Museum and Library). 

This is evidently T.N. Kaul’s first meeting with Kissinger after taking over as Indian Ambassador in Washington D.C. 

Kissinger informs Kaul that the President was keen to meet him either in Camp David or Washington in first fortnight of July, and also that he was waiting to host the Indian Prime Minister in Lake Placid. 

1971 was reaction to a tactical situation: Kaul informs Kissinger that “we have got over the head generated by the events of 1971 and so had the U.S., and that we will. like to concentrate on the present and the future.” Kissinger justified the US actions in 1971 stating that they “were reactions to a tactical situation and were not in accordance with any fundamental US interest.” (emphasis mine)

Kaul mentioned that he had missed the hint from Kissinger in their previous meeting of his planned to China, but also that Kissinger had told him that US wants a strong India and did not favour Chinese domination. Kissinger confirmed that this remains his position even after the visit. When Kaul welcomed the US détente with China and Russia, Kissinger replied that each country should choose its own foreign policy and would not force any choice on India. 

Qualifying on this statement, Kissinger stated that US was using its influence with the Chinese to improve the latter’s relations with India. Kaul responded that though there has been some improvement in the style, it has not shown in the substance of the relationship. Kaul rued that there has been no response to the feelers India had put out toe China and perhaps Beijing was waiting for normalisation of India-Pakistan relation. Kissinger agreed with this point. 

Recognition of Bangladesh and PoWs: Kaul pointed out that India is making every effort in this direction and that persuading Bangladesh to give up its pre-condition of recognition by Pakistan, and that the humanitarian issues were separated from legal and political issues in the 17 April Joint Declaration. Kissinger, for his part, felt that it should be possible to arrange simultaneous recognition of Bangladesh with the return of prisoners of war (PoWs). 

However, Kaul provided two Pakistan Aide Memoires which should Pakistan did not support such an arrangement. Kissinger promised to pressure President Bhutto on this when he visits Washington. Kaul opined that following recognition of Bangladesh, Pakistan can talk direction on issues like repatriation of Bengalis and Pakistanis in each other’s territories, the status of PoWs, and the question of war-crime trials. 

Kissinger retorted by asking whether war-crime trials were actually necessary, which, he felt, was prompted by public opinion. Instead, he felt, that there should be simultaneous movement on all these categories. 

The Indian envoy also pointed out the delay in recognition by Bhutto being surprising as the latter had committed in Shimla to recognise Bangladesh by July or August 1972, which Kissinger also endorses. Kaul mentioned that a section of PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party to which Bhutto belonged) had approved the recognition but opposed a referendum on the issue. Both expressed doubts about whether Bhutto was serious and that no can be certain about him. 

Neighbours fearing a strong India: Kaul told Kissinger about Sisco’s concern about India’s neighbours being apprehensive about a strong India. Emphasizing that India has good relations with neighbours, he hoped this assessment is not shared by the White House. Instead, Kaul points out, the real fears in the region is about China. Kaul talks about how the Burmese had conveyed about Chinese intervention in their internal affairs to the Indian Foreign Minister. While affirming that he does not see India as a threat to its smaller neighbour, he opines that this is judged on the basis of one’s actions. 

Kaul, however, explains to Kissinger that India has greatest stake in the stability, cohesion and prosperity of Pakistan, and that it was to help Bhutto, as the first democratically elected leader, that India had made concessions at Shimla, notwithstanding strong domestic opposition against withdrawal from territories captured by Indian armed forces.

Kissinger, for his part, points out that Pakistanis have accused India of encouraging separatist tendencies in Baluchistan, which Kaul rejects stating that India did not have any physical contact with either Baluchistan or the frontier province. Citing the case of foreign arms discovered in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, Kaul affirms that even Pakistan accepts there was no Indian role in it. Interestingly, to Kaul's question on what India gains by destabilising Pakistan, Kissinger stated that many Indians have never accepted partition, and that right wing groups like the Jan Sangh have articulated such positions. 

Kaul, however, emphasizes that the Indian government has at no time been interested in such idea whether it was Pakistan or Bangladesh, and that the PM had made this quite clear during and after the 1971 conflict, even in Washington. Kaul tries to end this debate by remarking: “we had enough domestic problems of our own and would not increase them by any merger.” Kissinger attempts a final word by remarking in a jocular vein that “Bangladesh was a loser.” 

However, the debate continues as the apprehensions expressed by the Shah of Iran over disintegration of Pakistan comes up, and Kissinger stating that even the US “too had the impression that India’s intervention in West Pakistan was intended to further dismember Pakistan.” Kaul pointed out that the Shah’s misgivings was because his advisors gave him only the Pakistani version, which was held by Zahedi, then Iranian Foreign Minister and later the Ambassador to US, who had also confirmed to Kaul about sending arms to Pakistan in 1965. Kaul indicated that the Shah’s concerns were largely about Baluchi minority in Iran and Arab neighbours, mainly Iraq. 

Kaul pointed out that both the US as well as Iran were non-committal about arms given to Tehran reaching Pakistan though Kissinger tried to impress that arms transfers are done under severe restrictions. However, Kaul conveyed that some arms, including tanks, have landed up in Pakistan in both 1971 and 1972, which, even when intended to strength militaristic and anti-Indian groups, will weak the democratic forces and not in interest of US, India or Pakistan. At this point, Kissinger tried to wash off his hand stating that the “US was now more aloof from the evolution of the sub-continent and that the US did not intend to send any large scale arms to Pakistan, apart from spares.

Chinese attitudes towards India: The Indian Ambassador then asked Kissinger for his assessments about Chinese attitudes towards India, to which the latter replied that the Chinese were emotional about India, partly due to their relationship with Pakistan. Kissinger also felt that it was also “due to the arrogant treatment to some of their leaders in India in 1960, 1961 and 1962.” 

The Chinese, Kissinger pointed out, believed that India was acting as a Russian puppet in the pursuit of Soviet foreign policy objectives. For Instance, he remarked, “should India sign a treaty with Indonesia of a nature similar to the Soviet treaty, the Chinese would see that as a treaty bringing the Soviet Union into Indonesia.” 

Kaul, for his part, explained that PM Nehru never took a hard line with China and that the Chinese had themselves roused strong feelings because of their somersault in their attitude towards the McMohan Line in 1960 and their armed incursions into Indian territory. The Indo-Soviet treaty, Kaul insisted, “was not a military alliance and we had, in fact, offered to have similar treaties with other countries.” Kaul reminded Kissinger that it was President Nixon himself who pointed out in 1971 that no such need existed for a similar treaty between India and the US. The conversation on China ended with Kaul remarking that Pandit Nehru had declared even in 1960, when Chou En-Lai visited India, that one of the cornerstones of our foreign policy was to work for friendly relations between India and China. 

Economic cooperation and PL-480: Kissinger mentions to Kaul that his predecessor, L.K. Jha, was already apprised about the US government being ready to formalise economic relations through a Joint Economic Commission, which could be extended to cultural and scientific matters. Kaul, however, requested that this could be done after the irritants are addressed first. He insisted that first priority should be given to find a solution the PL-480 rupee funds and that the US Mission in Delhi could perhaps negotiate on this. 

Kissinger replied that a decision has been taken to resolve this using the Saulneir Report and that instructions will be sent to the Mission in Delhi. Kaul then suggested that the same team can then work on framing a Joint Commission, and reiterating the President’s advice that “we should proceed step by step.” 

Pointing out that he could not gauge the US position as firm or precise on his visit to the State Department, Kaul affirms that India should get some idea of the pledges before finalising plans. Kissinger replies that Jha was informed about the US development assistance being in a framework within which it could be slowly phased out. Kaul endorsed it stating India wants to phase out all external assistance by the 5th Plan in 1980. 

Kaul explained that the Indian desire was to substitute trade for aid and that this could be done only if exports are encouraged. While there are encouraging features in the Trade Bill, Kaul singled out the $25 million quote on certain items which needed to be liberalised. Kissinger then suggests that he meet the Treaty Secretary and other officials to resolve this. 

The discussions then veered to other issues with Kaul congratulating Kissinger on the Vietnam agreement but asking why no reference has been made of Cambodia, which the latter attributed to three-way negotiations including China. The two diplomats extensively discussed the situation in the Far East. 

Like in the earlier conversation with L.K. Jha, this seemingly debut conversation with T.N. Kaul on taking charge of Indian Ambassador in Washington D.C. is yet another astute narrative on Kissinger’s statecraft. The highlight of the conversation was how he worded the justification for the US responses to the liberation war in Bangladesh by terming it as “reactions to a tactical situation” which were not “in accordance with any fundamental US interest.” 

It will be worth examining, in retrospect, whether this was the official line of the US government in public, and if not, how this represents Kissinger’s style of diplomatic negotiations – keep the opposite party in good humour, empathize with their views to the extent of making them feel that he is on their side, and then draw the dagger and claw to drive home the US point resolutely. 

This was also evident in the way Kissinger used the conversation on Shah of Iran to impress upon Kaul that the US too felt that India had the intention to dismember Pakistan, which, in fact, India did by creating Bangladesh – an aspect which Indian diplomatic historians largely overlook. Kissinger sought to remain ‘aloof’ from commitments arising from Bangladesh’s creation, including getting Pakistan to recognise the new nation, get both countries to agree on PoWs and war-trials and so on. In the same vein, he placed the task of resolving economic irritants on the Treasury department and the US Mission in India, thus largely using the first conversation with Kaul to clearly drive home the points he wanted to make. 

(c) Letter to Foreign minister from Ambassador, dated 09 September 1973 

Kaul details in the letter that Kissinger was invited to a dinner for RBI Governor L.K Jha was visiting Washington, and that though Kissinger could not make it to the dinner, he had a separate meeting with Jha for an hour, and both having a private conversation for 5 minutes. Kissinger inquired about Moynihan (Daniel Patrick), the US Ambassador India since January 1973, about whom we have detailed in Part I of this series. 

Kissinger again sought to drive home a profound point when he remarked that the bilateral relations had shown considerable improvement though he regretted that “between India and US, there were no hair down sessions to discuss everything with candour as between the US and a number of other countries including even China.”  

Kaul lists other points that were discussed: 

The first point was about the forthcoming visit of Indian Foreign Minister to New York. Kissinger volunteered to meet the Minister at the White House in Washington as that will enable him to quietly usher in the Minister to meet the President as the latter was not meeting any other visiting minister other than Gromyko (Soviet Union). Kissinger also offers a lunch in honour of the Foreign Minister at the State Department where senators from the Foreign Relations Committee will also be present. 

Rescheduling of debts: Kissinger raised the question of rescheduling of debts that year and remarked that “after the bureaucrats had played their game, he hoped to settle this issue in the near future.” Jha, instead, proposed that instead of an acrimony-ridden re-scheduling of debts as an annual exercise, the US could be imaginative by rescheduling all debts during the 5th Five Year Plan period, particularly since massive payments for food imports and net transfers from India to US are already happening. 

Kaul also adds by stating that by tying debts by Consortium with non-Consortium group will prompt the Soviet bloc to demand repayment in form of exports from India and no in convertible currency. Kissinger accepts the logic and said he will examine it further. 

Image problem after Liberation War: The discussion was about a negative report on India in New York which was palpably attributed to sources in the US Embassy in Delhi, and probably revolved around American scholars in India. Kaul had apparently written a letter to the New York Times, which Kissinger endorsed. 

However, Kaul mentioned to him that the sources could probably be lower-level embassy officials who needed to be pulled up. Jha intervened to suggest that lower-level officials “were ticked off for identifying with the Indian view point” during the conflict, and under career pressure, many of them are deliberately giving anti-India briefings to the Press and possibly also to the State Department. Kissinger promised to take up the matter with Moynihan and curb this tendency. 

South Asia division in State Department: Kaul suggested that it was unfair to lump India, Pakistan and Bangladesh with the Middle East Division in the State Department and that Kissinger should think of a more logical arrangement. Kissinger states that he was combining the sub-continent and South Asia with East Asia Division and changing the officials. To this, Kaul pointed out that all senior officials in the South Asia Division had served in Pakistan and none of them in India, which was reason for their incorrect slant in attitude to India. Kissinger promised to rectify this in the near future. 

US and Kashmir: Pointing to the normalisation in the sub-continent, Jha implored Kissinger that the time has come to ensure that “Kashmir did not once against become an international question,” and that the one step towards this would be “to dissolve the UNMOGIP which was wasting UN funds and had no legal role to play as the UN ceasefire line had ceased to exist by agreement between India and Pakistan.” 

The RBI governor and former ambassador also added that the US Congress was always critical of allotment of funds for the UN and withdrawing UNMOGIP might go down well with them purely as an economy measure. In his reply, Kissinger agreed to consider it later as he felt it would be premature to push the idea z’in present circumstances.” 

Kissinger further stated to Jha that he has been discussing normalisation of relations in the sub-continent with Kaul and that he had also taken a proposal to the Shah of Iran, who neither accepted nor rejected it (though Kissinger not clarifying what that proposal was). 

When Kaul congratulated Kissinger on becoming Secretary of State and hoping greater coordination on foreign policy matters, Kissinger remarked that he would have been reluctant to accept it “but for Watergate.” Even though he had the final say on foreign affairs, with regard to major powers, Kissinger stated that he will not be able to control the bureaucracy. 

While Kissinger felt that India-US relations are improving and will be further strengthened, Kaul added that “the tilt was now over” and that if PL-480 and other issues are resolved, relations will be strengthened. Kaul also thanked Kissinger for convincing Bhutto on the India-Pakistan agreement while Kissinger conveyed that Bhutto was informed of no further supply of arms. 

Kaul ends the letter by stating that their general impression after meeting Kissinger, who met Jha in spite of his preoccupations, was to probably convey his personal desire to play an increasing role in strengthening relations with India. The invitation to the Foreign Minister could also be intended as a concrete gesture towards this. 

The significance of the letter is the fact that it details the first conversation with Kissinger after he became Secretary of State. The change of office certainly seems to reflect in his responses and approaches. Kissinger had started the conversation on a candid note by stating, though not in equivocal terms, that India was not as important as China for having tense and plain-speaking discussions, he conveyed it with a smoothness that did not ruffle his Indian guests. 

As the conversation went forward, Kissinger is seen to be genuinely expressing the desire to improve relations with India by promising to intervene in almost all the areas flagged by Kaul and Jha. Unlike the earlier conversation with Jha while he was still NSA, Kissinger this time was more forthcoming on resolving the PL-480 matters, and more importantly, espoused the confidence that he can handle the bureaucracy better then on. 

Kissinger’s role in cajoling Bhutto on the Shimla Agreement and his initiative to clear the Shah’s misgivings about India were evident of this reformed approach, which Kaul too endorse about the general impression they gained from the conversation. That Kissinger was keen to arrange a special meeting for the Indian Foreign Minister with the President also confirmed these transformations. 

(d) Foreign Minister’s meeting with Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger, on 03 October 1973 at the State Department.   

This document, from the T.N. Kaul papers, seems more of a note from the Indian Embassy in the name of the Ambassador than a letter written by the Ambassador. Whether it is addressed to the Foreign Secretary or concerned Joint Secretary in MEA is also not clear. 

The Note states that the meeting between the FM and Secretary went on for half an hour before lunch and both the Ambassador (Kaul) and Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, were present. 

The two dignitaries exchanged a handful of pleasantries including for Kissinger’s appointment as Secretary of State, the Foreign Minister’s speech at the UN, invitation extended to Kissinger to visit India, appreciation for each other’s ambassadors and a specific reference to Moynihan “imbibing the spirit of India.” Kissinger stated that he was considering getting Moynihan back, but have decided not to do so owing to the importance of Indo-American relations. 

The FM stated that a mutuality of interest will enable things to change for the better and lead to greater security and stability. Kissinger pointed out that “the difficulties of 1971 are over and we can now have better relations. We consider India as our key interest in South Asia; we have no clash of interests and an objective basis exists for good relations between us.”

The FM then gave an elaborate enunciation on South Asian having many things in common and that 700 million people could lead a better life if there is peace and cooperation. He proclaimed that India has no desire to lead or dominate, or overlord the area. “Our size naturally creates some feelings among our smaller neighbours. We therefore go out of our way to reassure them. We have never interfered in their internal affairs or political, social or economic system, and have close and friendly relations with all of them,” he added. 

When he spoke about how the Shimla and Delhi agreements demonstrated that problems could be solved peacefully, Kissinger endorsed it as a major development. The FM reminded that “despite military vicissitudes, we did not give any feeling to Bhutto that he represented a defeated country. Our PM made his feel completely at ease.”

Conversations with Shah of Iran: Kissinger states that US does not support one side or other through they have concern about Afghanistan, and that both Pakistan Iran have been told not to interfere in Afghanistan unless the latter tries to subvert their internal system. The FM states that this matter came up when he met the “Shahenshah” in Iran. The FM had asked the Shah plainly: “Is it your position that you will always side with Pakistan against India, whatever the merits are?” 

The Shah, according to the FM stated that it was not a blanket commitment, and made two points: (1) if Pakistan was aggressed upon though he also thought that it was not India’s policy to commit aggression’ and (2) if there was a danger of disintegration of Pakistan, particularly in Baluchistan, he will then support Pakistan in resisting such a movement. The FM then told the Shah that the Indian PM had made it clear made times that India had no interest in internal affairs of Afghanistan or Baluchistan. 

To this, Kissinger opined that the Shah was not accusing India but only mentioned various possibilities. The FM replied that he told Shah that India was not supporting any subversive movements in either Baluchistan or NWFP. Kissinger than mentioned about the request from the FM to Shah on whether the latter could consult the FM before providing arms to Pakistan and that he had replied in the affirmative. 

The FM then made it clear to Kissinger that India had no interest in the dismemberment of Pakistan and wanted peaceful, friendly relations with the latter. Kissinger ended the conversation by welcoming this policy.

This conversation at the highest level of foreign policy mandarins in both countries also indicated the maturing of Kissinger in the office of the Secretary of State and showed how he was playing an active role in facilitating peace in South Asia as well as conditioning the role of players from the extended neighbourhood like the Shah of Iran. 

(These conversations continue into November and December of 1973, which are detailed in Part III of this series.)