Much has been written in the last few days about Henry Kissinger, the veteran American statesman, who passed away on 29 November after a mercurial and accomplished lifetime of a century. Few personalities could have witnessed, participated and shaped modern world history and the evolution of the Westphalian state system as we know today as much as this German Jew, who made the United States of America his home, having been lucky enough to escape, in the nick of time, the tentacles of Nazi Germany.  

As Fareed Zakaria noted in his obituary, Kissinger, as the first Jewish and immigrant US Secretary of State, served in that position only for 8 years but created a lasting impact in the shaping of the American grand strategy as well as embedding an intransigent realist character to world affairs or the pursuit of inter-state relations by the comity of nations.

Many accolades like the framing of the Paris Peace Accords of January 1973, the transformation initiated in Sino-American relations, the détente with the Soviet Union and the peace agreements in West Asia are cited to reinforce the Kissinger legacy. However, South Asians, particularly in India and Bangladesh, will have the lasting memories of the carnage of 1971 unleashed by the Pakistan Army in what was erstwhile Bengal, and subsquently East Pakistan, and how the Nixon-Kissinger duo was seen to have tacit complicity in shrugging aside, if not mandating, the Pakistani Army’s brutality. 

History, as judged from this part of the world, may not be kind to Kissinger who was tagged to a perceived hatred towards India and erstwhile leaders like Indira Gandhi. The Kissinger-India binary, for that matter, has not been subjected to an detailed inquisition which could entail not just a vast exploration of archival and oral history accounts across regions, but could also provide insights on a significant chapter in Cold War history.  

In this two-part analysis, The Polity  explores a brief set of references to Kissinger in Indian archival documents to see how the interactions and conversations with this much reverred and equally loathed academic-turned-diplomat went. The analysis largely capture the conversations involving or referring to Kissinger as listed in the T.N. Kaul and P.N. Haksar papers. 

Henry Kissinger in T.N. Kaul Papers

In the records of T.N. Kaul (Subject File No. 1, 2, 3 part-I & II, 4, Papers of T.N. Kaul [Instalment I, II and III], Nehru Memorial Library and Museum, now the Prime Minister’s Museum and Library), which include his speeches as Indian Ambassador in Washington, and his meetings and correspondences with Kissinger in the 1973-75 period, most discussions veered around India-US relations, India-Pakistan relations, wheat purchases and PL-480, Iran and the subcontinent, Bi-National Commission, Cambodia, Bangladesh and so on. 

Interestingly, Kaul describes Kissinger as being cordial in his interactions with Indian officials before becoming the Secretary of State and in the initial months. Record of the meetings between T.N. Kaul and Kissinger in June and July 1973 are important segments of this conversation, including reports sent to the Foreign Ministry. 

(a) Notes on T.N. Kaul’s meetings with Henry Kissinger in August 1973 

Kissinger, Iran’s Shah and India: In his telegram to the Secretary to the Prime Minister, Ambassdor Kaul mentions that the issues discussed include Indo-US relations (PL-480/Rupee problem) as well as Iran and Bangladesh. The context is the Indian Foreign Minister’s recent visit and the Shah of Iran having briefed Kissinger about the visit. 

Kissinger said: “The Shah assured us that he would consult your (Indian) government before making any decisions. We told him we would not give any substantial arms to Pakistan and Bhutto knows this. As I have told you, Ambassador, we have no intention of playing any major role in Pakistan so long as the process of improving relations continues.” 

Kissinger also apparently told Kaul that if India had any workable proposals to make before Bhutto visited the US, he could support them. 

In his subsequent telegram to the Foreign Secretary, Kaul states that Kissinger also said that the Shah told him that our Foreign Minister’s visit had been very useful and removed some of his doubts and suspicions. Shah had told the Minister that before considering giving any help to Pakistan in case of an India-Pakistan conflict, he would first consult India. 

The Shah, Kissinger pointed out, seemed genuinely worried about the integrity of what remains of Pakistan and particularly at Soviet and Afghan attitudes towards Pakhtoonistan and Baluchistan. Kissinger stated that Shah also hinted at the close India-Iraq relations. Regarding arms, Shah was willing to consider the reduction of arms by Pakistan and India. 

In his response, Kaul tells Kissinger that India’s requirements for arms could not be equated with that of either Pakistan or Iran. We had to defend our frontier on two fronts. Kissinger replied that Shah was concerned about India’s expanding navy. Kaul responds that India’s Navy was not aimed against Shah and that the present naval strength was hardly adequate even for our own defences, considering our long coastline. In any case, we had no trouble with Shah and he should have no anxiety, Kaul assured. 

Similarly, on India-Pakistan relations, Kissinger stated that it would be stupid and suicidal for Pakistan to provoke another conflict with India. He thought it was conceivable in the light of India’s superior military strength. Kaul told him that one could not, however, ignore the desire for vengeance of a defeated army, especially if they had access to superior weapons. Kaul mentioned F-4, F-14 and F-15 which the Shah was buying from the US. 

Kissinger, for his part, ruled out the possibility of the Shah transferring any of these planes to Pakistan as they needed special training to operate which the Pakistanis did not have. He assured that America would not give any additional arms to Pakistan. Kissinger also insists that the US did not vitiate the atmosphere between India and Pakistan and that “it would take perhaps another war to make us change this policy.” Kaul replies that India too did not desire any conflict unless Pakistan “forced one upon us as in 1971.” 

It is worth noting that this conversation happened close to two years after the events of December 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh. 

Kissinger’s nomination as Secretary of State: Kaul states that Kissinger did not give any hint that he was going to become the Secretary of State, in this luncheon meeting. “I anticipate that Kissinger will be much more effective as SoS than Rogers was. I am particularly glad about this because Sisco had brought all these ‘boys’ from Pakistan to run the South Asia Division. I had told him so and had also mentioned this to Kissinger. I hope there will be a change now, if not in personnel, at least in attitudes and policies towards India,” Kaul remarks, in an apparent reference to Joseph J. Sisco, the CIA officer, who became Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in 1969. 

Whether Kaul’s complaining about Sisco mattered at all could be a subject of conjecture as Sisco became a close aide to Secretary Kissinger and managed his shuttle diplomacy to West Asia. Nonetheless, Kaul’s remarks largely underlined the antipathy that existed in the US State Department towards India, especially after the 1971 war. That Kaul mentions “boys from Pakistan” (probably those who served in Pakistan) as running the South Asia division implies their natural bias in favour of Pakistan. In fact, even when discussing nuclear policy and issues like the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) the next year, the context cannot be divorced from the general state of Indo-US relations during that period. 

(b) Letter from T.N. Kaul to P.N. Dhar, Secretary to PM, 20 September 1974  

Mrs Gandhi’s CIA fears and Moynihan: In this letter, which is in Subject File No. 2: 1974 of the T.N. Kaul papers, the Indian envoy in Washington tried to clarify with Dhar that he is not allergic to Moynihan, but that he could make factually incorrect statements and give wrong impressions about Indian policy. The reference is to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who served as the US Ambassador to India from 7 January 1973 to 28 February 1975. 

To drive home his point, Kaul explains: “In a recent cable he sent to the State Department, which was leaked to the press, he has linked CIA activities in Chile without determination to go in for nuclear weapons and means of delivery! I do not see how he linked the two and this cast doubts on our various declarations that we are using nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. Such statements coming from a man like Moynihan naturally decrease our credibility and distort our image in the USA.”

Kaul’s reference is to the Cable from Moynihan to Secretary Kissinger, which was reported in the New York Times, and in which the US envoy predicts that Mrs Gandhi will develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems (following the PNE). The Cable also took serious note of the Indian Prime Minister’s statements, citing the coup in Chile, to allege ‘counter-revolutionary actions’ by the CIA against India. At a subsequent presser in Washington, Kaul neither refutes nor confirms such operations of CIA operatives in India. 

Since these conversations regarding CIA's role do not patently involve Kissinger and yet entail detailed discussions, it could be addressed in another analysis. 

(c) Record of Foreign Minister’s Meeting with Henry Kissinger in New York, 15 April 1974

The note starts by mentioning Kissinger’s lighter remark about visiting Kashmir during his visit to India (if in June, to avoid Delhi’s heat): “If I got to Kashmir, I will infuriate three countries,” Kissinger remarks and further stating that “your ambassador (Kaul) has been very active and very effective. Sometimes he employs terror tactics. What I mean is he threatens that he wants concrete results and not merely sweet words and thus he puts me under moral pressure.” 

The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, replied: “I am glad our relations are definitely improving slowly and steadily. A war that should never have taken place did take place, but we took the initiative to re-establish peace and stabilise. Kissinger responded that the US was pleased with India’s efforts in arriving at the agreement. The minister, however, reminds Kissinger that it was not an easy one though it paved the way for cooperation and normalisation. Recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan, the Minister emphasized, paved the way for the recent meeting, though recognition was delayed too long. 

Prime Minister Bhutto is fond of choosing dramatic moments for such things and he chose the Islamic summit to announce his recognition, he remarked, pointing out that in Simla, when Kaul was also present, Mr. Bhutto told us he could and should have recognised Bangladesh in early 1972; but he did not do so. 

He created dramatic situations and then tried to solve them in a dramatic manner. That is his style and we are getting used to it. However, Bangladesh was very generous in agreeing to give up a trial of 195 prisoners of war (PoWs) against whom feelings were very strong, the Foreign Minister told Kissinger. 

(d) Letter from T.N. Kaul to Foreign Secretary dated 7 June 1974, with points of Kaul’s lunch meeting with Kissinger at the State Department

Evidently, the second such lunch meeting in a gap of 10 months, but it held significance as it came days after the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) and palpably was about Kissinger’s forthcoming visit to India. 

Kissinger started by apologising for having to postpone his visit to India because of his unexpectedly long stay in the Middle East. He suggested his visit to India could be between 25thAugust to 5th September (1974). There was a discussion about the joint commission.

Kaul then narrates the conversations on specific matters, provided below in his words: 

On the PNE: I told him that I have been re-reading his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy published in 1957. He had predicted therein that secondary powers would be able to acquire nuclear devices within a few years. Kissinger said “I am not surprised that India has exploded a nuclear device. I am sure India would do so sooner or later. The State Department wanted to launch a campaign against India, but I had to firmly put it down and authorise the issue of only a mild statement. I do not mind if India makes nuclear weapons. In fact, I am sure India will do so. Why should India not make them if she has the capability when we and other nuclear powers make them?” 

I felt he was deliberately leading me on. I therefore categorically rejected any idea of India going in for nuclear weapons, firstly because we could not afford the luxury and secondly, because we did not feel the necessity for it as it was inconceivable that any nuclear weapon power would dare to use nuclear weapons in any future conflict. 

Kissinger said he was glad to hear this because he had to answer a lot of questions in Congress where he had been for the last two days and today pleading for the aid packet. He suggested that I should also meet some Congressmen in this regard. I told him that I had already met leading Senators and some leading Congressmen and their reaction was not negative. Even The New York Times which had been critical in today’s leaderette supported aid to India in spite of the tests. 

As indicated by Kaul, the most interesting aspect of this conversation was that Kissinger was phishing to see what Indians had in mind by talking in support of Indian tests, though Kaul outsmarted him by stating that India had no such plans. Kissinger, as a master realist statecraft practitioner, had seemingly given mixed or confusing positions on the Indian PNE, with mild public remarks while at the same time being known to be towing a tough line on India.  

The situation in the sub-continent: I told him that France had welcomed our nuclear experiment while the reactions of the third world generally had been favourable. Japan’s reaction was predictable. Canada’s reaction was mainly because of their impending elections. Pakistan’s reaction was unnecessarily sharp and may be due to the internal troubles of Bhutto. I hope that Pakistan would see the benefits of normalisation and cooperation with India. 

Nuclear experiments had created a very good effect internally in India and produced political confidence and stability among our neighbours vis-à-vis China and Russia. It had great potential for economic cooperation between the countries of the region including Iran and Afghanistan. Kissinger said he was glad to hear this and he would certainly advise Bhutto not to impede the process of normalisation but to facilitate it. 

Arms sales to Pakistan: I told him that it was my duty to warn that by resumption of lethal weapons to Pakistan by the US would have adverse effects and the process of normalisation and adversely affect stability in the region. Kissinger replied “Aziz Ahmed pleaded strongly for military supplies because of the alleged threat from India. We have however given no promise and have no proposal to revise our policy in this regard. We shall always consult you in such matters.” 

However, Kissinger asked me how could we justify the refusal of arms supplies to Pakistan when we were getting large quantities from the USSR. I told him that Pakistan’s armaments at the moment were greater than in December 1971 although she had a smaller area to defend now. India had not yet been able to replenish the arms she had lost in the 1971 conflict. We had two fronts to look after while Pakistan had only one. I could give him details of Pakistan’s armaments if he so desired. 

Kissinger added that it would be good for us to talk to Pakistan in this regard and that maybe it would be possible for the two to agree on the reduction of armaments along their common border. He accepted India’s need for armaments on the Sino-Indian border.

Regarding Moynihan: Kissinger said that he had received a letter from Moynihan complaining about articles in the Indian press. He said laughingly “Moynihan seems to be on the brink of resigning.” I told him that Moynihan was a very fine man and perhaps he was too outspoken with the Press and they sometimes let him down. 

Kissinger replied: “You are also outspoken with the press but you are more successful.” I told him that Moynihan’s relations with the Government were excellent and I expressed the hope that he would be kept on. In the end, Kissinger said “India is a great power. We want to deal with India as a Great Power. Please rest assured that we want to maintain and further strengthen the improvement that had already taken place. I am greatly looking forward to my visit to India. The nuclear explosion has had no effect on that as I said at the press conference yesterday.”

The reference to India as a ‘great power’ by Kissinger at that point in time is interesting. Whether it is based on his historical assessment of India or whether this is prompted by the Indian PNE and a recognition of the PNE as a symbol of India’s technological capability has to be culled out as meaning from these conversations. In fact, in the current times when the ruling regime is expounding ‘greatness’, this conversation could be a reminder that such attributions have happened in the past too, without much meaning and substance. 

(e) T.N. Kaul’s Letter to Henry Kissinger dated 6 July 1974 (as a response to Kissinger’s statement on PNE) 

While Kissinger had impressed upon Kaul in the above-mentioned luncheon meeting that the US response was measured, the former had made multiple statements on the Indian test, one in Washington and another in Jerusalem. 

Responding to media queries in Washington on 7th June, Kissinger stated that he does not believe that the “Indian nuclear explosion changes the balance of power, though, if India had asked our advice, we would probably have not recommended it. However, we do not believe it changes the balance of power since its resources will be relatively limited. Nevertheless, we are opposed to proliferation. I have had to delay my trip to India not as a result of the nuclear explosion but as a result of the extension of Israel-Syria disengagement talks. And I still plan to visit India in the relatively near future.”

However, weeks later, in Jerusalem, Kissinger took are more aggressive line by stating that “the Indian explosion occurred with material that was diverted not from American reactor but from Canadian that did not have appropriate safeguards.”  

A truncated version of Kaul’s response is provided below: 

Dear Mr. Secretary, I had wanted to see you and write to you about your statement on our nuclear test explosion during your press conference held in Jerusalem on June 17, 1974. As you were out of the country, I did not think it proper to disturb you there.  

While I appreciate the context in which you emphasised the efficacy of American safeguards application to American reactors, I feel that the statement could convey the impression that we diverted Canadian material from the Canadian reactor for our test explosion. 

I should like to invite your attention to the following facts: 

(i) The plutonium that we used for the test explosion was entirely Indian. The first Indian reactor APSARA designed and built in India went critical in August 1956. We started making nuclear fuel in 1960. Plutonium was first extracted in an Indian-designed and built plant in 1964. 

(ii) The underground nuclear test explosion is, by all accepted international standards, an experiment to develop peaceful uses of a nuclear explosion. The recent agreement between the US and USSR also clearly distinguishes between test explosions for military purposes and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.  

(iii)  In using our own material which was put through the Cirus reactor and using the plutonium separated from waste products in our own plutonium separation plant for peaceful purposes, we have not violated any condition of the Indo-Canadian agreement. This fact has been recognised by the Canadians themselves. Mr. Mitchel Sharp, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a Press Conference on 22 May in Ottawa said: “Uranium rods that we (Canada) provided did not work very well and the INdias made their own from their own uranium.”  

(iv)  At the recent meeting of the Aid India Consortium in Paris, the Canadian delegate conceded that India had not violated any bilateral agreement in conducting its peaceful test explosion. The Chairman of the Canadian AEC has also stated that we have not used the Canadian reactor or technology in any manner that violates the India-Canada agreement. 

(v) What I would like to emphasise is that we did not use or divert any Canadian materials: we used 100 per cent Indian material, Indian technology and Indian personnel. 

(vi)  I thought I should bring these facts to your notice so that you may consider whether, on a suitable occasion in the near future, you may wish to correct any wrong impression that might have been created by the statement at your press conference in Jerusalem. Many Congressmen have asked me about it and seem to have been influenced by it, as was seen in the recent Amendment passed to the IDA Bill in the House. 

Upending the anti-India tilt: An interesting point to observe is none of the correspondences in the months running up to the PNE shows any discussion or reference to the possibility of India planning to conduct such a test nor about Washington suspecting the possibility of such a test or India making preparations for the same. Even during the meeting between Swaran Singh and Kissinger, on 15 April 1974, the discussions did not have any reference to nuclear issues but largely discussed about Bangladesh, China, PL-480 and Kissinger’s forthcoming visit to India. 

In fact, at a dinner held by Kaul on 11 April 1974, Kissinger said thus about US-India relations: 

“US relations with India had taken a decided turn for the better and in the course of this year, the relations will reach a stage whereon could say that they had never been better in the whole post-War period. We remember the difficult days of 1971 when some of us were said to be tilting in one direction – as a journalist present never lets me forget. But it was inevitable that two great democracies with so many common values and aspirations would eventually find a way of jointly realising their common objectives and work for peace and welfare of mankind.” 

In a telex message from the Indian Embassy in Washington, which detailed Kaul’s dinner as including Kissinger and Senator Mike Mansfield, Kissinger is shown as remarking that “the tilt was over.” He went further and said that his forthcoming visit to India would lead to further strengthening of relations. 

Senator Mansfield’s reference, on the other hand, to India’s policy of peace, disarmament, relaxation of tension in the IOR, etc, was, the telex points out, a significant hint against the administration’s plan for setting up a military base in Diego Garcia. Kaul also suggests that India should push forward the proposal for an international conference that could discuss the means of great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean (or deployments such as Diego Garcia). 

(f) Telegram from Ambassador to Foreign Secretary, and Secretary to PM (16/7/1974)

The telegram of mid-August shows that the discussions involving Kissinger continued to revolve around the PNE. Kaul informs that he had told Kissinger of being glad to see the two superpowers had expressly recognised the difference between peaceful and military purposes of underground nuclear explosions in the latest agreement signed in Moscow. 

Kissinger, in turn, replied: “I knew that you would use this to justify your own explosion. I have taken a very sober and realistic view of your explosion and I would not be surprised even if you went in for nuclear weapons.” In response, Kaul tells Kissinger that “we had no such intention and we would much rather see an international agreement applicable to all countries including nuclear weapon countries to regulate underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. That would be a real step towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” 

Kissinger, however, sounded sceptical stating that it would be difficult if not impossible to distinguish between explosions for peaceful and military purposes unless there was some machinery for on-site inspections. According to him, the Soviets were not willing to allow such inspections. He then said, “Even if we and the Soviets agreed, you are unlikely to agree unless France and China also agreed. That is why perhaps you are making the suggestion because you know that all nuclear weapon powers will not agree.”

Kissinger then went on the ask Kul whether India would sign such an international agreement if the USA and USSR agreed to do so. Kaul replied that he could “put it to my Government and we might consider it if it was a real step towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament without any discrimination against the nuclear non-weapon powers. 

Kissinger, however, admitted that such an agreement was unrealistic at the present moment but may be a possibility in the future. 

On the Tarapore (Tarapur) Plant: Kaul told Kissinger that he was pained to see the State Department going back on their bilateral agreement with India on Tarapore and asking for fresh assurances. Kaul added that the Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had already written to the US Chairman suggesting discussions for a fresh agreement if necessary. 

Until then the bilateral agreement should be fulfilled as India had to shut down the plant for want of some components which the GEC were willing to give but the State Department had not cleared. Kissinger replied: “I am sorry I did not know about this. This happened during my absence. I shall look into it immediately.”

The conversation is interesting for two things: 

(a) The question of why Kissinger took a sober view: Was he sure that at some stage of other India would go nuclear or progress from nuclear latency to achieving and demonstrating the capability? Was it based on an appreciation of the threat environment that India faced?  

(b) The masterstroke by Kissinger on PNEs: First, he highlights the technical difficulty of differentiating between peaceful and military purposes of nuclear explosions. Then he insists that the Soviets will not allow such inspections. Third, he states that even if the superpowers agree, India will not agree to such an agreement to regulate nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes unless France and China. Fourth, he squarely describes it as an Indian strategy to evade pressure on PNE despite it being very clear to India that all nuclear weapons powers are not likely to agree or accede to such a treaty. 

This is a classic example of Kissinger’s statecraft – on how to diffuse a policy proposal or checkmate a diversionary tactic by the other. Considering that there were not many references to India’s eagerness for such an international agreement, other than Kaul’s pronouncements at various forums, it is interesting to see how Kissinger exposed this strategy and dug deep into India’s intentions. 

(g) Letter from Ambassador Kaul to Foreign Minister (on FS and Kaul meeting with Kissinger) dated 2/8/1974

At this meeting, the Foreign Secretary informed Kissinger briefly about his discussions in Canada and said that he had pointed out there that PNE was an internationally accepted concept and our experiment had no political or military implications. In the interest of our economic development, we would like to remain abreast of this technology. The Canadians, he said, agreed that we had not even remotely gone back on any bilateral or international agreement. Further discussions will be continued between the two governments on this subject. 

Kissinger, for his part, differentiated between peaceful nuclear explosions conducted by advanced countries as referred to in the US-USSR Agreement and similar explosions conducted by less nuclear-developed countries, like India. In the former case, they were less sophisticated than explosions for military uses whereas in the latter case, they have dual possibilities, both for peaceful and military purposes. 

He then said that when he comes to India, he would like to have very private talks on how to prevent the spread of nuclear explosive technology beyond India. He said that India is clearly in a dominant position militarily in the region and this may contribute to stability, but if a nuclear race starts owing to the desire of other countries to achieve parity with India’s military superiority, this would be undesirable. The US, he said, is now working out a general non-proliferation strategy and will have to treat India as a nuclear power, and proceed to see how further non-proliferation can be avoided. 

The Foreign Secretary replied that we would be happy to exchange views on the subject when Kissinger visits India. Kaul, in turn, pointed out that any proposals that are discriminatory against India will not be accepted and drew attention to the recent amendment to the Bill introduced by Clarence Long and approved by Congress. Kissinger said that this is a great mistake and he is totally opposed to it. He said that efforts will be made to rectify the mistake by suitable legislation connection connected with the Foreign Aid Bill now before Congress.

Kissinger’s deft strategy at play again: As in earlier instances when he disowned actions of the State Department and his own diplomats, here, he is seen to be critical of a Congressional decision. The more interesting part, however, is how he makes a distinction on the PNEs which sounds crafty in the context of diplomatic polemics. 

Kissinger contended that the US-USSR recognition of the PNE as a peaceful technology stems from the understanding that the device used by them for such explosions is less sophisticated than those used for military uses. He then goes on to classify the device India used for PNE as one with dual possibilities of both peaceful and military. This is in fact an interesting contention that has been rarely used to pinpoint the risks associated with India’s PNE. 

Further, Kissinger points to the impending scope of a nuclear arms race as India has attained a dominant military position and others in the region might try to seek parity through nuclear weapons. This, Kissinger contended, drives the US non-proliferation strategy, also indicating that India will be seen then on as a nuclear power and that steps will be taken to ensure no more proliferation happens. 

Thus, Kissinger was elucidating the US strategy of ensuring that India does not graduate its PNE capability or latency towards a full-fledged nuclear weapons programme. And that could explain the kind of restrictions sought from various quarters (along with delayed decisions) when it came to renewing fuel supplies to Tarapur. 

(h) Letter from Ambassador Kaul to MEA dated 21/8/1974 (regarding Kissinger) 

Though a handful more correspondences related to Kissinger can be traced in the 1974 files, a significant one was this letter from Kaul, which talks about Kissinger’s personality and provides a relevant conclusion to this analysis about Kissinger. 

Kissinger the realist statesman: Kaul states he has known Kissinger since 1969 and I must say he has developed from a dogmatic professor with pre-conceived notions and theories into a realistic and pragmatic statesman. His previous theories about the concept of power have also undergone some change. For instance, he said in an address at the Pacem in Terris Conference in Washington last October “The most striking feature of the contemporary period, the feature that gives complexity as well as hope – is the radical transformation in the nature of power.” 

Kissinger went on to say “today the vocabulary of strength is more complex… countries can exert political influence even when they have neither military nor economic strength… with the overwhelming arsenals of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage is both pointless and potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is reached, additional increments of power do not translate into usable political strength; and the attempts to achieve tactical gains can lead to cataclysm.” 

Earlier this year (1974), in Panama, Kissinger said “Power has grown so monstrous that it defies calculation; the quest for justice has become universal. A stable world cannot be imposed by force, it must derive from consensus. Mankind can achieve community only on the basis of shared aspirations.” This, Kaul points out, does show an injection of some ethics and morality into his concept of power. Also, the interdependence of various countries in the world has made him realise that peace is vital and necessary for all countries and war cannot achieve any results for the victor. 

Kaul suggests that “we start some studies on the hint that Kissinger threw when you (possibly, the Foreign Secretary) saw him that he wished to discuss some kind of an agreement between the nuclear powers, in which he included India regarding non-proliferation. We are trying to study it here but do not have all the facts. If you wish any particular info on the subject, I shall get what I can. I would suggest that you ask Dr Sethna, P.N. Haksar, yourself and one or two others to get together and clear our own thinking on the subject. I should be grateful for any guidance that you can give me so that I may try to problem Henry accordingly.”

It is unknown what that agreement could have been that Kissinger hinted about – whether it was a new non-proliferation agreement between nuclear powers, by including India, and to build upon the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 255 of 19 June 1968, which reinforced the status of the nuclear weapon states in the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and enshrined the nuclear security guarantees. Considering that no such agreement had ever come, Kissinger might have been dangling a carrot to read the minds of the Indians, or maybe, allure India to join the NPT. 

Copiously evident in these papers are shades of a personality and how he practised his craft, which was statecraft of an unprecedented rigour, scale and intensity, rarely witnessed in post-war international politics.