As Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, returns from his first State visit to the United States of America (USA a.k.a. the US), the otherwise landmark visit was over-shadowed by questions of suppression of democracy, human rights and religious freedom that were raised in various quarters in his host country during this visit. 

Besides the explicit questions that were directed to both the US President, Joe Biden and the Indian PM at the White House presser on 22 June 2023, the American media had, in an unprecedented fashion, sought to keep the spotlight on the ‘backsliding of democracy’ in India. 

Leading media platforms like the Washington Post and the New York Times constantly raised the pitch on the democratic erosion under Modi. Democrats like Pramila Jaypal and Chris Van Hollen , as well as another group of 75 US lawmakers including the veteran Bernie Sanders, wrote to Biden asking him to raise these issues with the visiting Indian PM, besides some of them boycotting his address to the Congress. 

While such a targeted campaign against a visiting head of government, on a State visit, might be rare, if not unprecedented, the irony will not be lost on the Indian Prime Minister, who had, on the eve of the visit, ruminated upon the Emergency of 1975-77 and such challenges to democracy in both his monthly radio address, Mann Ki Baat, as well as a rare interview to the Wall Street Journal. It might sound uncanny that despite PM Modi making it a point to remind the nation every year about the Emergency, his own regime has been held to scrutiny with allegations that, even if in moderate terms, echoes the excesses of this episodic phase in independent Indian history.  

By the time PM Modi lands back in Delhi from his two-nation visit, the country could have already observed the 48th anniversary of the Emergency, which involved a heavy clampdown on civil liberties and freedom of the press, large-scale crackdown and jailing of opposition leaders and activists, and many high-handed actions. Stretching close to two years, the Emergency was widely seen and described as the darkest phase in the world’s most populous democracy. 

48 years later, echoes still 

On 25 June 1975, President Fakhruddin Ali issued an order under Article 352 of the Constitution proclaiming an Emergency in the country. There are 9 paragraphs or sub-sections under Article 352 which provide the framework for the proclamation of an Emergency. 

Paragraph 1 states thus: 

“If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether, by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the whole of India or of such part of the territory thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation Explanation A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression or by armed rebellion may be made before the actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or rebellion, if the President is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof.”

Notwithstanding these provisions, the political situation in the country then, despite being volatile, did not merit being seen as a security threat to the country. Nor was there any war, external aggression, or armed rebellion though the call for Sampoorna Kranti (Total Revolution) by Jai Prakash Narayan and the ongoing protest movements led by the socialists had the potential for civil strife, particularly Narayan’s open call to the police and armed forces to disregard the unconstitutional and immoral orders of the Indira Gandhi government. 

Incidentally, the presidential order for imposing the Emergency cited ‘internal disturbances’ as the reason for invoking the order which gave unprecedented powers to the government (read, the Prime Minister), besides cancelling elections. Moreover, the presence of threats to national security was also cited by the government at a time when the ‘external hand’ and ‘foreign interference’ were a constant feature in Indian politics. 

Also cited were the impact of the 1971 war with Pakistan and the liberation of Bangladesh on the economy and further battered by the recurring protests and strikes, most notably the railway strike of May 1974. 

Despite these contentions, it is widely believed that the Emergency was imposed by Mrs Gandhi in the aftermath of the verdict of the Allahabad High Court of 12 June 1975, which convicted her of electoral malpractices, disqualified her and debarred her from holding any elected post for the next 6 years. That the Emergency was imposed soon after the verdict literally confirmed the belief that Mrs Gandhi was seeking this route to stay in power and overrule the High Court verdict, which could have forced her exit. 

The Emergency ended on 21 March 1977 with PM Indira Gandhi calling for fresh elections. The excesses of the Emergency period have been well documented and there is consensus among contemporary historians in terming the period as a dark phase in independent India’s democratic evolution. This is besides the prevalence of some public narratives that touted the efficiency with which many governance systems functioned during the Emergency years. 

While the criticism of the Emergency is ubiquitous, this essay examines some archival documents that reveal how a key official of the Indira Gandhi regime sought to defend the Emergency in the Western hemisphere and particularly in the US where he served as the Indian Ambassador. The envoy in question is T.N. Kaul, who was the Indian ambassador to the US from 1973 to 1976 and before that posting was also foreign secretary and ambassador to the USSR. 

Considered a key player in Mrs Gandhi’s inner circle, the then US ambassador to India, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, had in 1973 reportedly described Kaul as “a Kashmiri Brahmin, self-assured to point of arrogance by birth… marked by pro-Soviet bias and concomitant anti-American words and deeds.”

T.N. Kaul’s defence of the Emergency

The remarks listed in this essay are largely based on T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalment I, II and II), Subject File No. 1-4, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi. Besides numerous delivered remarks and speeches at various institutions and events in the US, Kaul had also defended the Emergency in a handful of interviews, including a long interview with Boston Globe (2 July 1975), NBC (13 July 1975), and CBS Radio Network (17 August 1975).  

Some of these press reports, provided in these files, summarise the core arguments that Kaul presented in order to justify the Emergency. Kaul is quoted by these reports as describing the imposition as a “temporary phase in the nation’s development,” and that the Prime Minister’s crackdown and suspension of rights came “not a day too later” and adding “if anything, the government was too patient.”  Kaul also stated that the internal threat came from the right – militant Hindus who want to establish a religious kingdom – and the light (probably, the Left) which is in search of a revolution. 

Both sides of the opposition, Kaul had remarked, were mistaken in their aims. “If the government had fallen, they would have fallen out with each other. There would have been civil disorder and religious strife,” Kaul contended. At the same time, he also dismissed possible CIA involvement in the right-wing plots: “we are big enough and sophisticated enough to prevent a foreign intelligence from subverting our government.” 

Attempting to articulate the vision of the government, Kaul remarks in one of the interviews: “A government of the elite, for the elite, is trying to transform itself into a government of the people. We have instituted land reform on surplus land in the rural areas and built low-income housing on land in the cities. Essential commodities have been put under controlled rates so that poor people can have access to them. Shopkeepers, hoarders and dealers have been dealt with drastically and the rate of inflation has dropped from 30 per cent to minus 2 this year.”

Similarly, in Subject File No.4 of the Kaul papers, there are documents and letters that show how Kaul looks at perceptions in the US about the Emergency, including the support given by some personalities in the US who felt that the Emergency was needed to ensure that the country did not slip into chaos. There are analogies drawn with Abraham Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus at the beginning of the American Civil War.

There is also Kaul’s letter regarding Subrahmanyam Swamy’s campaign in the US, and his warning of summer uprisings in India. Added, there are correspondences regarding CIA activities in Chile, the vulnerability of Allende and subversive movements, and so on. Mrs Gandhi, apparently, had referred to the Chilean case when talking about the threat from external forces to her government and her life. 

A handful of addresses at various American institutions by T.N. Kaul and some correspondences also sheds light on not just his personal perspectives on the Emergency, but also how the Indira Gandhi regime sought to project it to the international community. Given below are summarised versions of some of these remarks: 

1. T.N. Kaul’s meeting with Indian expatriates in Albuquerque, New Mexico, February 1976

Though Kaul briefed the community on a range of issues pertaining to India including the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), he had the following to say at this meeting on the Emergency: 

“What was happening in India was that some of the opposition parties, minority political opposition parties, having failed to win the elections through the ballot box and to gain a majority either at the centre or in the states, were feeling frustrated and they wanted to take the battle from the ballot box to the streets. Well, that’s not on in a democracy; you have to work within the framework of the law and the Constitution and fight elections through adult suffrage and secret ballot and with the support of the people. But the opposition tried to subvert the Constitution and the law and compel the majority party to resign both in the states and the centre through physical coercion and through force.” 

He continues: “when they failed in this, they publicly on the 25th of June incited the civil administration and the police and the armed forces to disobey the orders of the government. They announced they will embark from 29th June on the civil disobedience movement and surround the Central Cabinet, as they did in Gujarat. Had the Govt not declared an Emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution, there would have been chaos, disorder and worse religious strife of a magnitude unseen before. It is not as if we scrapped the Constitution.” 

Contending that the government had the right to impose an Emergency, Kaul states that “the Constitution provides in democratic countries to meet emergency situations through emergency laws. And the safeguard in the Indian Constitution is that any such proclamation of emergency must be ratified by 2/3 membership of the Parliament within two months of the time it is issued. This was done one month after the issue of proclamation,” he added.

Further elucidating on the state of democracy in the country, Kaul remarks, “democracy so far in India was really a government of the elite by the elite and for the elite. So far, as the broad masses were concerned, it had no meaning for them and therefore would not be viable and stable unless it gains social and economic content. What is happening today is to give our political democracy social and economic content.”

Kaul lists these as including the action against smugglers, hoarders and black marketers which had allowed mopping up 2 billion dollars worth of black money; the rate of inflation brought down from 305 to -8% below zero (which implied deflation); land reforms; industrial productivity increases by 25 %; PDS system improved, and so on.

2. Letter to PM Indira Gandhi from T.N. Kaul as Ambassador to the US, dated 23-7-1976, (regarding perceptions about Emergency in US)

An important document that reveals the discussions within the government on how the West looked at the Emergency was this confidential letter from Kaul to Mrs Gandhi. The letter, which reveals how Kaul attempted damage control in the US and sought to influence the perceptions of the Americans towards the Emergency, reads thus:

“I have made it a point to meet as many Indians as possible wherever I got and sought out special opportunities in Washington, Chicago, San Francisco, Houston and New York areas to meet and discuss matters with them. 

Either through ignorance or through some unhealthy influences, some of our Indians do propaganda against India in both USA and UK and it suits the press of both these countries to encourage them. The large majority of Indians here have welcomed the emergency and have heard from travellers about the healthy changes that have come about in India since the emergency was proclaimed. However, most of them are professionals and do not readily engage in public political discussion. 

In order to get them to take a more active interest in India, I think it would be useful to try and organise a convention of overseas Indians, especially with an emphasis on those from the USA, UK and Canada to meet in India. The Indian community is not as big and is only about 2 lahks strong. It is likely to come to about one million by 2000 AD. 

I am suggesting specifically the USA, UK and Canada as a large convention of all overseas Indians will not be practicable considering the complexity of our population settled in various areas and possible misinterpretations about dual loyalty like in some areas like East Africa, Fiji or the Caribbean.” 

Besides seemingly seeking to curry favour with the PM, like in his other expositions, Kaul displays lack of conscience in overlooking the excesses and violations while providing absolute justification for the Emergency. Brimming with a typical bureaucratic demeanour, Kaul called the opponents of the Emergency among the Indians in the US either ignorant, prone to unhealthy influences or being propagandists themselves against the country. Also, he claims that the Indian professionals in the US, though lacking political exposure, are supportive of the Emergency and the ‘healthy’ changes it has brought to the country. 

In fact, the very purpose of Kaul’s letter is to harness or reach out to this supposedly apolitical constituency by organising a convention for overseas Indians, probably the precursor to the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas. Quite informative is Kaul’s assessment that the Indian community then was only about 2 lakhs strong and could reach a million by the end of the millennium, which in fact, turned true.  

Other undercurrents 

While Kaul had made numerous remarks in many subsequent meetings with various groups and institutions in the US, he was not seen to be making direct references to Emergency or seeking to defend them with newer arguments. 

However, another letter written to the Prime Minister, dated 6 February 1976, talks about the Ludhiana Christian Medical College Board in New York. Referring to Anand Patwardan’s movie, ‘Waves of Revolution’, which he made as a student of McGill University, Montreal, and showed police violence in Bihar during the JP movement, Kaul writes: “I found the gathering of about 80 people interesting to learn about what we are now doing in India. Also, it seemed to me that all church groups are somewhat on the defensive after recent statements by authorities in the US that not only had the CIA in the past used missionaries as contacts but also proposed to keep up the practice in the future. 

At this meeting of the Inter-church centre, Kaul points out that the Chairman hotly denounced such an attitude on the part of the authorities as compromising the spiritual work of missionaries who did not wish to have anything to do with such clandestine organisations. Kaul suggests that, hence, it might be useful to take advantage of this period in which the Christian groups are anxious to dissociate themselves from the Administration and to show their independence. 

Further, Kaul’s telex of 30 June 1976 notes that Jethmalani had chosen to ignore the warning that any effort to indulge in propaganda against the government from foreign soil will be objectionable and would complicate matters for him further in India. His testimony before the Fraser sub-committee was a bitter personal attack against the PM, her colleagues and her son. 

Kaul also refers to Jethmalani’s assertion before that committee that his testimony would provoke the Indian government to impound his passport, whereupon Fraser said; “in that case, this house will want to know.” If Fraser thought this would deter us from taking a step in our national interests, he should be made to realise he is wrong, Kaul adds. 

Not stopping there, Kaul thereupon asks for anything suspicious about Jethmalani’s background, especially his involvement with black-marketing and smuggling activities, which could be used to influence members of Congress and Govt about him. Kaul suggests the need to protest before the US government and the US embassy in Delhi regarding Jethmalani and Chauhan behind called for a hearing as interference in our internal affairs. 

While this correspondence and the issues raised in it could be seen as a sideshow of the campaign surrounding the Emergency that was playing out in prominent world capitals, the US decision to conduct testimonies was invariably seen an interference in India’s internal affairs, as Kaul points out. However, this comes as no surprise if one considers the fact that this has always been how the Americans have operated – holding testimonies even on matters pertaining to other sovereign nations, on the assumed role of a hegemon. 

Mrs Gandhi fumes

Such interventions by entities like the US Congress, however, only buttressed the prevailing perceptions about the ‘external hand’, which was religiously parroted by the regime. While one needs to look at the historicity of this element to know how much effective or logical this theory was and how it favoured the regime’s plans, that Mrs Gandhi was personally scornful of the interventions by the Western powers was most manifest in her letter, dated 2 June 1976, to Krishna Kripalani, the Indian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom. 

Mrs Gandhi writes: “I learn that the British press is once again on the rampage, engaged in scurrilous and vicious attacks on us, and especially Sanjay. The latest reports I have seen are so fantastic and utterly baseless, one doesn’t know what to say. Have they gone stark mad? Is it old pent-up hatred and bitterness? Or, as some say, is this their way of giving encouragement to the new political party about which Jayaprakash has spoken but which has not yet materialised? It may be all of these but the deeper motive is to try and queer the pitch for us at the Colombo meeting of the Non-Aligned. I have noticed at the Commonwealth Conference in Jamaica and in other forums how much the British resent the regard for India shown by other countries. Right now, we seem to be beleaguered from all sides. Western high-pressure tactics go far beyond their frontiers (I have no doubt that the press is encouraged by governments). There is the Israeli lobby and Islamic bloc – to say nothing of the machinations of some of our neighbours. We have no choice but to face this onslaught if we are to retain our self-respect, and continue with our essential programmes.”

The Prime Minister’s letter to the envoy in London is not just significant in terms of the bitterness she had developed for Western criticism of the Emergency. More importantly, it provides insights into how she looked at the nature and character of foreign interventions. In fact, her statement that the British Press intends to back the new party by JP could be a scathing attack on the Western democracies and its arms, particularly since she views the media reports as ‘encouraged’ by their respective governments. 

Mrs Gandhi, interestingly, also saw this trend as pent-up anger against India, which she felt, could be driven by the British resentment of the regard others show to India. What could be that particular context or tradition of regard that she might be talking about, especially whether it is a standard perception about the respect India garners or whether it is about the support to the Emergency from some quarters, is something hard to decipher from this short letter. 

Another insightful aspect is that she accepts that she is under great pressure internationally on the Emergency, and points to both the Israeli lobby and Islamic bloc. This could be surprising as India was considered close to the Islamic bloc and not favouring Israel on the West Asian issues. While Mrs Gandhi proclaims it as a matter of self-respect to withstand the onslaught, the reference to ‘Sanjay’ indicates how she was feeling the heat on her family’s role in various actions associated with the Emergency. 

An electoral autocracy? 

From a bureaucratic perspective, it could be said that the current government will have missed an envoy like T.N. Kaul to aggressively defend itself when subjected to the intense scrutiny that the American media subjected PM Modi to during his state visit. But then, the current government has had to face allegations of democratic erosion, stifling of dissent and discrimination against minorities and opposition groups without even having declared any action that was akin to the Emergency of 1975. 

In this context, one could recall the ratings by Freedom House in March this year in which India was downgraded in global democracy ranking and termed as an ‘electoral autocracy’ and ‘flawed democracy’. From describing itself as the ‘mother of all democracies’ to being rated as a flawed and autocratic democracy, such scrutiny might be a wake up for the political leadership to take actual lessons from the Emergency of 1975-77 beyond resorting to mere moral preaching about the ‘dark years’.