The 85th plenary of the All-India Congress Committee (AICC), the apex decision-making body of the Indian National Congress (INC), was in session at Raipur last week. Mallikarjun Kharge, in his first plenary as the president, had set the pitch for agenda-making at this crucial session which will prepare the party’s ideological and organization moorings for the 2024 general elections. 

The message is clear and present: the INC will strive for an alliance with like-minded parties in the run-up to the 2024 elections. “We once again look forward to forging a viable alternative by aligning with like-minded parties to defeat the anti-people and undemocratic BJP government,’ Kharge asserted, in his presidential speech at plenary, also insisting that “… in the prevailing difficult circumstances, the Congress is the only party in the country that can provide capable and decisive leadership.”

Will this be through an expanded United Progressive Alliance (UPA) or will there be a new alliance formation? Officially, the UPA still exists on paper and is in power-sharing or other similar political arrangements in a few states without the nomenclature or by other names like the Secular Progressive Alliance (Tamil Nadu), Mahagathbandhan (Jharkhand and Bihar with a different set of parties in each state), Maharashtra Vikas Aghadi (MVA), etc. 

The INC is in power on its own in Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. The party continues to be the chief opposition in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat, Uttarakhand and Kerala. It is in contention for the second position in a few other states like Orissa, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Goa and some North Eastern States. In other states, it remains an also-ran with nominal legislative presence and organizational bases that have failed in mass mobilization and impact, as evident in the case of Uttar Pradesh. 

Wither the UPA?

On paper, the United Progressive Alliance is a 19-party formation that saw new additions like the Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and Shiv Sena joining the formation as a result of post-2019 political realignments. At 114 seats, the UPA was just around one-fifth of the total 543 seats in the 2019 Lok Sabha. Much lesser it was without the JD(U), RJD, Shiv Sena and the National Conference, which were not part of the UPA in 2019. 

After the 52 seats of the Indian National Congress which were 9.61 per cent of the 2019 Lok Sabha, it was the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) with 24 seats accounting for 4.44 per cent which was the sole other UPA constituent that won in double digits in 2019. Of the recent additions to the UPA strength, it was the Shiv Sena with 19 seats (3.51) and JD(U) with 16 seats (2.96 per cent) that had seats in two digits but gained as members of the National Democratic Alliance in 2019. 

The JD(U) vote share was 21.81 per cent in Bihar whereas the Shiv Sena got a 23.5 per cent vote share from the Lok Sabha seats in Maharashtra, both as NDA partners, with the lead partner, Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) receiving 27.84 per cent in Maharashtra and 23.58 in Bihar, respectively. The lead party in Bihar’s UPA currently is the RJD which had a 15.36 vote share in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections but did not win any seats. However, in the state assembly elections a year later, RJD emerged as the largest party with 75 seats and 23.11 per cent votes in the state assembly, followed by the BJP with 74 seats and 19.46 per cent, and the JD(U) with 43 seats and 15.39 per cent. 

That the leader of the junior NDA partner, JD(U), became the chief minister of the NDA government in Bihar in 2020 only to quit the alliance to form the Mahagatbandhan in 2021 with RJD, INC and the Left parties are all part of the recent Indian political history, but with implications for the UPA structure and political future. 

The Maharashtra political scene represented a political roulette of sorts with the Shiv Sena’s exit from the NDA in the 2019 Vidhan Sabha elections having fallen behind the BJP in several seats, in both Lok Sabha and assembly elections since 2014, and losing claim over the NDA leadership role and chief minister claim in the state. Still contesting as NDA junior partner, Shiv Sena won only 56 seats of the 126 contested with around 19.44 per cent of the vote share as opposed to the 105 seats won by BJP of the 164 it contested and gaining 36.46 vote share. 

Having subsequently formed the MVA government with the Nationalist Congress Party (54 seats and 18.75 per cent) and INC (44 seats and 15.28 per cent) on 28 November 2019, the Shiv Sena ended up being split right through the middle in 2022 with a splinter section led by Eknath Shinde forming an NDA government with the BJP on 30 June 2022. 

With the Central Election Commission now endowing the symbol and control over the legislative structures of this party to this splinter group, the role and space for Shiv Sena in the 2024 general election could come across in a ruptured and variegated form. Going by the current positioning of the party’s cadre and leadership elements, the ongoing political equation within the Shiv Sena is not likely to favour the present UPA calculus, unless, of course, the Thackeray clan manages to prove its dominant clout and hold over the party’s organizational edifice and network. 

As for the other major UPA partner in Maharashtra, the NCP, it seems to be still nursing the wounds of the MVA government’s unceremonious ouster and its inability to grasp the direction in which the Shiv Sena’s political character is likely to take in the run-up to the 2024 polls. A dismembered Shiv Sena is hardly the political pivot that the NCP leadership will seek to inherit for the UPA’s 2024 campaign, which will, in fact, weigh largely upon the revival of the NCP’s fortunes in its traditional strongholds, the anti-incumbency mood expected off the state and central governments and the reinvigoration of the INC cadre in the state.  

Consequently, in the current scheme of things, the DMK and the RJD are seemingly the only two members of the UPA with strong political footings in their respective states of Tamil Nadu and Bihar, where both are in power now and, hence, also susceptible to anti-incumbency. The DMK look formidable in Tamil Nadu as of now thanks to the faction-striven state of the main opposition party, the AIADMK, which had begun to lose its sheen with the death of Jayalalitha.

As for Bihar, the burden of anti-incumbency, if any, will have to be necessarily borne by Nitish Kumar and JD(U) as head of the government and ruling alliance. Hence, even if one is to assume that anti-incumbency against both the state and central governments will echo in the 2024 general elections in Bihar, RJD is expected to remain insulated from its detrimental effects unless major scandals break out in the run-up months.   

Nonetheless, considering that these two parties could only fetch a decent number for the UPA in two states, the political fortunes of UPA to come anywhere close to the 200-250 mark will largely depend on the reinvigoration of the Indian National Congress and its ability to win back a sizable number of seats, in three digits, which also makes it at least the second largest party in the Lok Sabha. 

The purported success of the Bharat Jodo Yatra has certainly kindled the hopes of an astounding revival of the ailing grand old party of India and putting life into the semi-cadre organizational structure. The higher-than-expected turnout along the yatra route, however, was more seen as an indication of popular resentment on pinching issues like inflation and unemployment than an outright endorsement given to Rahul Gandhi. Hence, political observers are unanimous in casting doubts on the actual gains that Bharat Jodo Yatra, or its reported second edition from West to East, might accrue for the Congress in mission 2024.

How then can the INC expect to throw a challenge for the ruling party in 2024? Will Kharge’s exposition on alliances translate into anything concrete beyond the current UPA set-up? 

Congress + the extended ideological family 

Assuming that the current UPA order may fall short in the 2024 campaign, where should the INC leadership be looking in order to find those force additions that will provide muscularity to the alliance expansion plan? 

The answer invariably lies in the extended Congress family or the erstwhile Congressmen who ditched the mother ship and floated their own parties as also those regional outfits which do not have an ideological aversion to the INC. They include, above all, the likes of All India Trinamool Congress (also known as TMC) led by Mamata Banerjee, Jagan Mohan Reddy’s YSR Congress (YSRCP), and the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS), now renamed as the Bharat Rashtra Samiti (BRS), led by Chandrasekhar Rao, who, if not a congressman by legacy, also had a history of closely associating with the party in his pursuit of the Telangana cause. 

There are many others as well who fit the bill, including the NCP and the DMK, which are already in the UPA coalition as also socialist entities like the Janata Dal (S), which was in the UPA coalition earlier and is also supposedly yearning for a return. There are parties like Biju Janata Dal (BJD), Samajwadi Party (SP), Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP), and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), all formidable regional political forces in their own right but with a known ideological aversion to the Congress, even though some of them, like the Samajwadi Party, has a history of cooperating with the INC. 

Those were, however, arrangements of political convenience and cannot be seen as resolute political collaborations. Just like the fact the communist parties cannot be expected to have a permanent alliance with the ‘centrist’ Congress, we cannot also expect parties from the socialist clan or the sub-nationalist entities to be ‘all-weather’ allies in a Congress-led front. Be it the ethnic sub-nationalists like DMK, AIADMK, Telugu Desam Party (TDP) or the Shiv Sena and the Kashmiri ‘autonomy-seekers’ like National Conference and PDP (despite their early Congress linkages), these parties have distinct ideological identities and baggage that may come in conflict with INC’s way of politics, especially when in power. 

Considering that the party with the strongest Congress lineage, the NCP, is already a prominent force in the UPA scheme of things, Kharge’s immediate consideration will be to find the means to attract three prominent regional players to the UPA bandwagon, namely the TMC, YSRCP and TRS/BRS. 

All three were either erstwhile frontline Congress leaders and foot soldiers or had inherited the mantle through family ties, or had strong collaborations with organizational affiliations. All of them had distinct and individual reasons to part with INC and float their regional outfits but none being of a major departure from the INC’s all-inclusive dogma. Some of them have had a history of dilly-dalliances with the NDA, but more seemingly for political expediency than by any ideological affiliation. 

Their electoral record has been formidable and remains the pivotal factor that the INC leadership has to take into consideration when thinking of expanding the alliance tentacles. Sample their performance and records:

All Indian Trinamool Congress - The Trinamool (meaning grassroots) Congress, formed by Mamta Banerjee in 1998, is the third largest party in the Lok Sabha with its 23 members and cornering 43.69 per cent vote share in the state. In the 2021 assembly elections in West Bengal, the TMC won 48.02 per cent of the vote share from the state, an increase of over 4 per cent from its 2016 share of 44.91 per cent. Having debuted with 7 seats in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, the TMC’s rise has since been exponential, having reached a peak of 34 seats out of the 42 in West Bengal in the 2014 general elections. 

Though the slump in the number of seats in 2019 was attributed to the rise of BJP in the West Bengal, the TMC vote has been consistent and intact as evidenced by its performance in the 2021 assembly elections. The recurring victories demonstrate the TMC’s organizational strength and its ability to withstand anti-incumbency trends and formidable political challenges from key adversaries. 

As a drop-out from the Congress family, and by naming her party as a grassroots version of the ideological parent, Banerjee had essentially intended to replace the moribund Congress organization with an alternate framework that represented a bottom-up revitalization of what was in West Bengal then a top-heavy organizational setup. Thus, it will not be inappropriate to aver that TMC represents the actual Congress ideological base in West Bengal. 

That Banerjee had collaborated with the INC for local, state-wide elections on numerous occasions and was part of the UPA as well may not be considered as a virtue by the INC leadership for the simple reason that Banerjee was also a part of the Atal Bihari Vajpayee ministry and, hence, showed no qualms in siding with the right-wing coalition. However, it could also be reminded that even the DMK, then led by the rationalist and secular M. Karunanidhi, had also joined hands with Vajpayee and functioned as an NDA constituent. 

Beyond such political and ideological baggage, two significant factors could stymie the TMC’s return to the UPA bandwagon. First, the TMC supremo, Mamta Banerjee, has been a votary of a federal front that could be formed through an alliance of regional parties. If such a front garners enough seats in the 2024 general elections, Banerjee possibly sees herself as a top contender for the Prime Minister’s post. 

Although such a front is unlikely to form a government without the support of leading opposition parties including the INC, regional leaders like Banerjee nurse such ambitions and refuse to join more pragmatic coalitions. The second is the discord between Banerjee and the Gandhi family which seems to rear its head on many occasions. Visible differences over each other’s styles of functioning, ego clashes and notable political differences between the two leaderships have emerged as key hindrances to any alliance suggestions. 

The key to a TMC-INC coalition in West Bengal in 2024 will be the join vote they could mobilise in an alliance in order to keep the BJP at bay. While the BJP had garnered over 40 per cent vote share in 2019, the INC share of 5.67 per cent in 2019 when adding up to the TMC’s 43.69 could add up to a formidable concentration if they can sustain this chunk in 2024.

(Spoiler alert: INC’s surprise win against TMC in Sagardighi in the latest by-polls, in alliance with the CPI (M), could be a wake-up call for Banerjee.) 

Telangana Rashtra Samiti - The TRS chief, K Chandrasekhar Rao, started his politics in Youth Congress before moving on to the Telugu Desam Party. Having declared the Telangana mission in 2001 and floating the TRS for this purpose, Rao joined hands with INC in 2004 and was part of the UPA formation since its outset. In 2006, he parted ways and agitated for the Telangana state which the UPA granted in 2009 with the credit garnered by Rao. 

The formation of the state enabled its accession to power as its Chief Minister and his party held the roost in the newly formed state until now. The INC, which should have cornered the credit for creating the new state, in turn, lost both the new state as well as its previous incarnation, Andhra Pradesh, thanks to the ill-conceived moves of the senior INC leadership during the formation of Telangana. 

TRS has had a meteoric rise ever since, starting with 26 assembly seats and 5 Lok Sabha seats in the 2004 elections while still being part of undivided Andhra Pradesh. Its aligning with TDP and BJP as an NDA constituent in 2009, however, did not fetch it much favour at the hustings. The tide, though, changed in 2014 when Rao and his TRS, riding on the fervour of the new statehood, swept the first elections new Telangana state by winning 63 of the 119 assembly seats, and forming the government, and at the same time also winning 11 out of the 17 Lok Sabha seats belonging to the new state. 

Confident in his popularity, Rao dissolved the assembly and conducted elections in 2018, in which he increased the tally to 88 seats. A year later, however, he took a beating in the 2019 general elections with his Lok Sabha tally reducing to 9 seats though he still managed to garner a 41.29 per cent vote share. It is worthwhile to note that the INC, despite winning only three seats in 2019, however, cornered a 29.48 per cent vote share as opposed to BJP’s 19.45 per cent.

The 2019 vote share if replicated even in closer terms in 2024 could amount to a sizable 70 per cent vote share assuming TRS will not be hit by anti-incumbency as much as the BJP could confront when both face off at the hustings in 2024. The element favouring an alliance is that TRS could use the INC votes to secure its existing seats whereas INC will gain from the larger UPA coalition if formed in Telangana.  

However, like in the case of West Bengal, the foremost obstacle to the TRS joining the UPA or an INC-led front is the prime ministerial ambitions of Chandrasekhar Rao, which also reflected in his party shedding the Telangana identity in favour of ‘Bharat’. Having declared this ambition in as many terms on many occasions, Rao, however, is banking on the possibility of a federal front wherein he will join hands with regional prime ministerial aspirants like Mamta Banerjee and Naveen Patnaik. It is, however, affirmatively lamented that such a federal front will not be able to come to power without the backing of the top two national parties. 

Nonetheless, considering that Rao has emerged as a fervent critic of the BJP and the central government is one glimmer of hope for Kharge that TRS could eventually be roped into the UPA bandwagon, notwithstanding the vocal attack by Rahul Gandhi against the Telangana chieftain during the recent Bharat Jodo Yatra. 

YSRCP – While the Indian National Congress failed to gain in political terms from the role it played in the creation of Telangana, the party lost heavily in Andhra Pradesh owing to the resentment of Andhra people who had high stakes in the development of Hyderabad as an IT metropolis and ending up losing the city to Telangana. 

While TDP made a revival in the anti-Congress wave that swept AP since the announcement of Telangana’s creation in 2009, the INC was completely swept out of the state not just owing to the Telangana factor but also another grave misjudgment by the central Congress leadership about a regional chieftain’s legacy. The leadership’s failure to gauge the mood after the death of Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy a.k.a YSR, who was the tallest standing leader in the region, and pass on the baton to his son, Jagan Mohan Reddy, despite support from most Congress legislators, cost the party dear in Andhra Pradesh. 

Jagan Mohan’s Odarpu Yatra (in memory of YSR) became the vehicle to launch his political career and mass mobilization for his new party across the state. The central leadership’s attempts to scuttle the yatra only led to its further alienation among the already-disgruntled party cadre and voters of the state. Following the announcement of the YSCRP in March 2011, Jagan Mohan swept most of the elections in the state that was already reeling from the fear syndrome created by the Telangana statehood announcement.  

Notwithstanding the drubbing he faced in the back of the Modi wave in 2014, when his party won only 67 of the 175, he still managed 45 per cent vote share, just two per cent behind the 47 that the winning TDP garnered in alliance with BJP. The impact that even slight margins in vote share could make a difference in such tightly contested states is enough catalyst for Jagan Mohan to think of suitable alliances in the 2024 campaign. 

Despite the drubbing of 2014, Jagan Mohan made a massive comeback in 2019, winning a massive 151 of the 175 assembly seats and 22 of the 25 Lok Sabha seats. YSRCP bagged an astounding 49.95 per cent vote share as against the 39.18 that the TDP could collect. The vote shares gained by the other parties in Andhra Pradesh in 2019 are also revealing: while the BJP, which went solo, could get only 0.84 per cent, an umbrella coalition formed by actor Pawan Kalyan under his Jana Sena formation with BSP and left parties as allies, though dubbed as a disastrous electoral debut, still managed to accumulate over 6.8 per cent votes. 

This is a classic case of a confusion-ridden political scenario wherein new players compete to fill in for the vacuum created by the fall of domination of regional and national parties in a state’s political scene. With the Congress completely wiped out, the BJP failing to make a dent and the TDP succumbing to corruption scandals, Jagan Mohan’s massive victory was a natural fall-out along with the failed attempt by others to carve out a space. 

It is into this matrix that Rahul Gandhi walked into with his Bharat Jodo Yatra hoping to make some ripples in the state’s politics. Having lost its influential Reddy leaders to the YSRCP and BJP, and with the dominant upper-caste Kammas still aligned with their traditional loyalty to the TDP, the Congress also failed to capitalise its Kapus-centric OBC constituency despite managing to bring popular actor Chiranjeevi to join its ranks. The 2019 polls, however, showed Chiranjeevi’s brother Pawan Kalyan extracting back the Kappu vote from the Congress kitty. 

With Chiranjeevi ruling out a return to politics and the INC’s state unit already announcing plans to go it alone in 2024 along with declaring YSRCP as the second enemy after the BJP, it will need Kharge to move mountains to reinvigorate the party’s political fortunes in the state. While one can note that Rahul Gandhi was not as acerbic in his attack on YSRCP as with the BRS while passing through Telangana, there is visibly no love lost yet between the Gandhi and Reddy clans with the acrimony of the Odarpu Yatra and the CBI raids on Jagan Mohan by the UPA regime refusing to fade out from the political memories of Andhra Pradesh, which is also still reeling from the bifurcation. 

Building a broad Congress family: Kharge’s mission 2024?

Politics, they say, is the art of the impossible. Indian politics have regularly seen sworn ideological enemies joining hands to share power. If the Gandhi family can reconcile with Sharad Pawar, who was the first voice against Sonia Gandhi's accession to power; if the Gandhi family can re-unite with the DMK after ostracizing the Dravidian party for its support to the Eelam cause; if the INC could remobilize its political base in Punjab and gain the confidence of the Sikhs after the Indira Gandhi assassination and the anti-Sikh riots; if the INC can sit with Shiv Sena to form the MVA in Maharashtra, there is no reason to believe that the Congress leadership under Kharge should desist from reaching out to members of the extended Congress family that had jettisoned the mother ship and wades out on their own in their smaller rafts.  

The key to credible coalition building for the Indian National Congress, either through an expansion of the UPA structure or facilitating a new political formation will invariably depend on the ability of the current leadership to reach out to the political fraternity that shares its political legacies as well as its ideologies affinities.