21 September 2024

What the Gaza conflict tells us about privatisation of security

Statecraft

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23 November 2023, 10.15 pm   

"The industry has witnessed a major boost since the COVID pandemic as it was categorized as an essential industry and allowed to function amidst the pandemic-induced ban on most activities. Given the high potential, the Central Association of Private Security Industry (CAPSI) has already demanded a suitable amendment to the Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act 2005 raising the FDI limit to 74%."

The author is Professor of History at the University of Calcutta, and Convenor of the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies, Calcutta. He can be reached at: chakrabartishantanu@hotmail.com.

The end of the Cold War was celebrated by many as an end to the conflict-determined pattern of global relations, which would ensure greater cooperation and peace. Such optimism, however, died soon. While the number of inter-state conflicts certainly came down in the post-Cold War years, externally induced factors as well as the rising instances of collapsing internal institutions witnessed the rise of intrastate conflicts of several types involving various categories of state, non-state and hybrid actors in global conflict zones. 

One is perhaps forced to acknowledge, at least, the partial validity of the prophecy made by John J. Mearsheimer in 1990, in a different context, that we will soon be missing the order of the Cold War years as we leap into ‘untamed anarchy.’

In the post-Cold War period, we find ourselves in a world of small wars and weak states. Such developments have intensified the trend towards privatisation of violence at different levels of conflict through the involvement of agencies like warlords, militias, rebels, paramilitary groups, gangs, and organized crime groups. 

Global proliferation in the supply of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), as a result of easier accessibility and poor or failed controlling mechanisms, has also helped in perpetuating such conflicts at local levels. This is very much evident in the post-Cold War conflicts ranging from the Balkan Wars down to the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. 

While the ongoing Gaza conflict is immensely discussed in public forums and media channels examine all angles ranging from humanitarian to strategic aims, one missing item in such discussions and debates is the deep involvement of private players, in particular, the private military and security companies (PMSCs). 

The involvement of private security players in the Gaza conflict just like the ongoing Russo-Ukraine conflict (which, in contrast, has witnessed significant discussions around the role of the Russia-based Wagner Group), is a further confirmation in the global strategic culture of the arrival and dominance of what historian Mary Kaldor defined as ‘New Wars’, in contrast to the old forms of wars prevalent before the 1990s. 

Privatization of security, in fact, has been a major trend since the early 21st century, with the Private Security Industry (PSI) becoming a major player in the Israeli industrialization process. In a major initiative undertaken by the Israeli government in 2005 and continued since then, as one report indicates:

Private security companies in Israel play an active role in the occupation of Palestinian land and control over Palestinian people. Private security guards operate checkpoints and guard settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. These security guards have policing powers, they bear arms and are entitled to use force in performing their duties. In the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the private security guards, who are hired by the state of Israel to guard the settlements, de facto serve as a private police force that serves the settlers population.

The policy of privatization probably fitted well with an overall Israeli strategic policymaking of deterrence. RAND Corporation, in one of its reports on the Israel-Hamas conflict prepared in 2017 had commented: 

“…this is a story of deterrence. Israel never strived for a decisive victory in Gaza. While it could militarily defeat Hamas, Israel could not overthrow Hamas without risking the possibility that a more radical organization would govern Gaza. Nor did Israel want to be responsible for governing Gaza in a postconflict power vacuum. As such, Israel’s grand strategy became “mowing the grass”— accepting its inability to permanently solve the problem and instead repeatedly targeting the leadership of Palestinian militant organizations to keep violence manageable.” 

The Kamikaze-style Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 changed the old strategic narrative. The Hamasoperation not only involved traditional rocket attacks on a massive scale but also militant groups using gliders and vehicles to cross border barricades and taking Israeli prisoners of war, both soldiers and civilians, men, women and children before killing many victims. 

The Israeli counterattacks involving missile attacks and aerial raids along with the ongoing ground offensive inside Gaza have led to massive destruction and deaths. Sporadic attacks on Israel by Iran-backed Hezbollahfrom Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen have also led to Israeli retaliation risking prospects of further spreading of the conflict. 

Wagner's influence over Hamas?

Significantly, the change in offensive style by Hamas has been attributed to the influence of private security operators in certain quarters.

The former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko, for instance, in an interview given to Euractiv said“I know the signature of Wagner from their attacks in Lysychansk, Severodonetsk, Soledar, Bakhmut. This is exactly Wagner's tactics…I’m absolutely sure that the Russian Wagner instructors in Syria were transferred to Hamas in Gaza and participated in the training of terrorists to prepare the absolutely barbaric attack on Israel from the Gaza strip.” 

While Poroshenko did not back up his assertion with any evidence, recent reports of the Wagner Group’s intentions to supplythe Iran-backed and Lebanon-based Hezbollah with the Russian SA-22 Greyhound system consisting of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery to intercept aircraft, have raised suspicions about tacit Russian support and backing. The Russian air defence support could further bolster the Hezbollah operators to launch more attacks on Israel which they have already started. The expected Israeli retaliation will make the volatile regional situation more complex. 

The PMSCs, however, do not only play a role in escalating or encouraging conflicts but also in providing help and succour in conflict situations. The Gaza conflict has not been an exception. Like in Israel, the PMSCs also proliferated in Gaza in recent years. The Middle East Monitorreports that these companies have solved a major problem for international organizations which have offices in Gaza. 

Some of these multinationals had to suspend their work for a while because they did not want to deal with the official security services, which have been run by Hamas since mid-2007. The arrival of the PMSCs solved their problem, to an extent. These private security firms have been known to provide security for international envoys, including those working with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), when they visit the Gaza Strip.

Even today, as the ongoing conflict shows no signs of abating any time soon, the PMSCs like International SOS and Control Risks along with others are playing a crucial role in the evacuation and rescue process of civilians in the border zones. A reporter, based on her interviews with local operatives of the International SOS, a security and risk management company with operations in more than 90 countries, has commented that it has helped the movementof at least 200 people around the region, as well as assisting ‘hundreds more’ with information and advice on safety.” 

While these companies have previous experience in such evacuation from global hotspots like Afghanistan, Sudan and Ukraine, admittedly the challenges in the Gaza conflict are much higher. 

The Gaza conflict, perhaps, is a typical example of the new types of hybrid conflicts defined as ‘lawfare’ by the RAND Corporation in its report in 2017. The report argued that Operation Protective Edge of 2014 launched by Israel against Hamas had shown “how modern democratic militaries must increasingly confront lawfare – using law as a substitute for traditional military means…These engagements became the subject of intense legal scrutiny and a UN-led inquiry, which called into question the IDF’s use of weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated areas and other tactics.” 

Confronting a hybrid enemy requires new and fresh strategic initiatives from Westphalian states. Privatization of security, with all its pros and cons, is likely to be an essential component of this new-age strategy in any conflicts in the future.

The Indian scenario

The trend towards privatization and outsourcing of security is also transforming the Indian security market. A media report of April 2023 estimated that the number of operating companies is approximately 15000, both unorganized and organized, with over 5 million private security guards available in service as opposed to 3.2 million police officers. 

The industry has witnessed a major boost since the COVID pandemic as it was categorized as an essential industry and allowed to function amidst the pandemic-induced ban on most activities. Given the high potential, the Central Association of Private Security Industry (CAPSI) has already demanded a suitable amendment to the Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act 2005 raising the FDI limit to 74%.

Such trends towards privatization of security had initially been greeted with a great deal of scepticism and were equated with crass commercialism unleashed by the forces of globalization. This has, however, given way to greater acceptability and respect for the industry in recent times. An indication of this was the attendance of President Pratibha Patil at the annual conference day event organized by the Central Association of Private Security Industry (CAPSI) in December 2009. This is beside the fact that 4 December is commemorated as Private Security Day by the CAPSI. 

More recently, speaking at the CAPSI Annual conference in December 2022, the Minister of State for Road Transport and Highways and Civil Aviation, Gen (retd.) V.K. Singh, himself a former chief of the Indian Army, opined that“the private security sector needs to set standards and meet benchmarks which match international standards so that they could be given the responsibility of safety and security of important installations not only in the country but also overseas.”

The Indian government has also initiated a series of steps to legalize and standardize the industry through several legislations. These were primarily the Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act 2005and the Private Detective Agencies (Regulation) Bill 2007. Several analysts have highlighted the importance of proper training and skill development in order to enhance the employment opportunities for private security personnel.

One analyst suggests that given the vast potential and quick growthof the Indian private security industry, the next logical step should be creating Indian Private Military Corporations (PMCs) or Companies like those in the ‘Western World’. There is great potential for the deployment of Indian private security personnel as the professional behaviour of most Indian personnel has already been acknowledged in several global conflict zones. 

study undertaken by Ulrike Joras and Adrian Schusterfor the Swiss Peace Foundation in 2008 on interactions between private security personnel and local populations in Afghanistan and Angola, reported that though the local people hated PMSCs as essentially ‘white dominated’ organizations, nonetheless, there was greater respect for Asian private security personnel, particularly the Gurkhas. 

Given the fact that most security personnel employed in private companies are retired army and policemen, their experience and training could be used in deflating and tackling conflict situations in global hot spots, such as Gaza.

The use of the PSCs, in fact, can be integrated within the Security Sector Reform (SSR) model which is being advocated all over the world as a necessary model for combining security and good governance. Overt securitization of the problems could, however, lead to the neglect of the issues related to governance as the establishment (or re-establishment) of the state monopoly of force becomes the primary concern in conflict situations, often through the adoption of extraordinary measures leading to the fracturing and proliferation of conflicts rather than ending it. 

Privatization of security, in this connection, may be looked upon as a double-edged sword that requires skillful handling, as a challenge to meet dynamic internal and global strategic challenges in coming times.

(Views expressed are solely of the author.)

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