The tragic crash of a Bangladesh Air Force training aircraft in Dhaka on July 21, 2025, exposed a significant societal fault line. While the nation grieved the loss of lives and debated the government’s response, a notable paradox emerged.

As the chief adviser of the interim government faced criticism for appealing for financial aid on social media, the Islamist political party, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, stepped forward, announcing an initial swift medical assistance of Taka 50 lakh for the victims.

This stark contrast raises a critical question: how does Jamaat-e-Islami wield economic power that enables it to act as a parallel state, and what does this mean for the government's authority?

This report examines the central issue, investigating the economic sources of Jamaat-e-Islami and how these resources influence the balance of state power.

Image: A Facebook post by Mohammad Yunus, the Chief Adviser of the Interim Government of Bangladesh, where he asked for financial help for the milestone victims. Following wide criticism, he deleted the post.

The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami recorded the highest income among 29 registered political parties that submitted their 2024 audit reports to the country’s Election Commission (EC). Since the government cancelled its registration in 2013, Jamaat had not submitted such statements until now. It regained registration following an order by the Bangladesh Supreme Court in June 2025.

According to the statements submitted, Jamaat earned Taka 28.97 crore and spent Taka 23.73 crore in 2024, surpassing both BNP and the Jatiyo Party. The BNP reported an income of Taka 15.65 crore and an expenditure of Taka 4.80 crore, while the Jatiyo Party reported an income of Taka 2.64 crore and an expenditure of Taka 1.79 crore.

Interestingly, the account statements reveal that Jamaat stated it does not maintain a bank account.

Economic sources of Jamaat-e-Islami

According to these reports, in the last calendar year, Jamaat earned 165,642,162 Taka through contributions from its workers and members. Contributions from the executive committee, advisory council, and other sources totalled 37,87,149 Taka.

Donations received from various individuals or organisations were 118,638,619 Taka. Income from the sale of the party’s newspapers, magazines, and books was 911,290 taka. The party earned 721,790 Taka from other contributions, with a total income of 289,729 Taka.

Apart from these declarations by the Jamaat, prominent media outlets in Bangladesh frequently publish reports about the Jamaat’s financial sources and its suspicious linkages. Sample these reports: Prothom Alo, on 21 September 2005, titled “Five JMB leaders arrested in Chittagong participated in Jamaat politics and used the Islami Bank to transact Taka 160,000.”; the Daily Star, 31 August 2005, “34 Islamic NGOs get over Taka 200 crore (the USD 33 million) from donors a year”; the Daily Star, 22 September 2005, “Authorities have released over 1000 militants, and 40 percent of them belong to Jamaat-e-Islami.”

Image: A Facebook post by Dr. Shafiqur Rahman, President of Bangladesh Jamaat-i-Islami, where he primarily announced to offer 50 lakh Taka for the medical help of the milestone victims.

Many Bangladesh economists and political observers had termed the financial system controlled by the Islamist groups as “economic fundamentalism.”

According to prominent economist Abul Barkat, Islamic fundamentalism has economic spin-offs, with the religious groups creating an ‘economy within the economy,’ and a ‘state within the state.’ Pointing to their financial strength, which ranges from the micro to the macro levels, and is key to sustaining their colossal political organisations, Barkat terms it the “economics of fundamentalism.”

Even in the narrow sense of the term, Barkat explains that this economy functions through enterprises ranging from large financial institutions to household-level microcredit, from mosques and madrasas to news media and information technology outfits, from nationwide trading enterprises to local-level NGOs.

Barkat estimates the annual net profit of economic fundamentalism in Bangladesh would be about USD 250 million (20 billion Taka). The highest share of such profit, 27 percent (of total net profit), comes from financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, leasing companies, etc.).

The second highest, 18.8 percent of total net profit comes from NGOs, trusts and foundations, 10.8 percent comes from trading concerns, 10.4 percent profit comes from pharmaceutical industry and health institution including diagnostic centres, 9.2 percent comes from educational institutions, 8.5 percent comes from real estate business, 7.8 percent comes from media and information technology businesses, while 7.5 percent comes from transport sector.

Although the above net profit earning is primarily based on heuristic estimates, the pattern is (at least) indicative of the direction of such financial networks. At the same time, this pattern of net profit earning by various sectors and sub-sectors of fundamentalist economics is much in congruence with the mainstream economic trends as well.

Links to militancy

Money from these sources is not solely spent on social welfare or religious purposes, as claimed to be, but also on promoting militancy, extremism, etc. According to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Bangladesh Police, 620 million Taka was deposited into the account of Bangladesh Chashi Kalyan Samity as foreign donations between 2007 and 2018.

Its founder is Maulana Abul Kalam Mohammad Yusuf, former Naib-e-Amir of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. The organization registered with the Department of Social Services in 1992 and the NGO Bureau of Affairs in 2005.

Later, farmers' groups believed to be supported by the Jamaat-e-Islami established the Nabakrishi Private Limited, the Bangladesh Chashikalyan Samity, and Nabadhara Kalyan Foundation – organisations which are alleged to be involved in promoting fundamentalism and militancy.

According to a report by Jugantar, over 625.6 million Taka was deposited into the account of Bangladesh Chashi Kalyan Samiti from 2007 to 2018 as donations from abroad. From 2012 to 2016, Mostaq Ahmed Khan, a former Jamaat-e-Islami senator, brought money from a religious extremist group in Turkey, which was allegedly used to spread militancy and finance terrorism in Baniachong Upazila of Habiganj.

Later, the Bangladesh police filed a case against Mostaq Ahmed Khan.

In February 2018, the Counter Terrorism Unit reportedly arrested Hasanul Banna, the executive officer of Nabadhara Kalyan Foundation. The case investigation revealed that Hamidur Rahman Azad, former Jamaat-e-Islami member of parliament from Cox’s Bazar-2 (Moheshkhali-Kutubdia) constituency, instructed the Bangladesh Chashi Kalyan Samity to transfer 4.2 million Taka from its account to Nabakrishi Private Limited.

Fault lines exploited by Islamists

The former Bangladesh Culture Minister Asaduzzaman Nur had indicated the involvement of Islamic fundamentalists in the vast collection of funds from mosques and Bangladeshi establishments in London. These reports also suggested that the fundamentalist organisations are not dependent solely on these foreign-generated funds, as the Jamaat-e-Islami allocated around ten percent of its annual profit in Bangladesh to fund the party’s political activities.

Analysts have also calculated that this ten percent can sustain almost 600,000 cadres. As the Jamaat-controlled economy is showing a higher growth rate—9 percent per annum—than the mainstream’s growth figure of 6 percent, the fundamentalist bloc can remain assured of a continuous flow of money.

According to Professor Barkat, one can trace the relative strength of the economics of fundamentalism in Bangladesh to the fact that its annual net profit is equivalent to 6 percent of the government’s annual development budget. 

The question then arises as to what the fault lines are that have enabled the Islamists to gain ground in Bangladesh’s political and economic spheres. A clear trend that comes out in most analyses is the failure of governance that has provided space for Islamist groups to exploit.

Through the numerous socio-cultural and socio-economic institutions, some of which are listed above, Islamist groups pervasively propel the structures of religious and cultural fundamentalism across the country. These include financial, banking, educational, and healthcare institutions, which not only generate extensive financial output but also are a means for employment, especially for the Islamist cadre and their enabling ecosystem.

The shortcomings of the Bangladeshi State have created an opportunity for Islamist groups in several identifiable areas:

(a)   Pervasive corruption and weak governance

Bangladesh has consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries, indicating a deep-seated culture of corruption, power abuse, and weak governance in a country that has alternated between military regimes and mainstream political parties, most of which have faced corruption allegations.

In the 2024 survey by Transparency International, Bangladesh was ranked at 151 out of 180 countries, scoring 23 out of 100, its lowest score in 13 years. A year prior, it was ranked 149th, reflecting its consistently lower position in global corruption surveys.  

Though an Anti-Corruption Commission was formed in 2004, it is seen to be ineffective due to government control. It is no wonder then that corruption emerges as a common theme in Bangladeshi political discourse, with every incumbent being accused of corruption, only to be followed by another 'corrupt' regime.

Image: Bangladesh in corruption rankings.

According to Geoff Macdonald, the increasingly authoritarian secular state in Bangladesh provides radical Islamists with a compelling grievance around which to recruit and mobilize.

(b)   Jobless growth and high unemployment:

Despite economic progress, the country suffers from “jobless growth,” characterized by alarmingly high unemployment, particularly among young people. The youth unemployment rate is 8 percent, and over a third of university graduates are jobless for a year or more.

According to a World Bank report, between 2016 and 2022, young people face significantly higher unemployment rates, particularly in urban areas. The availability of jobs has declined for urban, educated youth, and job creation in large industries, like the ready-made garments sector, has stagnated.

Since 2016, Dhaka has been the main centre for job creation, while three divisions—Chattogram, Rajshahi, and Sylhet—have experienced substantial net employment losses.

In addition, the Labour Force Survey 2022 of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) reveals that while the national unemployment rate is 3.53 percent, the youth unemployment rate is as high as 8 percent. The share of unemployed youth in total unemployment is 83.2 percent.

Informal employment as a share of total employment was 84.9 per cent in 2022.

(c)   Rising Inequality and Educational Disparity:

Poverty persists across the nation, and the resultant inequality is on the rise. A significant educational gap exists between urban and rural areas. Despite 70 percent of the school-going population being from rural areas, only 34 percent of university students come from these areas.

A. Hossain in his book. Bangladeshi Rajnitite Dharmo O Dharmoniropekhota (Religion and Secularism in Bangladeshi Politics) (2019) contends that the development models implemented in Bangladesh since independence have not led to any qualitative improvement in the living conditions of low-income individuals. On the contrary, the gap between the rich and the poor has increased.

By exploiting this weakness of the government, the religious political parties made themselves legitimate to the people. Some popular slogans of the Jamaat provide an example of this. For instance, ‘Anno, Bastro, Basosthan, Islam Debe Samadhan’ (Food, clothing, shelter, Islam will provide solutions) and ‘Allahr Ain Ebong Satloker Sason Chai’ (seek the law of Allah and the rule of righteous people.

Ripe political conditions

Apart from economic factors, some political and social factors also paved the way for Jamaat’s rise in Bangladesh’s politics and social spheres.

(a)   Constitutional Changes:

Bangladesh has stated its journey with Socialism, Secularism, Democracy, and Nationalism as the guiding political principles. However, following the assassination of Sheikh Mujib Rahman, the constitutional amendments by President Zia-ur-Rahman and President Hussain Muhammad Ershad, both former military officers, not only changed the political identity of the country but also paved the way for Islamists in the soil of Bangladesh.

Zia-ur-Rahman’s tenure saw an amendment that changed the Preamble of the Constitution. The words “historic struggle for national liberation” were replaced by “historic war for national independence.”

The word “secularism,” appearing in the Preamble and Article 8 as one of the four fundamental principles, was substituted with “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah.” The legislature inserted a new Clause (1A) to emphasize that “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah” should be “the basis of all actions.” Article 12, which defined secularism, was omitted.

Above the Preamble, the words “Bismillah-ar-Rahman-ar-Rahim” were inserted to give the constitution an Islamic colour. Economic and social justice, taken together, created a new ideological terrain that the regime used to legitimize its rule.

Furthermore, through the Eighth Amendment, Ershad declared Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh. Although Sheikh Hasina again incorporated ‘Secularism’ in the constitution when she came into power after 2008, she did not change the state religion.

(b)   Coalitions with the Islamists

Since 1991, a trend had emerged in which Islamist political parties, mainly Jamaat-e-Islami, had become a key factor in winning elections. In 1991, the BNP entered into a political coalition with the Jamaat.

Before 1996, it was evident that the Jamaat was the primary partner of the Awami League in protesting against the BNP. Above all, in 2001, the BNP coalition, Islami Oikyo Jote, came to power, where the Jamaat played a pivotal role.

Before the 2008 election, the Awami League coalition included anti-Jamaat Islamist parties. In 2006, the Awami League allied with the orthodox Deobandi party and pledged that if it came to power, it would not enact any laws contrary to the Quran.

In the 2018 elections, out of the ten registered Islamist parties, six were associated with the Awami League and two with the BNP. Moreover, 15 Islamic, like-minded political parties formed the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) on 17 September 2018 and extended their support to the alliance government led by the Awami League.

Consequently, Islamist ideas became more prevalent in the country’s political discourse. This process was spurred by and coincided with the rising fortunes of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the country's predominant Islamist political party. The Awami League and the BNP, as the two main parties, had thus found it politically expedient to incorporate Islamic elements into their campaign rhetoric and to form both short-term and long-term alliances with Islamic political parties.

In other words, the opportunistic politics of the two frontline parties, which also affected Bangladesh's political and social character, led to the rise of the Jamaat.

Besides, global events – the Yom Kippur War, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the conflict in Afghanistan, the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attack in the US and the subsequent Global War on Terrorism, which was portrayed in some quarters as being against Islam, among others – have all had a huge catalytical role in the trajectory of religious extremism across different countries, including Bangladesh.

The first instance of organized religious extremism in Bangladesh was in 1986, when the Muslim Millat Bahini (MMB), under the leadership of Major Mati-ur-Rahman, had a connection with militants fighting in the Afghan War. It reported that over 3400 Bangladeshis took part in the Afghan war and eventually returned to the country with stronger radical ideologies and greater affinities for violent activism.

(c)   De-secularisation/Islamisation of education

De-secularisation of education in Bangladesh is a crucial factor that was meant to enhance Islamist psychology along with ideology. Two key aspects drove this phenomenon: increasing the number of madrasahs and modifying the study syllabus.

It was reported on August 24, 2025, that the Qawmi Madrassa is now the fastest-growing educational system in the country. There are two kinds of madrasah in Bangladesh: Qawmi and Aliya. Qawmi Madrasa education is entirely private, with full autonomy to design the curriculum. The government lacks credible statistics or monitoring of the number of students studying in these institutions.

A total of six large and a few small boards oversee the educational program of Qawmi Madrasahs in the country. Analysts consider the Befaqul Madarisil Arabia Bangladesh (BEFAQ) to be the largest of these boards.

An analysis of the number of participants in the central examinations held under it has shown that the number of examinees has increased by about 55 percent in the last three years. A total of 225,631 students participated in the 2022 BEFAQ examination. An estimated 3,47,776 students are sitting for the examination this year.

Accordingly, the number of examinees has increased by 1,24,415 in the span of three years. Among them, the participation of female examinees has increased significantly. The objective of this education system is not only to produce individuals with religious knowledge but also to equip them with job skills.

Therefore, in the modern era, their education system is being improved to include subjects such as Bengali, English, mathematics, social science, and computer science, which provide them with opportunities to enter the workforce.

According to the report, these madrasas have 11,491 teachers and 785 employees.

In 2017, Bangladesh’s education ministry introduced significant changes to the Bengali language textbooks used in its schools and Islamic seminaries. For instance, the ministry removed poems and stories penned by non-Muslim writers, and replaced the pictures of girls in traditional clothes with those in Islamic attire.

This, in fact, is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh, and had begun some years after the country's independence.

Emajuddin Ahamed and D. R. J. A. Nazneen, point out that the Bangladesh government appointed in 1977 a ‘syllabi committee,’ which declared that “Islam is a code of life, not just the sum of rituals.” “A Muslim must live their personal, social, economic, and international life following Islam from childhood to death. Hence, the acquisition of knowledge of Islam is compulsory for all Muslim men and women,” the committee had professed. 

A year later, the government established a separate directorate within the education ministry and the ‘Madrassah Education Board’ to oversee madrassa education (traditional Islamic religious education provided by clerics). Also, ‘Islamiyat,’ a course on Islamic studies, was introduced at the primary and secondary levels (i.e., grades 1 through 8).

Indoctrination through mass communication platforms

In the 2019 ICT Development Index of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Bangladesh ranked 147 out of 176 in terms of the number of mobile phone users. The Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) reports a total of 123.82 million internet subscribers as of December 2021, of which only 10.09 million use broadband connections, while the remaining 113.73 million are mobile internet users.

In 2017, Bangladesh ranked second globally in terms of the number of active Facebook users.

Md. Sayeed Al-Zaman contends that the emergence of a new Islamic public sphere in Bangladesh in recent years, comprising Islamic fiction (e.g., novels, stories, etc.) and Islamic study groups (e.g., Halaqa and Taleem). Such analyses, though, overlook the emergence of a new age ‘digital Islamic public sphere,’ and its weaponisation against local religious and ethnic minorities.

Image: A Waz Mahfil in session. Picture courtesy: Wikipedia

Another vital medium for Islamisation in Bangladesh is the Waz Mahfil, a religious gathering where Islamic scholars deliver speeches and conduct religious debates. These speeches promote the path of Islamic tradition, inspiring many rural Muslims to follow it.

Waz Mahfil is a crucial medium for Islamisation in Bangladesh. Many Islamic scholars, mostly graduates of madrasas and overseas Islamic universities, became essential figures delivering speeches at Waz Mahfils. Many rural Muslims with little or no education were inspired to follow the path of Islamic tradition by listening to speeches from these gatherings.

In this way, concurrent with the constitutional changes and government support, Islamisation became a broad cultural process that produced Islamic traditions in everyday life.

A parallel power centre?

Islamist groups, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami, capitalise on these failures by establishing a broad network of social and economic institutions. These institutions not only generate revenue but also serve a critical social purpose by providing employment and essential services, thereby creating a loyal support base.

The audit report provided by Jamaat-e-Islami reveals its expenditure of over 65.7 million Taka on employee salaries and benefits, a clear indication of its role as a significant employer.

This parallel ecosystem comprises a diverse range of enterprises that provide services the state often overlooks. These include:

?      Educational institutions and coaching centres that cater to students who lack access to quality education.

?      Hospitals and healthcare facilities that provide medical services to communities.

?      Transport companies that create jobs and services within the informal sector.

?      Publishing houses that disseminate their ideology and generate income. 

Image: These are some institutions funded by the Jammat-e-Islami, though many are not only creating jobs but also spreading their mass base through these institutions.

By providing these vital services and creating employment opportunities, Islamist groups cultivate a parallel system of patronage and loyalty that operates outside the government's control. This strategy strengthens their economic and political influence, gradually gaining ground by meeting the needs of a population that the state has failed to address.

The economic and social power of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami represents a critical challenge to state sovereignty. Rather than existing as a mere political opposition, the party has successfully cultivated a parallel “economy within an economy,” fuelled by a network of businesses, non-governmental entities, and social institutions.

This vast financial apparatus, whose growth rate outpaces that of the national economy, enables Jamaat-e-Islami not only to sustain its operations but also to provide employment and services that the state fails to deliver.

By filling the social and economic void created by unemployment, corruption, and inequality, Jamaat-e-Islami is not only gaining political ground; it is also establishing a deep-rooted ecosystem of loyalty and dependency.

This strategy effectively hollows out state authority from within, transforming the party into a de facto parallel power structure that threatens the very foundations of democratic governance in Bangladesh.

(The views expressed in this article are the author's own.)