The meeting between Iran and the European majors (E-3) - the UK, France, and Germany – was held at the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul last Friday was reported to be inconclusive as both sides stated that the talks will continue. According to various reports, the meeting lasted for four hours and was led on the Iranian side by the Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi.  

The Iranian delegation was quoted as describing the exchange as “serious, frank and detailed,” and that both sides had agreed to further consultations. Some reports stated that the E-3 had reiterated the threat to trigger the ‘snap-back’ mechanism, which entail imposing sanctions, if Iran breaches the terms of 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

There are no confirmed reports on whether the talks dealt with return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and the question of uranium enrichment. However, Gharibabadi had reportedly reiterated on social media that Tehran’s nuclear efforts must be respected and that the talks should not serve as a “platform for hidden agendas such as military action.”

Neither has any indication been given on when the next round of talks will be held.

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The meeting in Istanbul was a bid to restart the nuclear talks that were halted mid-June following the initial Israeli military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities starting 12 June 2025.

The Israeli strikes had spiralled into full-fledged military hostilities between the West Asian neighbours, and aggravated further when the Trump Administration also launched air and missile strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities on 22nd June.

The Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action (JCPOA), which went into effect in January 2016, had imposed restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear programme, particularly its enrichment capabilities.

Image: US President Donald Trump announcing withdrawal from JCPOA on 8th May 2018. Photo courtesy: White House

At the heart of negotiations with Iran were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and Germany—collectively known as the P5+1.

The European Union (EU) also took part in these negotiations, which resulted in the JCPOA.

What makes these early talks necessary is the increasing scepticism that Iran’s nuclear facilities were not really ‘obliterated’ by these military strikes. Multiple assessments have concluded that the US strikes could have destroyed only one of the three nuclear enrichment facilities in Iran, which could have set back Iran’s enrichment programme significantly.

The strikes, these assessments note, did not manage to sufficiently damage or degrade the other facilities in a manner that has curtailed Iran’s enrichment programme to bounce back swiftly.

The E3 intervention, primarily, seeks an early access to Iran’s nuclear activities in order to initiate verification measures, including allowing IAEA inspectors, and finally to revive the direct U.S.-Iran talks.

But Iran remains firm on its preconditions of security guarantees against any such future airstrikes. Iran also seeks to ensure that the nuclear talks do not bring to the table any discussions regarding its ballistic missile programme or its support to alleged proxies in the region.

Europe’s E3, as France, Germany and the UK are collectively called, also remain bound by their own public pronouncements that unless there is verifiable progress by the end of August, they will “snap back” UN sanctions on Iran. As these sanctions will remain exempt from ‘veto,’ Iran’s friends like Russia and China cannot block them either, even though they are opposed to unilateral sanctions and are parties to the 2015 JCPOA.

Recent military strikes on Iran saw them inclined towards Iran’s uranium enrichment sovereignty. Meanwhile, though Iran has agreed to resume dialogue with E3, Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi has called E3’s August ultimatum a non-starter, undermining their credibility in mediating for the resumption of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks.

Can this lead to U.S.-Iran talks?

Starting from April this year, U.S.-Iran talks have witnessed a rather hectic pace, with five rounds of talks: three in Muscat, followed by two in Rome. Their sixth round of talks was due for 15 June in Muscat, which was abruptly suspended following Israeli air attacks on Iran, followed by American strikes a week later.

But within three weeks, they were ready to revive U.S.-Iran talks in Oslo, which, for unknown reasons, could not fructify.

This is partly because the Trump Administration’s approach remains inconsistent and wavering. While chief negotiator Steve Witkoff has been suggesting that Iran need not enrich beyond the JCPOA limit of 3.7 percent, the Republican hardliners, led by President Trump himself, want a complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

For its part, Iran asserts that no red lines on its uranium enrichment are acceptable, and yet it expects relief on sanctions as well as security guarantees against U.S.-Israeli airstrikes.

Image: Then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspecting a nuclear facility in February 2012

In this backdrop, E3-Iran talks have limited prospects. Any deal facilitated by the Europeans alone, minus the U.S., China and Russia, would be unrealizable. To recall, President Trump’s walking out of the JCPOA in 2018 had already seen Iran rescind compliance with its agreed uranium enrichment limit.

The March 2025 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had estimated Iran possessing about 400 kg of uranium with 60 percent enrichment, good enough for making ten nuclear devices over a fortnight.

The Sino-Russian factor

Therefore, the responsibility of the E3's parleys with Iran would be to build momentum – not just to draw in Washington but China and Russia as well.

The E3 hopes to influence President Trump by aligning with his narratives and to eventually resume their 2013 Oslo format of P5+1 dialogue. This had last time resulted in their 2015 JCPOA that was signed by Iran and the P5 – China, France, Germany, U.K. and U.S. – plus Germany.

However, this JCPOA is due to expire on 18th October 2025.

This puts a premium on time and makes any progress equally dependent on responses from both Moscow and Beijing. As regards the E3 engaging China and Russia, they apparently appear to stick to their time-tested step-by-step approach with Iran in order to craft a boilerplate for the resumption of the U.S.-Iran talks.

But will the E3-Iran talks yield such progress as to pave the way for broader engagement that could include both the U.S., as well as Russia and China and do this in time?

China and Russia both actively support the European Union (EU) mechanisms like INSTAX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) that bypasses U.S. sanctions and preserves trade links with Iran. However, it is important to remember that while being strong advocates for restoring the original JCPOA, they also remain opposed to unilateral sanctions.

More recently, both China and Russia have condemned the military strikes of June and called for multilateral diplomacy. But, both Moscow and Beijing are likely to oppose the E3’s “snapback” on legal grounds, though their opposition might turn out to be inconsequential as the “snapback” bypasses UN vetoes.

Russia has maintained its long-running nuclear cooperation with Iran, for instance, the support in building the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Moscow has been unequivocal in supporting Iran’s right to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme. Russia also backs China’s call to lift sanctions and return to the JCPOA.

Hence, though Beijing and Moscow support multilateral diplomacy and the revival of JCPOA-style constraints, they are not likely to pressurise Iran into making concessions, while also not expected to block the E3 efforts to reapply sanctions if Iran fails to show compliance.

Resurrecting the JCPOA 2.0

Crafting a JCPOA 2.0 also hinges on several sequential milestones.

In order to make at least incremental progress, Iran will be expected to pledge to scale back on its enrichment activities and restore access to IAEA inspectors. If the E-3 could secure pledges from Iran for full verification before the end of August, this might pave the path for the resumption of the U.S.–Iran nuclear dialogue.

The next stage could be initiated with President Trump’s expected visit to Beijing in early September, to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, where he will be meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin as well as Chinese President Xi Jinping. This formidable trio could then consider reviving a formal P5+1 format.

However, this will weigh on how and whether the E3 will manage to ensure agreement and subsequent compliance of Iran halting enrichment and enabling IAEA verifications. This could convince the Trump Administration to drop certain sanctions as well, which could compel Iran to join negotiations with the P5+1.

Having advocated diplomacy and opposed unilateral sanctions, both China and Russia may feel compelled to project themselves as supportive allies, not spoilers, to the revival of negotiations at the P5+1 level. A phased revival of the JCPOA 2.0 could then become feasible, though the challenge lies in whether the E3-Iran meeting this Friday can nail down initial steps for the U.S. to re-enter talks.

But even an optimistic JCPOA 2.0 will only be a first step in addressing complicated challenges of Iran’s proxies, ballistic missiles and other regional tensions. In doing all this, no multi-party arrangements can work without synchronising with timelines. And here, time remains limited as the JCPOA expires in the next three months.

Image: The heavy-water reactor in Arak. Photo courtesy: Nanking

While the E3 remain bound by their pronouncements of an August deadline to initiate “snapback” sanctions on Iran, President Trump seems to be in no hurry, driven by the belief that he has ‘obliterated’ Iranian nuclear facilities.

A battered Iran also needs to assuage its internal constituencies. Maintaining his consistent belligerent posture, the Supreme Leader Khamenei has rejected full suspension of enrichment and, in the process, ceding its sovereignty over their nuclear program.

On the eve of the talks with the E-3, Iran’s nuclear negotiator, Kazem Gharibabadi, had reiterated a hardline stand that Iran was “more determined” than before the war to maintain its right to enrich domestically and that Tehran would not accept proposal for a regional consortium of enrichment outside of Iran, as proposed by the Trump Administration.

Emphasising that Iran does not trust the U.S. to resume any kind of direct negotiations, Gharibaabdi confirmed on the eve of E3-Iran talks that there is no formal Iranian assessment of the impact of U.S. strikes on the nuclear facilities. This contrasted with the assertion by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Fox News that the strikes had “seriously damaged” the facilities.

Time is ticking…

In sum, the Istanbul talks this Friday mark a crucial first step not just for Europe and Iran, but for the potential P5+1 talks that remain a prerequisite for the restoration of a workable JCPOA 2.0. With the clock ticking, signs of trust and reciprocity will determine whether this modest beginning can scale into full-scale nuclear diplomacy.

Image: Signatures in the JCPOA of 2015

At the least, this resumption of E3-Iran talks marks a significant first step for wider negotiations for JCPOA 2.0. Initiation of these talks also reflects a unified European undercurrent for building trust, technical agreements leading finally to wider P5+1 negotiations with Iran. However, their inability to get the U.S., China and Russia into the fold could slide it into an irreversible precipice.

Any continuing ambiguity may trigger Israel’s aggressive intervention once more, and Iran’s security reflexes could also trigger renewed military flare?ups, thus undercutting diplomatic options.