Wars and conflict have marked the years since the pandemic of 2020-21. Like most great powers, it was a hectic year for Indian diplomacy as well. Besides reinforcing its prominent role in world affairs through its sustained outreach to other powers, actors in conflict zones and at multilateral forums, India had its own challenges to deal with in 2024, be it on the Khalistan issue with Canada and the US or the border dispute with China. As New Delhi negotiates through these challenges and capitalize on opportunities, it has now espoused its role as a “Viswamitra” which not just signals its advancement to multi-alignment but also its perceived status as an independent centre of global politics.
India was too busy in 2023 handling its foreign affairs, especially because of its presidency of the G20 and the hard work done by the Government of India to showcase India’s profile to the rest of the world.
As we entered 2024, the presidency was a thing of the past. It was the time to stabilize India’s gains in the international marketplace and leverage its new leadership role to ensure that the understanding reached in Delhi and the gains during the G20 summit were not a one-time affair.
The successful summit created the imperative to advance India’s expanding role in global affairs, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
It was not easy to stabilize India’s gains in global trade and the international economy. The global political economy, already suffering from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, reeled under the negative fallout of the continuing war in Ukraine and the conflict in West Asia even spilling over into the sea lanes of communication.
Meanwhile, the geopolitical tensions between Russia and the United States, and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies intensified during the latter half of the year. The Biden administration’s green-lighting of Ukraine’s use of US-supplied long-range missiles against Russia had already escalated the conflict with Moscow retaliating with its new hypersonic platforms.
As the conflict aggravates with drone strikes and targeted attacks, including against individuals and entities, the deployment of North Korean troops by Russia, along with China’s tacit support to Moscow, has also expanded the political nature of the Ukraine war with the potential for wider implications for the global economy.
The Israeli war against HAMAS in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and the shadow war with Iran did not make the peaceful ambience for the global economy to normalize.
The Indian economy certainly bore the opportunity cost of the two wars. However, the deft diplomacy by South Block secured the country’s energy interests by buying Russian oil in the face of stiff political resistance by the Western powers. New Delhi also departed from its long-held positions in West Asia by supporting Israel in its war against the ‘terror networks’ while maintaining cordial ties with the Arab countries and Iran.
India called for dialogue and diplomacy to end the wars in Europe and West Asia, while standing neutral in the war zone.
‘Vismamitra’ as the new Indian grand strategy
What did it signify? It indicated that India had no interest in getting entangled in other countries’ wars. It would seek to maintain friendly ties with all countries based on its new concept of “Viswamitra” or the friend of the world, which implies India’s ability to not just remain non-aligned and non-partisan but also with the potential to arbitrate for global peace and stability.
This concept is more positive in connotation than the traditional doctrine of non-alignment. It is this concept that justified oil and even defence equipment purchases from Russia while sustaining strategic partnerships with the United States and European powers, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Britain.
India also continued its strategic partnership with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other West Asian countries all at the same time. India had unequivocally condemned the terror attacks by HAMAS and Houthis while championing the two-state formula for the establishment of an independent state of Palestine.
Nonetheless, India’s ‘strategic autonomy’ has been under severe test through 2024. The benefit of the doctrine of strategic autonomy was prominently on display during India’s G20 presidency in 2023. The Indian government had successfully facilitated the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration at the Summit despite wild differences among G20 members on Ukraine and the tactful decision of Chinese President Xi Jinping to remain absent during the summit.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s diplomatic skills and leadership charm were also exhibited in the G20’s unanimous acceptance of his proposal to make the African Union a full member of the grouping.
Despite the grand success of the G20 summit, it cannot be said that the strategic autonomy had no cost.
The reason why the Biden Administration did little to derail the strategic partnership with India lies elsewhere. He did not want to push India in a direction where Russia, China and India would robustly band together against the United States. Amid an economic Cold War with China, the Biden Presidency could not afford to have lost India! Thus, it was not the rationale of India’s justifications that convinced President Biden of India’s right to buy Russian oil.
The US Administration’s frustration with India was mirrored in other spaces.
One was the political backing President Biden gave to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in the latter’s vilification campaign against the Government of India. Instead of supporting India in its fight against terrorism and criticizing the Trudeau Government for its soft attitude towards Khalistani extremists, President Biden sought to corner India by giving credence to Trudeau’s unproven allegations of the Indian government’s hand in the killing of a declared terrorist.
More whacky was the US State Department’s position on another Khalistani extremist operating from American soil and openly threatening India, including Indian diplomats. Still more bizarre was the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) issuing its version of violations of religious freedom in India seeking to tarnish India’s image by highlighting half-truths and using one-sided facts.
The Indian government’s response to all those provocations, nonetheless, has been guarded and measured.
Despite Western disappointments and criticisms, New Delhi preserved its strategic partnership with Russia. India’s trade with Russia rose to the tune of about USD 66 billion, and the governments of the two countries set a target of USD 100 billion for bilateral trade by 2030.
In the face of American sanctions, India did not hesitate to enhance its economic ties with Russia. However, the Indian government repeatedly stayed away from endorsing the Russian military adventures into Ukraine. Prime Minister Modi frequently exhorted that it was not a time of war even stating that to President Vladimir Putin during the former’s visit to Moscow.
Modi also made it a point to visit Ukraine in the middle of the war while the Ministry of External Affairs hosted the Ukrainian foreign minister in New Delhi giving rise to speculations that the Modi Government might be trying to promote reconciliation.
India’s ongoing strategic relations with Russia are based on practical considerations. It would not have been in India’s interests to condemn the Russian aggression and make common cause with the United States over the Ukraine war when the Russian President visited Beijing before the war and established a “limitless” partnership with China.
This happened close on the heels of the Galwan Valley clash between the Indian and the Chinese armies. Indian policymakers were also aware of the Russian vexations over the shrinking arms bazaar in India for Russian defence items and the rising share of the Western countries.
It has indeed been a difficult rope walking for India to balance India’s ties with Russia and the United States when their geopolitical differences have been worsening since February 2022. Yet, the success of India’s balanced approach is undoubtedly reflected in the fact that both Washington and Moscow desire to keep India on their side.
The situation today, for that matter, is starkly in contrast with the Cold War years when India had to strategically move closer towards the former Soviet Union with the successive American administrations erecting structures to limit India’s military power and technological abilities. During those years, most of the influential Asian and European countries also maintained strategic distance from India while maintaining ostensible economic and cultural ties.
India's emergence as the new power pole
However, today, India’s relations with most of the great and middle powers – be it France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain, Japan, South Korea or Australia – are not victim to the new Cold War unfolding in Europe or amid the China-US economic competition threatening peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
India’s participation in the Quad summit in the US, the BRICS summit in Russia, the G20 meeting in Brazil and the SCO summit in Islamabad is a signpost of India’s goal to be one of the power centres in the global distribution of power and influence.
India has moved from non-alignment to multi-alignment to “Viswamitra” and is now signalling its new status as an independent centre of global politics.
In coordination with all like-minded countries, India is seeking to shape the world order based on values of national sovereignty, multilateralism, rule of law, equitability, opposition to war and support for diplomacy. In all the international forums that India participated in 2024, it called for institutional reforms, a globalisation process that is sensitive to the Global South, inclusive steps to combat climate change and all-out efforts to tackle energy insufficiency and natural disasters.
As the world enters 2025, the challenges of yesteryears will not disappear as the new leadership in Washington will require policy adjustments and the slowdown in the global political economy will raise additional constraints.
India will have to provide its knowledge, experience and leadership to discover the opportunities among challenges and make innovations to promote international peace.
2025 will thus be a year of hectic action and outreach for Indian diplomacy through which New Delhi could pursue the vital elements of its new grand strategy – “Viswamitra” – in order to carve out its distinctive and influential position in the global order.
(The views expressed in the article are the author's own.)
