On 6 October 2024, the Kerala Government removed an Indian Police Service (IPS) officer, Ajith Kumar M.R., serving as Additional Director General of Police (ADGP), from the charge of law and order in the state. Another senior IPS officer was instead appointed the ADGP in charge of law and order while Ajith Kumar was moved as head of ‘Battalion’, which, incidentally, he was already in charge of. 

Ajith Kumar’s removal as ADGP in charge of law and order came after weeks of controversy in the state’s politics over multiple allegations of what the state’s Director General of Police (DGP), Sheik Darvesh Saheb IPS, described in his inquiry report as “grave shortcomings in the official conduct of the ADGP” on a host of issues.

The spotlight fell on the ADGP after rebel MLA of the ruling front, P.V. Anvar, made a host of allegations including his role or connivance in the gold smuggling rackets allegedly operating in the state, his suspected role in the sabotage of the traditional fireworks at the Thrissur Pooram festival right amid the Lok Sabha election campaign, and, most significantly, his meeting with RSS leaders, which the opposition alleged was as a go-between the Sangh leaders and the ruling CPM in the state.  

While Anvar’s allegations were dismissed by Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan and senior CPM leaders as a political conspiracy, the Kerala leaders of the Communist Party of India (CPI), a leading constituent of the ruling Left Democratic Front (LDF), consistently applied pressure for an inquiry against Kumar and his ouster from key positions. Besides the allegations listed by Anwar, the DGP reportedly also placed suspicions on the actions of the ADGP in the investigation of the murder of a suspect in the gold smuggling racket. 

Despite what was seen as such serious allegations against a senior IPS officer, the action by the Kerala government – confined to mere changing of departmental roles instead of harsher disciplinary actions or initiating criminal proceedings – came as a surprise to many, including voices in the media, which saw it as a ‘light’ punishment or ‘kid glove treatment’.  

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In the first week of August 2019, a journalist was crushed to death when a 33-year-old IAS officer, Sriram Venkataraman, crashed his car into a wall late night in the heart of Thiruvananthapuram city with the former and his bike sandwiched between the car and the wall.

While eyewitnesses stated that the car was overspeeding and the driver was drunk, the IAS officer was not arrested until later the next day. As a result, the alcohol content in the IAS officer’s blood at the time of the accident could not be ascertained. Amid much uproar by the local media, Venkataraman was ‘arrested’ and presented before the court.

However, despite the widespread anticipation, the young IAS officer did not spend a single day in police custody, as he was moved to the Thiruvananthapuram Medical College hospital for ‘treatment’ and given bail the very next day. Besides Indian Penal Code Section 279 for rash driving, the police only charged Section 304 – culpable homicide not amounting to murder – even though the IAS officer was drunk at the time of the accident and also that the victim died as a result of his reckless action.

Through the events running up to his arrest and subsequent bail, there was speculation of intense efforts from the IAS lobby to pressure the state government to ‘save’ the young IAS officer. Subsequent actions confirmed this concerted move by the ‘system’ to either exonerate or lessen the quantum of punitive action against Venkataraman. Accordingly, in October 2022, the Additional Sessions Court in Thiruvananthapuram dropped charges of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and instead changed the charge to Section 304a (death by negligence). It took another year of strenuous legal fight by the victim's family for the Kerala High Court to set aside the Sessions Court’s order.

While the legal proceedings are going on in this matter, Venkataraman returned to active duty by being appointed as Survey Director in 2019, posted as Alappuzha District Collector in 2022, and later reportedly moved to Kerala Civil Supplies Corporation as its General Manager. Last known, Sriram Venkataraman is joint secretary for resources in the finance department with additional charge as Managing Director of Kerala Finance Corporation (KFC).

The notable aspect is that despite the death of a person due to drunken driving and ongoing court proceedings under Section 304, the career trajectory of the IAS officer continues to advance without any interruption.

A question then becomes inevitable to be asked: will such privileges and immunity be available for an ordinary citizen or even another public servant if he or she is prosecuted for a similar criminality that cost a life?

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In the previous decade, an IAS officer who was serving as Additional Secretary in the Government of India and was in a prominent posting in Delhi at the time of his retirement, was in the race to head a financial watchdog, as a post-retirement posting. However, it was rumoured that this officer was moved out of the shortlist following objections from the Intelligence Bureau (IB) reportedly on allegations of corruption and bribery involving a major defence deal while serving as a joint secretary in the Ministry of Defence.

The Polity could not independently confirm the veracity of this story; however, it remains a fact that the IAS officer in question, despite being among the reported front-runners for this posting, was eased out of the race and not considered for any of the post-retirement appointments. The government eventually settled for a one-year extension to the incumbent chief, particularly after another reported front-runner, a public sector bank chief, publicly opted out of the race.

Only the relevant files of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) pertaining to this appointment will be able to provide factual insight into this episode. However, seeking these files will be a futile exercise as the Cabinet Secretariat no longer provides copies of ACC files in response to RTI applications, citing a stay by the Delhi High Court. 

The question then remains moot if the rumours were indeed true about these corruption allegations and there was indeed an adverse IB report on this officer, why then were no investigations launched based on this presumed report and the public informed about its outcome? Furthermore, there were no indications in the public domain of any enquiry undertaken into any ‘disproportionate assets’ possibly amassed by this officer or any other public official supposedly involved in that alleged corruption in the said defence deal.

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During the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government years, an espionage scandal emerging out of a cyber cooperation initiative with a foreign nation, which was also a key strategic partner, was reported by sections of the national media. A few officers employed in a national security organization that coordinated the Indian side of this initiative, including some armed forces personnel on deputation, were arrested and jailed for a considerable period. While there was considerable debate on the ‘innocence’ of the jailed employees, at one point, it was also inferred that the scandal could have been a fallout between two intelligence agencies.

Nonetheless, despite the arrest of junior ranked officers, there was no substantive action reported against any of the senior officers at this national security organization who were handling leadership roles in this cyber cooperation project. It was speculated that some senior officers were moved out of the organization, including the Joint Secretary supervising the project, who, though, returned to head the same organisation some years later.

When discussing this episode with one of The Polity editors in the 2008-09 period, some journalists of a news agency quipped thus: “In India, babus are kicked up or down, but not out!”

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Many scams gripped the UPA government in its second term from 2009-2014. A journalist of a national daily, not known for wide circulation, was credited with breaking the story on one of these scams. While this journalist received many awards for this story, he had then narrated the story behind this ‘scoop’ to one of The Polity editors.

The journalist received a call in his office, with the anonymous caller stating that a packet awaits him at the reception of a prominent hotel in Janpath, New Delhi and that he should check it out. On receiving the packet at the hotel reception, the journalist was stunned to see a complete compendium of highly sensitive and confidential documents that revealed the story of what was reported as one of the major scams of the UPA era.

If this story is credible, it could be reasonably assumed that the documents could have been provided as a compendium by or with the connivance or knowledge of senior officials in the concerned ministry who were powerful enough for even the hotel to not reveal the source of the packet or potentially these same sources figuring in any of the subsequent investigations.

The journalist had turned down The Polity’s request some months ago to be a guest in our The Long Conversation series to share his reporting experience of this scam, stating that the matter is still sub judice.

When The Polity enquired about this matter with some journalists and officials of that era, the dominant opinion was that a section of the bureaucracy was annoyed with the Administrative Reforms Commission constituted by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The recommendations of this Commission, they feared, would lead to the disintegration of the bureaucracy in its present form and end their dominance over the country’s governance apparatus. Consequently, some of them attributed the consistent exposing of scams and corruption episodes of the UPA era by the media to the resentment within the bureaucracy against these reforms.

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The Income Tax Department taped the conversations of Niira Radia, a political lobbyist and public relations honcho, during the 2008-09 period, for over 300 days, which led to investigations over the alleged 2G scam. While the conversations were reportedly taped with approval from the Home Ministry, the contents of these recordings were leaked to the press by some officials in the IT department.

There have been no subsequent reports of any investigations followed by any departmental or legal action against the officials who leaked these conversations, particularly since the court had acquitted all accused in the alleged 2G scam. It is highly unlikely that leaks of such sensitive records with intense political implications could have happened without the knowledge, connivance or direct involvement of higher echelons of the IT department, largely manned by Indian Revenue Service (IRS) officers.

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The indictment of Vikas Yadav, supposedly an employee of the Research and Analyses Wing (RAW), by the US Department of Justice over alleged attempts to assassinate a prominent Khalistan separatist leader in the US has hogged headlines in recent days. The incident coincided with similar allegations by the Canadian government against who they termed were “Indian government agents” having orchestrated the killing of another Khalistan separatist leader in Canada around the same time. 

Subsequently, the Canadian government accused officials in the Indian High Commission in Ottawa of ‘criminal’ and ‘clandestine’ activities related to the actions against Sikh ‘dissidents’ who were Canadian citizens. While this prompted New Delhi to recall its envoy in Ottawa, both countries indulged in tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats from each other’s missions. On the other hand, Washington sounded a warning against similar actions on American soil even as a US court issued a summons to the Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) and the FBI issued a lookout notice against Yadav.

The discerning aspect of these episodes is the differential treatment given to the RAW field officer and the diplomats. While the Indian High Commissioner, who could be a Special Secretary ranked Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officer, was recalled by the Indian government and defended throughout the Canadian onslaught, the RAW officer, who was reportedly a CRPF Assistant Commandant on deputation to the external intelligence agency as a Senior Field Officer (SFO), was summarily disowned and portrayed in the media as a person involved in criminal activities.   

The alleged assassination attempt against the separatist leader based in the US cannot, by any reasonable standards, be seen as Yadav’s personal mission to keep his organization in the dark. It was evidently a mission planned and designed by his seniors in RAW with the decision chain of command running all the way up intelligence and national security bosses, including the NSA.

When the political leadership had decided to publicly proclaim plausible deniability over the mission, why has only a lower-level official been sacrificed? Are the higher-level officers in the intelligence set-up – from the Group A ranks and above – insulated from such measures? Put differently, are only the subaltern officials seen as dispensable in the Indian administrative apparatus?  

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In recent months, a notable number of lower-level officials of Delhi Police were arrested on bribery charges as well as some GST officials over scams pertaining to tax collections.

Such instances also beg the question of whether the vigilance and anti-corruption bodies have also ascertained if the spoils of any bribery episodes have also moved higher up the hierarchy and whether senior officers have amassed a disproportionate amount of assets and wealth. The question then becomes moot whether these agencies have sufficient intelligence mechanisms to track and monitor the higher echelons of the bureaucracy and whether such corruption mitigation can function effectively against the bureaucratic elite in the country if there is a culture of insulating them from punitive actions.

Evidently, unlike the perceived efficacy or proactive implementation of vigilance and anti-corruption measures at the lower levels of the administrative system, the same alacrity and commitment might not be visible in tackling the corruption culture and abuse of authority at the higher levels of the bureaucracy, particularly in tracing disproportionate assets or their latent as well as patent roles in perpetuating corruption.

Whether this is a result of the tardiness of the concerned agencies to pursue credible anti-corruption actions at the higher levels of the officialdom or whether this is because the top bureaucracy operates as the ‘deep state’ in India and has always managed to safeguard its interests, remains an enigma.

Is the bureaucracy insulated from punitive actions?

Are the higher echelons of India’s bureaucracy – particularly the officers of the All India Civil Services cadre including the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS), Indian Foreign Service (IFS), Indian Revenue Service (IRS), Indian Forest Service (IFS), and so on – insulated from criminal proceedings, disciplinary actions and could operate with impunity despite acts of indiscretion, corruption or abuse of authority? Has India’s justice system and vigilance apparatus set a higher tolerance benchmark for their indiscretions, misuse of office or corruption, and does the law operate differently for this privileged class?

The Polity attempted to dig deeper and filed a handful of Right to Information (RTI) applications to know what the government thinks about these questions.

Before going into the responses received on these applications, it is important to highlight the approach that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has espoused after first coming to office in 2014. Riding on his radical approach towards policy matters, the Modi government had declared that ‘dead wood’ or non-performing officials would be removed from the higher echelons of the bureaucracy after a detailed assessment of performance.

It was reported in July 2017 that over 357 bureaucrats, including 24 IAS officers, were ‘punished’ over ‘performance’ issues, driven by the mantra – ‘perform or perish’. However, actual dismissal or compulsory retirement from service in this case included only 37 Group A officers, including from the IAS.

While it is evident that ‘non-performance’ or failing the benchmarks of ‘performance’ set by the government could have been behind the action reported in July 2017, there is nothing to suggest that this campaign included actions against bureaucrats involved in corruption, abuse of office or other violations of grave nature.

Nonetheless, the Prime Minister’s Grievance Portal where citizens can register complaints against various departments as well as government officials, including chief ministers and state government officials, has promising categorisations that cover the Group A officers.

For example, under the Department of Personnel and Training (DoP&T) section, there is a category devoted to ‘Allegation of corruption/misconduct’, under which there are sub-categories including Against Central Government Officials, Against IAS Officers, Against Chief Ministers and Ministers of State Government, Against CIC, and so on. Similarly, under the category of ‘Vigilance/Disciplinary Matters’, the sub-categories include, among others, Disciplinary cases of IAS officers on central deputation, Vigilance clearance of IAS officers, Vigilance matters pending before the ministries/departments, Vigilance Matters pertaining to Group A, B, C officials in CBI, Vigilance Matters of CVC, and many more.

When read with the action reported in July 2017, such an expensive net of vigilance and disciplinary execution framework will fuel confidence among the citizenry that a robust system is in place to address corruption, misuse of office or major violations in the higher bureaucracy.

Accordingly, to examine the efficacy of this mechanism and the results it has produced, The Polity, filed a RTI application with the DoP&T in August 2024.

What the DoP&T said…

The Polity’s RTI application of 19 August 2024 sought the following information from the DoP&T:

-        How many officers of the civil services cadres, namely IAS, IPS, IFS, IES, IRS, IIS and IFS (Forest Service have been prosecuted and/or convicted by the courts in India between 2000 to 2023?

-        How many retired officers of the above-mentioned civil services cadres who were appointed on re-employment in various government organisations and autonomous bodies, were prosecuted and/or convicted by the courts during the above-mentioned period? 

In its initial response, the DoP&T informed that the sought information pertains to various ministries and has been forwarded to multiple public authorities.

However, in the first reply of 30.08.2024 that came from a CPIO of DoP&T, it was claimed that the sought information was “not available in material form.” On closer look, it turned out that the CPIO who replied was in charge of CCS rules and claimed the questions were not about his jurisdiction.

The Polity immediately filed the first appeal stating that its RTI application was done through the online system in which the choice of the CPIO does not rest with the applicant. The appeal also challenged the assertion that information on prosecution/conviction of IAS officials is not in material form. Such a claim raises questions on how the vigilance clearance of IAS officials considered for promotions and senior secretary-level appointments, which is also prominently categorized in the PM’s grievance portal, is being undertaken if the DoP&T as the cadre controlling authority, particularly of the IAS, does not have this crucial information in material form – which also implies its absence in records or documentation.

The Appellate Authority refused to consider the points raised by The Polity and disposed of the appeal claiming that the “CPIO has replied as per the spirit of the Act.”

The remarkable aspect of the DoP&T’s response was that despite this department having over 76 CPIOs in its rolls, including those directly in charge of cadre-related matters, The Polity’s RTI application was, for unknown reasons or deliberately, not placed before the relevant CPIOs but diverted to CPIOs in charge of other matters and allowing them to dispose of the RTI application stating that the sought information was not of their jurisdiction.

Having raised how RTI applications are being diverted to CPIOs with non-relevant jurisdictions, The Polity received four more replies from the DoP&T – incidentally, one set on dated three consecutive days – 10, 11 and 12th September, and the fourth dated 20th September 2024. Two of them were from the same CPIO – Under Secretary Manoj Gupta, who provided the same content in both replies – that “the information sought does not pertain to the work dealt with the undersigned CPIO,’ and that “the RTI application has already been forwarded to other Public Administration & CPIO.”

The third reply, dated 12th September, was from CPIO and Under Secretary, Rupesh Kumar, who replied: “This CPIO is handling complaints and vigilance matters pertaining to Administrative Vigilance Division-I in respect of IAS officers. The information sought doesn’t pertain to this section and in this regard may be treated as ‘nil’.

The fourth reply, from Under Secretary Subodh Verma, was more detailed despite coming to the same conclusion. Verma informs that he “deals with proposals seeking Sanction for Prosecution against IAS officers as submitted by Central Bureau of Investigation/State Government/Central Ministry/Department under Government of India, under the Cr.P.C. and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 only. The information desired by you is not available with the undersigned CPIO as it does not fall in the purview of this Section.”

The replies from Under Secretaries Subodh Verma, Rupesh Verma and Manoj Gupta, who handle Sanction for Prosecution against IAS officers, vigilance matters and disciplinary cases of IAS officers, respectively, come as startling as even crucial divisions dealing with prosecution, vigilance, disciplinary actions claim to have no information regarding the number of IAS officers prosecuted and/or convicted during the past two decades. Besides revealing a significant information gap, assuming the replies were not deceptive and underlined reluctance to reveal such crucial information, the absence of such crucial and sensitive information shows the lack of credibility and robustness of the vigilance clearance process of IAS officers, when considered for promotion or secretary-level appointments.

What the other ministries said…

In fact, the replies from other ministries also did not evoke much confidence.

The CPIO from the Ministry of Finance, Under Secretary Balwant Parixit Pandey replied dated 26 September 2024 thus: “… it is informed that the information sought does not fall under the purview of Section 2(f) of the RTI Act. The point raised by you is vague and CPIO is not supposed to interpret/clarify/deduct information with respect to queries/clarifications. Further, interrogative queries viz why/how/when/what do not come under the RTI act."

Section 2(f) of the RTI Act states thus:

"Information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force.”

While it is unclear what aspect of this section has Pandey cited in order to deny the sought information, it is amusing to see him stating that “why/how/when and what” do not come under the RTI Act. Only the CPIO will be able to advise on how else to ask questions!

The Ministry of Home Affairs, for its part, refused to provide information to the RTI reply stating that “in terms of ‘Preamble’ of the RTI Act, only a ‘citizen’ is empowered to seek information under the Act.”

While it is clear in the Preamble states the RTI Act is a “practical regime of right to information for citizens,” at no place in the Preamble has this been mentioned as a conditionality nor is there any reference that any other entity within the country or owned/operated by Indian citizens cannot be provided the sought information as per the Act.

At the time of preparing this report, no reply has been received from the Ministry of External Affairs. 

Similarly, the CPIO of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting also stated that “no such information is available/maintained with the undersigned CPIO.”

The only seemingly progressive response from the ministries was from the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, with CPIO handling vigilance replying on 27th September 2024 that “Sanction for prosecution (has been) issued against total four (4) officers from 01.01.2020 to 23.12.2023.”

What the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) said…   

Following on the RTI filed with the DoP&T, The Polity also filed an RTI application with the CVC, dated 13.09.2024, seeking information on the complaints received against officers of the All India Civil Services as well as retired officers of these cadres on re-employment, and subsequent action taken on these complaints and investigations, since the time of the CVC Act 2003. 

While denying some information about PIDPI (disclosures/information from whistle-blowers), the CVC provided a list of numbers of the complaints received and action taken but only pertaining to a very limited window of 7 months (1.1.2024 to 31.07.2024), instead of the twenty years sought by The Polity’s RTI application.

Interestingly, even such a small period showed the quantum of complaints, which came to 1422. However, 896 were filed and 365 involving non-vigilance cases were forwarded to departments for necessary actions, while only 161 were taken up for inquiry by the CVO or CBI.

Considering that this is a huge number even for a 7-month period, it will be worthwhile to know the quantum of complaints and actions taken against bureaucrats over the twenty years of the CVC’s functioning, following the promulgation of the Act.  

Is such vital information being deliberately concealed?

The claim by the DoP&T CPIOs and various other ministries that information on prosecution and/or conviction of officers of the All India Civil Services though coming as a startling revelation, The Polity looked up to see how this aspect has been dealt with in previous years.

As per a reply given to the Rajya Sabha in January 2018, around 36 disciplinary proceedings were in progress against IAS officers then. The reply was to the specific question of how many IAS officers were facing disciplinary proceedings and investigations. However, to the question of how many FIRs have been registered and chargesheets filed after the investigation, the government then too claimed that “the information is not maintained centrally.”

Considering that this question was raised in 2018 and that RTI replies even in 2024 continue to maintain the absence of this data in material form raises serious questions about the state of vigilance and disciplinary frameworks in the higher bureaucratic set-up.

However, to a set of Lok Sabha questions answered on 10 March 2021, the government provided a more elaborate set of data and details. The reply shows that between 2015-2016 and 2020-21, a huge number of complaints have been received against IAS officers – ranging from 758 (highest in 2019-20) and 380 (lowest in 2015-16). Similarly, 44 cases were registered by the CBI against IAS officers during this five-year period, whereas 12 cases were registered against IPS officers.

While the reply highlights the lack of centrally maintained data on IPS officers, and IAS officers at the state level, there is no indication of the complaints received against IPS officers during this period. These data become relevant when the correlation is done with the action taken based on these complaints.

The Reply shows that despite over 3464 complaints received over a period of five years against IAS officers, prosecution sanction has been given in the five years on only 26 cases, and only two of them were dismissed from service, and most of the rest gained lesser punishments. During the same period, prosecution sanction was given against only 3 IPS officers, and only 2 dismissed from service while most others had cut in pensions, even as the quantum of complaints remained undisclosed in this reply.

No information has been provided on other relevant cadres like IRS, IFS, IES and so on.

The huge asymmetry in the number of complaints received and the action taken is a testament to the privileged position enjoyed by the Indian bureaucracy and how successive governments as well as the judicial and vigilance systems seem to have created a wall of ‘protection’ around the bureaucracy, and how they have been allowed to operate with impunity with a high level of tolerance evident on matters of corruption, abuse of office and other violations.

The 2021 data indicates that harsher punishment has applied only in rare and selective cases thus suggesting not just the long rope given to the Indian bureaucracy but how the law operates differently for this privileged class.

Is India’s bureaucracy its ‘deep state’?

The construct of ‘deep state’ is viewed through different paradigms in different societies though the common understanding is of a cabal of unelected officials deeply influencing, shaping and controlling the affairs of the state, with undue influence over the elected leadership, if in a democracy, and managing to safeguard their interests irrespective of the nature of the government or political leadership.

The question of whether the Indian bureaucracy has evolved into a ‘deep state’ or whether it is only a section of the bureaucratic-intelligence-national security elite that has formed the deep state in India is a subject for deeper exploration.