On 18th May 1974, India shook the world with a nuclear test, which it described as a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’. Coming four years after the non-proliferation treaty came into force, which India refused to accede to, and with the Chinese nuclear tests causing a pro-bomb clamour in the country, the PNE was deemed as a demonstration of a capability to develop nuclear weapons. The global reactions that followed were as intense as what we saw in 1998. On the 50th anniversary of the PNE, The Polity revisits the event through insights provided in archival and other first-hand accounts.
Images courtesy: Atomic Archive, INC, Nuclear weapon archive
“On May 18, 1974, that fateful Saturday morning when history was being made and the Earth about to shake, I went to PM’s house at about 7.30. The PM was formally dressed and looking into some papers…not attentive towards me. PM (sic) appeared to be under strain as she looked this way and that. She fixed her gaze on the telephone on her bedside table. I also looked in that direction and saw a notebook on which the “gayatri mantra” was written in long hand.”
Thus describes Dr K.P. Mathur, the personal physician of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, in the chapter “titled “Buddha’s Smile at Pokhran” in his book The Unseen Indira Gandhi: through her Physician’s Eyes on the moments before India conducted what was termed as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). The explosion happened precisely at 8.05 AM on 18th May 1974, at Pokhran, a name that got synonymous with India’s nuclear symbols thanks also to a series of tests that happened 24 years later, in May 1998.
As much as the ground in the Rajasthan desert, the rest of the world was also shaken by the Indian test, which came four years after the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force, and in a region which witnessed a handful of wars and dismemberment of a nation (along with birth of a new one) in the previous few years, and another country (China) already flaunting its nuclear prowess.
The test led to global outcry as western nations saw the PNE as a demonstration of a nuclear weapon capability even as India insisted on its ‘peaceful’ nature and fulfilling the developmental aspirations of the third world. As the world debated whether India had violated its agreement with Canada under the Colombo Plan by diverting the spent fuel from the CIRUS reactor for the PNE, Canada and the US moved to halt the ongoing nuclear cooperation with India. The action led to the stoppage of Canadian assistance in the construction of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) at Rawatbhatta, and the US putting on abeyance the supply of fuel for Tarapur nuclear plant in Mumbai.
The PNE was followed by a hectic diplomatic campaign wherein India sought to convey the ‘peaceful’ nature and intentions of its test while the western world entered into long-drawn negotiations that veered around questions on whether India had violated the CIRUS deal and whether nuclear cooperation could be restored without the risk of proliferation – implying India’s progress from latent nuclearization to active development of nuclear weapons.
It was also widely insinuated whether a ‘poor’ country like India, with innate economic difficulties, could divert its scare resources to the development of nuclear weapons, whether India has diverted its foreign aid to buttress its nuclear programme and questions on the actual ‘civilian’ or developmental benefits of nuclear explosive devices, among others.
Fifty years down the line, it may seem to India that the test was an expression of its strategic autonomy and intent to pursue its national interests free of any encumbrances. Whereas, the western world saw it as a clear demonstration of India’s capability to develop nuclear weapons. As the US delegation argued at the NPT negotiations – only a thin line divides a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purpose and for a weapon, with the defining point being the intention rather than the instrument.
As India marks the golden jubilee of this intrepid scientific endeavour, this retrospective series on the PNE explores the historicity of the 18th May 1974 event, particularly the insights provided in various archival documents.
Why the PNE?
At hindsight, the question remains moot on what India intended to achieve by undertaking the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974. For India never repeated the experiment of the device again, until 1998, nor had the country known to have publicly used the nuclear explosion technology for any civilian applications or developmental purposes. Thus, the test was more of symbolic value and sought to demonstrate to the world, probably the capability and likely intent.
According to Dr Raja Ramana, who headed the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the nodal agency under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) that designed the PNE device and spearheaded the 1974 test, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decreed that “the experiment should be carried out for the simple reason that India required such a demonstration,” when her key advisers were divided on whether to undertake the test or not.
That was in 1972, two years after the NPT entered into force, when the Indian leadership decided that such a demonstration remains an imperative, though no literature of posterity or official documents accessible to date can conclusively proclaim the reasons to go for the PNE, or what the government intended to posture through that action.
The decision to opt for PNE instead of a nuclear weapon device could have its genesis in the NPT negotiations. At the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), where the NPT drafts were being negotiated in the 1965-68 period, India had vociferously argued for PNE to be made an inherent part of peaceful applications of nuclear energy.
The Americans, on the other hand, felt that PNE was a ‘highly-sophisticated weapon’ as the “science and technology behind a nuclear explosive device were inseparable from those behind nuclear bombs.” Any non-weapon state that conducted a nuclear explosion, they argued, would be regarded by others as having acquired the basic technology for producing nuclear weapons. The US, in turn, proposed that nuclear powers could share the PNE technology for peaceful purposes to non-weapon states at affordable costs, which India rejected as an “atomic commercial super monopoly” amounting to a nuclear apartheid.
In the late 1950s, Bhabha had talked about utilizing atomic explosions for civil engineering projects, under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The project, termed the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Program (SNEP), was supposedly sanctioned by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1985, and was assumed to be the beginning of the Indian PNE effort similar to the US Plowshare programme under which Washington undertook over 30 PNEs since its launch in 1958.
In January 1965, US Presidential science adviser Jerome Wiesner, after visiting Bhabha, had reported his interest in the Plowshare to Under Secretary of State George Ball, and suggested that the Indian decision against developing nuclear weapons must be supported by gains in peaceful nuclear technology. There were also reports that the US had supplied a small amount of plutonium for research purposes to India in December 1966. Even Vikram Sarabhai, who succeeded Bhabha as AEC Chairman had demanded the right to undertake PNEs.
However, it was not under November 1972 that the Indian government made a formal endorsement of the programme when PM Indira Gandhi told the Parliament that the “Atomic Energy Commission is constantly reviewing progress in the technology of underground nuclear explosion both from theoretical and experimental angles, and assessing its economic value.” Similarly, nine months before the 1974 test, minister in charge of atomic energy, K.C. Pant, confirmed to the Parliament that studies are being done on this technology. He stated that “we have to identify the broad applications which are viable from our point of view,” and that “the technology is in part conditioned by the allotment application.” The emphasis in both statements was of the experiments and economic applications of the technology, thus trying to project that India will be using this technology purely for peaceful purposes.
Why then did Mrs Gandhi decree, as mentioned by Ramana, on the need for a demonstration and what could have been its purpose?
Through the May 1974 test, the Indira Gandhi government, thus, could have sought to posture to the international community that it was in a position to develop nuclear weapons but did not have the intent to do so. It will be, therefore, insightful to understand how India presented the PNE to the world (as seen in Indian archival documents).
The proclamation and aftermath
(Most of the insights provided below are based on the archival records in the National Archives of India, Nehru Memorial Library and Museum, now the PMML, US foreign policy archives and some documents from Wikileaks.)
The first official announcement of the peaceful nuclear explosion was a brief press note issued by the Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India on 18th May 1974. It stated:
“The Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India announced today that it carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment using an implosion device. The explosion was carried out at a depth of more than 100 meters. As part of the programme of study of peaceful uses of nuclear explosion the Government of India had undertaken a programme to keep itself abreast of developments in this technology, particularly with reference to its use in the field of mining and earthmoving operations. The Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India, also stated that India had no intention of producing nuclear weapons and reiterated its strong opposition to military uses of nuclear explosions”
A day later, the Foreign Secretary, Kewal Singh, and Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), V.C. Trivedi (who led the Indian delegation for the major part of NPT negotiations at ENDC) met the envoys of USA, USSR, UK, France and Canada – countries with whom India had nuclear cooperation agreements – to assure them that the nuclear test was for peaceful purposes and that India had no intention to produce nuclear weapons.
On the same day (19th May), the MEA sent out a telegram to its 95 Heads of Missions/Posts abroad as a follow-up to the telex of the previous day informing them about the PNE. The key instruction to envoys was that they have to convey to their respective host foreign offices that “India has no intention of producing nuclear weapons and continue to be opposed to military uses of nuclear energy.”
The note emphasizes that the experiment is in conformity with India’s declared policy and objectives and does not in any way affect the intention not to produce nuclear weapons. It warns that the reaction in some quarters may be critical and that there would be mention of India becoming the sixth nuclear power, which could set an example to other countries. The note affirms that this is not a proper appraisal and India considers all nations developing uses of nuclear energy as nuclear powers.
This description – of the sixth nuclear power – interestingly, was not used until then by India or other parties in the ENDC or UN debates. The note attempts a differentiation with nuclear ‘weapon’ powers, and insists that India does not want to become the latter even as “we advocate fullest development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”
The envoys are, hence, advised to ensure that a correct appreciation of the experiment as for peaceful purpose should be conveyed, ‘as unobtrusively as possible’, in the respective countries. Further, the envoys are strictly forbidden from giving any press conferences as such interactions were scheduled in the coming days by the AEC Chairman, Dr Homi Sethna, as well as by the Prime Minister, the note added.
Sethna’s press conference on the next day (20th May) was supposed to be the first outreach to share technical details about the test. Though an official release/record of the press meet was not filed in any related archival documents, the US Embassy in India had prepared a report based on Sethna’s press interaction. It said that Sethna talked about AEC considering the possibility of more underground nuclear explosions “if more data is required.”
Notwithstanding the alarm such a statement could generate, Sethna’s attempt was to portray the test as a civilian-scientific imperative. Asserting that one of the objectives of the test was to study whether it was possible to stimulate oil and gas in depleted or low yielding fields, Sethna, though, insisted he cannot elaborate on the ‘uses’ until six months when the data is processed. Sethna pointed to the US Plowshare techniques using gas buggy and the Soviet efforts on simulation of oil fields using nuclear explosives. To drive home the point about India’s PNE ‘intentions’, Sethna said simulation of oil and gas by nuclear explosion was cheaper than by conventional methods.
When queried whether more tests are in the offing, Sethna remarked: “such experiments were not performed for fun or to satisfy one’s ego,” and that India will go ahead if it could be of some use in the existing conditions while also maintaining that “our nuclear activity has been peaceful and will continue to remain so.” In the same vein, Sethna dismissed as ‘hypothetical’ a question whether Indian scientists can make nuclear weapons if the government gives the green signal. Further, he insisted that the date, time and place for the experiments were of his choice and not of the Indian government.
These assertions were seemingly to understate the political objectives behind the test and also portray it as an innocuous scientific activity without any strategic motives. Sethna also asks the press corps to avoid gloating over the PNE or exaggerating its meaning beyond the original one, which, he stated, was “as an experiment to study the cratering effect.”
Interestingly, the first public statement from a ministerial functionary in the government came on the third day after the test, the 21st May, when the Press Information Bureau issued a statement by the External Affairs Minister (EAM), Sardar Swaran Singh. The statement reiterated some of the already articulated facts:
“We are happy to note that the peaceful nuclear experiment which took place on May 18, 1974, represents a step forward on the road to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the welfare of our people…We have no intention of developing nuclear weapons. Indian scientists and technologists have been active in this field for two decades; and it is well-known already two atomic power plants are supplying nuclear energy into our national power grid…The experiment is important as it represents our resolve to develop indigenous resources of energy for benefit of our people through own efforts.”
But, also had some significant additions and twists: for one, it mentions about the “enthusiastic support we received in this endeavour from the countries of the developing world,” which indicated that the government received congratulatory messages (and implied support) from at least some third world and non-aligned compatriots.
The more significant tone of Singh’s statement, however, was the reference to Pakistan. Affirming that Pakistan has misconstrued the PNE and raised unfounded apprehensions, the statement underlines the primacy of the Simla Agreement to settle all differences. Rejecting Pakistan’s allegations of hegemonistic designs, Singh urges Pakistan to have a “cool reflection based on realistic and objective assessment.” The Pakistan focus intrinsically seems a result of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s initial reaction on 19th May that the test was nuclear blackmail and that it will “not be intimidated by the Indian explosion, despite the unparalleled anxiety the nation is facing.”
As global reactions, both critical and supportive, started coming-in in the days after the test, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi used the Africa Day Function held in Delhi on 25th May to reach out to the third world community and garner support.
Mrs Gandhi remarked in her speech:
“We have been taunted that a poor nation cannot afford this luxury. This same argument was advanced when we established our steel mills and machine-building plants. They were necessary for development, for it is only through acquiring higher technology that we can overcome backwardness and poverty…Is it the contention that it is all right for the rich to use nuclear energy for destruction but not right for a poor country to find out whether it can be used for construction? We have shared a great deal of our developing industrial know-how and research and training facilities with our neighbours in Asia and Africa…We shall always be willing to use our own knowledge to help our friends and neighbours.”
In fact, most of Indira Gandhi’s statements and letters sought to stir the conscience of the third world community - by projecting the PNE as a symbol of pride for the third world or constantly referring to the rich world’s taunts about a poor nation’s technological aspirations. In fact, in an early July (1974) letter to a Nairobi-based journalist, Gandhi refers to the scientists of Eastern Europe and the non-aligned and developing countries having welcomed the experiments, and so too the black people of the United States of America. The reference to Black people was, apparently, based on a letter from George W. Wilson, a Black American leader from Oakland California. In a letter of 2 June 1974 to L.K. Jha (the Indian Ambassador in Washington DC), Wilson conveys the appreciation of Black Americans on the PNE and describes it as “an achievement of the Black, Brown and Yellow people on Planet Earth.”
Gandhi contrasts such third world support with the prejudiced responses from the affluent countries, who, she termed as having a condescending attitude by deliberately planting misleading items in their press. In a letter to Narain Singh of Sunday Post in Nairobi, Kenya, dated 9 July 1974, Mrs Gandhi does not hesitate to describe the western anger as “born out of racialism, arrogance of affluence and plain ignorance,” which, she claimed, makes them to highlight the “paradoxical existence of nuclear capacity and mass poverty in our country.”
The inclination to flag the colonial and imperial imprints in the creation of the nuclear order, in fact, reverberated throughout in Indira Gandhi’s articulations. In a noting to a PMO official while discussing a letter from Marie Leadbeater of New Zealand Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Gandhi stoutly asks, “Is it Mrs. Leadbeater’s contention that UK and USA are peace-loving countries?” and instructs a strongly-worded reply.
The reply sent by the PM’s private secretary, N.K. Seshan, on June 29th questions why the Indian test has “evoked far louder and more acrimonious criticism than the continuous and more powerful tests conducted by other countries.” Seshan points out to Leadbeater that testing by the nuclear powers continued even after the PNE, and affirm that her attitude will not be “free from prejudice” if her organisation has not sought similar guarantees from the nuclear powers that it seeks from India.
Seshan asserts that India did not sign the discriminatory NPT as the attitude of allowing nuclear powers to increase stockpiles while denying others even peaceful applications does not serve the cause of peace. The letter, in fact, questions the morality of the agency (an anti-nuclear NGO) in not challenging the imbalance of the NPT, in not raising questions about testing to the weapon powers, and why acrimonious and louder criticism has been made against one country which tested once and that too with clear peaceful intentions.
A fortnight after the test, and after seeing the initial round of global responses, the MEA sent another note to all the Indian envoys, this time with a lengthy dossier that lists “India’s dedication to the policy of using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes,” “India’s firm policy not to accept any constraints on the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” and “possible uses of peaceful nuclear explosion technology,” (with description of the applications, sans reference to any specific projects or plans), etc.
The covering note describes the dossier as India’s approach to the question of peaceful nuclear explosion, and based on the “principled stand adopted by India over the years on the question of PNEs.” The note instructs the envoys to use the dossier to “counter any misinformed or malicious slant being given to the peaceful aims of our nuclear development programme.”
Thus goes the initial broad responses from the Indian government to the global reactions to the PNE. However, these assertive responses soon gave way to more reasoned and calibrated articulations, in the one-to-one negotiations as well as in the outreach by various personalities, notably the speeches by T.N. Kaul, the Indian envoy in US who succeeded L.K. Jha in the subsequent months.
(Next in the series: global reactions to the Indian PNE)
